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Abstract
Since 1988, more than 150 US military bases have been closed. As the federal,
state and/or regional governments plan for the reuse of these installations,
surrounding communities struggle to replace local jobs and revenues lost as a
result of these closures.
In this thesis, I survey the closure processes of two US Army installations closed
in 1991: Fort Ord, on the Central Coast of California; and Fort Devens, in North
Central Massachusetts. Through detailed accounts of the on-going base
redevelopment efforts, I explore the inter-governmental dynamics of the military
base reuse process. The primary purpose of this study is to get a better
understanding of the how local, regional and state interests and objectives were
balanced in the military base redevelopment process at for Fort Ord and Fort
Devens.
Specifically, I examine some of the issues that shaped the economic
development planning process at each case study site. I find the ability to
balance the needs and objectives of multi-jurisdictional government entities
critical to the success of these processes. I also find that local inter-jurisdictional
competition for limited planning and redevelopment resources, and the lack of
coordination between local and federal closure procedures most negatively
affected the economic planning efforts. Finally, one case suggests that the role
of the state government may be most effective in the reuse planning process
when it assumes financial and political responsibility for the base redevelopment
on behalf of the economically impacted communities.
In a concluding section, I consider the prospects for economic development in
low-income communities surrounding closing military bases. In one case, I find
that the needs of the most economically impacted communities may not have
been adequately addressed in the local economic planning and development
processes exhibited. However, several context-specific factors exhibited in each
case make it difficult to draw any conclusions regarding the prospects for low-
income communities in future closure situations.
Thesis Supervisor: Bernard J. Frieden
Title: Ford Professor of Urban Development
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Chapter One:
Introduction
Economic Development in the Military Base Reuse Process
Since 1988, the Department of Defense has closed more than 150
domestic military installations in three separate closure rounds carried out in
1988, 1991 and 1993. This figure represents more than one quarter of the major
bases that existed in the United States in the late 1980's (Hill and Raffel: 1993,
pg. 1). The result of significant cuts in US defense spending, military base
closures have economically impacted hundreds of defense dependent
communities throughout the county.
At first glance, the closure and reuse of military installations appear to
offer unique development opportunities for local communities as a means to
stimulate localized economic growth. Presumably, when the military moves out,
local -- or host -- communities are given access to large parcels of developable
property (complete with infrastructure improvements, buildings and facilities), as
well as access to federal planning funds with which the communities can begin to
rebuild their economies. However, these opportunities are often overshadowed
by an immediate loss of municipal revenues and jobs that were once supported
by the military neighbor.
As a result of years of military's presence, many surrounding communities
have grown to support the needs of the military and its personnel, providing
access to goods and services not available on the base. Fast food restaurants,
and liquor stores, are places of entertainment are often the drivers of these local
economies. When the military base closes, the demand for local goods and
services is reduced. Thus the loss to local businesses often leads to significant
reductions in local tax revenues and lost jobs in the host communities. Other
economic impacts to host communities may include population loss, an increase
in the number of vacant housing units, and the loss of federal subsidies provided
to the host communities for the provision of municipal services. The inability for
military dependent, or host communities to offset these losses with new sources
of revenues and jobs in the short term can make the impacts of base closure
even more distressing, and can make economic recovery more difficult.
However, the closure of a military base may also impact the economy of
the greater region. Defining the boundaries in which economic impacts from a
base closure are felt is often an arbitrary process (Kirschenbaum and Marsh:
1993, pg. 18). But these regions of impact are not always determined based
solely on the economic impacts experienced in the surrounding communities.
Sometimes these boundaries are defined geographically; and sometimes they
are defined politically, reflecting a district of political constituents, for example.
Thus, depending on the region of impact defined in each base closure situation,
the opportunities for economic development at a closing base may be viewed as
having regional or even state-wide importance. Not surprisingly, trouble arises in
the redevelopment planning process when the needs of the host communities
are different from the needs, interests or objectives of the greater region or the
state.
In this thesis, I explore the relationships and interactions between
government procedures in the military base reuse process. I provide an in-depth
look at the cases of Fort Devens, located in North Central, Massachusetts, and
Fort Ord, located in Monterey County, California. These case studies highlight
the inter-governmental dynamics of the military base reuse process. The
primary purpose of this study is to get a better understanding of the how local,
regional and state interests and objectives were balanced in the military base
redevelopment process. In order to do so, I will explore some of the specific
issues and challenges that emerged in the multi-jurisdictional economic planning
processes exhibited at each case study site. In a concluding section, I will also
consider the prospects for fiscal recovery in the low-income communities
surrounding closing military bases.
Methodology
To get a sense of the issues that affected the redevelopment processes at
each site, a chronological study of the on-going economic development planning
processes was compiled. The primary research for this study was conducted
through a series of interviews and a review of various documents including
meeting minutes, memorandums, annual reports and news articles. The majority
of the data was collected over a three month period from mid-June to mid-
September of 1994. Key players in the reuse processes were interviewed
including local, regional, and state government representatives, military
personnel, local residents and various reuse consultants. The questions asked
during the interview sessions depended upon the extent of the interviewees
involvement in, and knowledge of the respective reuse planning processes.
A total of 36 interviews provided information to support the presentations
of the two case studies in the context of the federal base reuse process. Eight
additional interviews were conducted regarding the issues surrounding the
federal base reuse process. The majority of the interviews were conducted in
person; however, for logistical reasons several had to be conducted over the
phone. Finally, information was collected at a conference on military base reuse
in California and at a short-course at MIT entitled Military Base Redevelopment.
Information from these sources was used to support both the case study
documentation and the findings presented.
In addition to data gathering, the purpose of my visits to Fort Ord and Fort
Devens was to get a sense of the overall planning environment. For instance, at
Fort Devens, I attended a number of public hearings and planning workshops in
which I experienced first hand the nature of the inter-jurisdictional relationships
between members of the local communities, the representative state agency and
the Army. At Fort Ord, I was able to get a better feel for the vastness and the
beauty of the 28,000 acre military property, as well as a behind the scenes look
at the dynamics of the locally driven planning process.
The bases were selected for study on the basis that they met the following
general criteria:
e Locational characteristics: suburban, semi-rural settings relatively
dependent on income derived from the military base;
* Similar socio-economic dynamics: surrounding region reflective of both
the low-income and wealthy communities;
e Project area size: at both bases, the developable property available
for local economic redevelopment is approximately 2,600 acres, plus
additional areas for public and institutional users;
* Multi-jurisdictional property rights and interests: physical jurisdiction on
the base is shared by more than one community;
* Because different service branches follow different reuse processes, I
chose two closure processes overseen by the Department of the
Army;
* Significant completion of economic planning process, at the time of the
study.
Additional characteristics of the two closure cases set the stage for the
discussion to follow. First, each base has been designated as a Superfund site
under federal environmental regulations. As such, I was able to observe the
interaction of numerous federal, state and local cleanup processes required at
each case study site. Second, both cases are located in "home rule" states, in
which matters of local economic development practice and policy are traditionally
handled locally. This gave me a political benchmark from which to compare the
cases. And finally, because both cases were chosen as "model bases" by the
Department of Defense, information regarding the closure and reuse processes
was more readily available.
Document Presentation
In the following two chapters, I provide a detailed account of the base
reuse processes at Fort Ord and Fort Devens. The case studies focus primarily
on the illustration of the entities involved with the reuse process, and the events
that led to the creation and implementation of an economic redevelopment
strategy. The case studies are presented from the experiences of the primary
economic planning efforts at each base: at Fort Devens, the planning process
was a joint state and local government effort; while at Fort Ord, the planning
effort involved primarily the local and regional governments.
In Chapter Five, I identify some of the prominent issues that affected the
local reuse processes exhibited in the case studies. These issues are presented
using experiences from each case. General inferences are drawn from these
experiences to conclude each section, and a summary of the findings is provided
at the end of the chapter. In the final chapter, I take a step back to consider the
implications for local economic development in communities most negatively
impacted by base closures.
Case Study Introduction
Fort Ord is one of 22 bases closed in California since the first round of
modern base closures in 1988. The property, the size of the City and County of
San Francisco, sits nestled between the Pacific Coast Mountains and the Pacific
Ocean on California's central coast. The case of Fort Ord illustrates the
interaction between local, regional and state interests and objectives, in which a
dispersed state government supported an unfettered local planning process. As
such, the state government was not directly involved with the reuse process at
Fort Ord, but was represented by some of the players in the regional reuse effort.
The case also illustrates how the state government was ultimately compelled to
take a leadership role in the Fort Ord reuse process to mediate inter-jurisdictional
conflicts between opposing local and regional interests. As a result, band-aid
state legislation was passed to restore order to the contentious local planning
process.
In Massachusetts, the closure of Fort Devens was the states first major
closure since a wave of installation closures shut down five of the state's major
military facilities in the 1970's. In contrast to the California case, state control
over the closure process was deliberate and proactive in the redevelopment of
Fort Devens. The Massachusetts Government Land Bank was empowered as
the state agency in charge of overseeing the planning and redevelopment of the
property at Fort Devens on behalf of the state, regional and local governments.
Although Fort Ord and Fort Devens were both slated for closure in the 1991
BRAC round, the redevelopment of Fort Devens has seemingly progressed
faster. At the time this study was conducted, a reuse plan and accompanying
land use bylaws were completed and approved by the state and the local
communities. Perhaps more importantly, carefully planned state legislation
made possible the creation of a super regional planning and permitting entity to
collectively represent the state and the surrounding communities with property
jurisdiction on the base. The case suggests that the elements of the successful
Devens reuse planning process were made possible through the execution of a
collective effort in which state and local officials, and individual members of the
local communities worked together to meet the interests and objectives of all
parties involved.
Chapter Two:
The Case of Fort Ord, Monterey County, California
Part I: Introduction
Located along California's central coast, Monterey County was best
known as a collection of wealthy retirement and resort communities, adjacent to
one of this country's most profitable produce farming regions. With its miles of
rocky coast line and mountainous landscape, the scenic beauty of the Monterey
Peninsula region attracted thousands of tourists every year. Quaint historic
shopping villages, guest houses and golf courses dot the landscape from
Monterey to Carmel-by-the-sea, catering primarily to a wealthy vacationing
clientele. This region is also home to a significant portion of the US military, who
were stationed at the Navy's Presidio and Post Naval Graduate School, the
DoD's Defense Language Institute and Ford Ord. Second only to the agriculture
and tourism industries, the military is one of the region's primary economic
generators. In fact, in 1991, Fort Ord was considered the County's largest single
employer with over 17,000 military and civilian employees residing primary in
Seaside and Marina (RKG Associates, Economic Impact Analysis: 1992, pp. iii).
Fort Ord was the largest Army training base in the US, home of the
Army's 7th Infantry Light troop division. Located just 10 miles north of the
Monterey Peninsula, the base encompassed 44 square miles (approximately
28,000 acres) of land in Monterey County. Fort Ord is flanked to the North by
the City of Marina and to the South by the City of Seaside. These outlying
communities, characterized by liquor and convenience stores, and automobile
showrooms seem out of place on the Peninsula. These behind the scenes cities
grew to service the needs of the military and its personnel -- out of sight from the
tourist villages of Monterey and Carmel.
Prior to the military occupation in 1917, the land at Fort Ord was primarily
undeveloped, unincorporated County land and private ranges. 1 In the 1960's
and 1970's many years after the Army established the base, non-federal
jurisdiction over the base property was divided among the County, the City of
Marina and the City of Seaside: approximately 75% of the base was incorporated
within the County's jurisdiction, with the remaining land divided between Seaside
and Marina (a total of approximately six square miles each).
These entities legally annexed portions of the base in order to receive
state entitlement funding, called subventions. These entitlements were funds in
lieu of property taxes used to support municipal services extended to the military,
military personnel and their children. Although the local municipalities were not
responsible for directly providing municipal services to the base itself, the local
governments contended that they could not support the presence of their military
neighbors without additional municipal assistance. Thus, subvention subsidies
were awarded to Marina and Seaside by the state primarily to support the
provision of public safety to military personnel and thier families. (Subventions
are discussed in greater detail in the section entitled Identifying Closure
Impacts).
Physical Description
Fort Ord encompasses approximately 28,000 acres along California's
scenic coast line, with approximately four miles of beach lying within the
California Coastal Zone. With its mountainous backdrop to the east, this
watershed region is home to several habitats including beaches, bluffs and
1 The site was acquired by the Army in 1917 as a maneuvering and firing area. By 1940 the base
was renamed Fort Ord and was expanded to house the 7th Infantry Division troops. After the
attack on Pearl Harbor, Fort Ord became a staging area for battles in the Pacific and was used as
an Advanced Training Facility during the Korean War (Kirschenbaum, 1992). The troops have not
experienced combat since the Panama conflict in the 1980's.
dunes, and coastal strand habitats covered with native and exotic plant species.
Additionally, the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary sits just off the shore
of the Monterey Peninsula region. This, the nations largest marine sanctuary, is
a haven for sea otters, seals, shorebirds, squid, sardines and thousands of other
species, including many that are threatened or endangered. Established as a
National Marine Sanctuary, the Monterey Bay is a virtual undersea laboratory
where lush kelp forests and North America's largest offshore canyon are studied
by researchers from all over the world.
Many areas of the inland portion of the base were established as multi-
species habitats by the US Fish and Wildlife Services after the base was
announced for closure. More than 70% of the land at Fort Ord, including the
coastal chaparral and dune areas, were identified as 'habitat reserve' during the
federal property screening process.2 The western edge of the base was
bisected by State Route 1, a north-south coastal highway running along the
entire California Coast. Route 1 was the primary access route to the Monterey
Bay Peninsula region, spanning two lanes in either direction. The majority of
development planned for Fort Ord is east of Route 1 in the Cities of Seaside and
Marina. (See Maps 1 & 2, Appendix B).
The existing physical infrastructure is similar to that of a large city, with
roads, water and sewer service, utilities (gas, electric and phone), as well as
schools, churches and other common municipal buildings. This infrastructure
served an estimated base population of approximately 25,000 military residents
in 1991. However, in many ways the existing infrastructure is not suited for
civilian reuse because it is too old and/or does not meet the prevailing state and
city safety codes. For instance, engineers have estimated that the existing water
treatment facility will have to be upgraded to meet the local codes, as well as the
additional capacity demanded by future users of the base property. In addition,
2 See Appendix A for more information regarding the federal property screening process.
many of the utilities on base will need to be re-metered to accommodate a
multitude of new users on the base.
The City of Seaside
Just to the south of Fort Ord is the City of Seaside. A densely developed
community of approximately 40,000 residents, Seaside's urban environment
stands in sharp contrast to the surrounding farm lands, and suburban resort
communities of Monterey, Carmel, and Pacific Grove. The City was incorporated
in 1954 to support the growing military presence in the region (Potter interview:
August 3, 1994). In addition to providing affordable housing for the military
personnel and their families, the City of Seaside catered to the military's demand
for goods and services not available at the base; including liquor stores, fast food
chains, bars, entertainment and convenience stores.
According to Seaside's Planning Service Manager, approximately 300-
400 of the city's civilian resident population was employed at the base (Potter
interview: February 7, 1995). Primary employment opportunities for the civilian
residents of Seaside were found in the local hotels, restaurants and other retail
and service industries that catered both to the military and the tourism industry in
Monterey, Pacific Grove and Carmel.
Accordingly, Seaside's economic base was tied primarily to the retail
industry and the military base. Sales tax revenues supported approximately 60%
of the city's municipal revenues before the closure (RKG & Associates,
Economic Impact Analysis: 1992, pg. 68). However, Seaside does not have a
traditional downtown. Instead the city's retail sector is located along busy two
lane boulevards anchored by strip malls and "mom and pop stores" (Potter
interview: February 7, 1995). Additionally, the automobile industry sales
represented approximately 50% of the cities sales tax revenue, prior to the
closure (McClair Interview, August 3, 1994). On the other hand, property taxes
in Seaside did not constitute as large a portion of the city's revenues because
California's Proposition 13 limited the amount of property taxes that could be
levied. According to RKG's study, property tax revenues constituted only 30% of
Seaside's municipal revenues in 1991 (RKG & Associates, Economic Impact
Analysis: 1992, pg. 68).
The Economic Impact Analysis prepared by RKG Associates estimated
that City of Seaside would experience significant reductions in local retail sales,
property tax losses (due to raising commercial and residential vacancy rates)
and the loss of its subvention subsidies, as a result of the base closure (RKG &
Associates, Economic Impact Analysis: 1992, pp. i-v). Job loss was also
expected to impact the Seaside's resident, primarily those who worked in the
service and retail sectors of the city, and were employed in civilian positions on
the base (ibid., pg. iii).
According to RKG's study, approximately 3,500 indirect, or service sector
jobs, and 2,500 on-base civilian jobs would be lost as a result of the closure.
However, the study also projected that job losses in the city of Seaside would be
offset by the approximately 2,500 indirect and 1,500 direct jobs vacated by
military spouses and family members (ibid., pg. 45). According to Seaside's
Planning Services Manger, Dennis Potter, there has been some undocumented
evidence to indicate that this projection may be true. However, he contends that
unemployment attributable to the closure is on the rise in Seaside; and as such,
the city still considers the creation of new jobs to be one of the primary local
economic goals in the redevelopment of Fort Ord (Potter interview: February 7,
1995). (Economic Impacts are discussed in greater detail in the section entitled
Identifying Closure Impacts).
According to Seaside's Mayor, the city's primary local economic goals in
the reuse of Fort Ord are: (1) to increase municipal revenues and maintain city
services; and (2) to create a variety of new jobs and employment opportunities
for its existing citizens. To meet these goals, the city envisioned the creation of
new industries and businesses focused primarily on the region's profitable tourist
market. According to the Planning Service Manager, this strategy offered the
greatest potential for short term economic recovery in the city of Seaside. After
all, the market already existed on the Peninsula -- all they had to do was tap into
it (Potter Interview, August 3, 1994).
Seaside is a racially mixed, primarily low-income community. Before the
closure announcement, the population of Seaside was approximately 50% white.
The remaining population consisted primarily of black, Hispanic and Asian or
Pacific Islanders (1990 Census). 3 Thirty percent of the residents of Seaside
were active or retired military personnel in 1990, the majority of which were
Officer ranked (Williams-Kuebelbeck & Associates, Inc.). Seaside's population
represented one of the lowest per capita incomes in the County at $10,409; this
was approximately 50% less than the neighboring community of Del Ray Oaks
(1990 Census). (See Chart 1).
Seaside is a city incorporated under the state's general law provisions.4
General law cities in California are typically responsible for public safety, streets,
parks and recreation, utilities and transportation and land use and planning.
Public safety (police and fire) is typically the largest item in a city's budget. The
cities are not responsible for public education; however, the provision of public
education falls under the jurisdiction of a geographically defined school district
that receives state funding. 5
3 However, it is expected that the racial mix will change significantly once the military has moved
completely out. The shift is expected to favor an increase in the Latino population and a decrease
in the black population (Denise Duffy & Associates: 1994, pp. v-3 through v-5).
4 As a general law city, Seaside has a City Council of five members, with one of its members
elected as Mayor; the Mayor has no more formal power than any other member of the City
Council. In addition, the City Council appoints a city manager to administer city policy and take
charge of the day-to-day activities and services. The City Manger was supported by an appointed
administrative structure, including City Service Departments such as planning, roads, parks, etc.
((Bell and Price: 1992, pp. 288-292).
5 Public education in California was historically a local activity. Each public school district was
governed by a nonpartisan regional school board, elected at large. In the 1980's, Proposition 13
would limit local tax revenues state-wide. When Proposition 13 went into effect, the amount of
money used to fund public education was reduced significantly. To make up for lost local
revenues, the state picked up the tab. By the 1990's, the state funded nearly 65% of all local
public education, including the state and community colleges and universities (Bell and Price:
1992, pp. 288-292).
Chart 1: Demographic Profile (1990)
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The City of Marina
Marina is located immediately to the north of Fort Ord, bordered to the
west by miles of dune beaches and to the north and east by undeveloped,
unincorporated County land. Like Seaside, Marina is home to many military
personnel and their families. In fact, Marina, also a general law city, is primarily
a residential community. Some retail and service related businesses exist in the
city, but sales tax revenues do not constitute a large portion of the city's
revenues. According to RKG's study, sales tax revenues constitute only 35% of
the city's revenues (RKG & Associates, Economic Impact Analysis: 1992, pg.
68). Instead, Marina is dependent primarily on property tax revenues and the
military subvention subsidies; property tax revenues and military subventions
constitute 45% and 30% of Marina's city revenues (ibid.). (Economic Impacts are
discussed in greater detail in the section entitled Identifying Closure Impacts).
Like Seaside, Marina is also a low-income, culturally diverse city. With a
population of only 26,000; 40% of the residents in 1990 were active or retired
military personnel (ibid., pg. ii). According to RKG's economic impact study, it
was estimated that the city of Marina would lose 4,500 of its off-base population
due to the relocation of military personnel from Fort Ord. In addition, local Army
officials noticed that many more former civilian employees were leaving the area
to take advantage of opportunities through the Army's Priority Placement
Program (ElIzey interview: August 4, 1994).6 Furthermore, Marina city officials
fear that additional residents will leave the area if the local economic decline
continues. As such, they are worried that these impacts will significantly reduce
Marina's population, in turn reducing the city's population-related local revenues
(Goblirsch interview: August 8, 1994).
According to RKG's study, Marina was determined to be the city most
economically affected by the closure of Fort Ord (ibid., pp. i-v). Not only would
Marina lose its subvention subsidies, but its property tax base and meager
commercial sector were in danger of significant decline. Given this, the City of
Marina immediately began to pursue its own approach to economic
development. Marina's primary economic objective was to increase municipal
tax revenues to support its municipal services. Like Seaside, Marina city officials
also felt that some of the people left unemployed by the base would fill the
positions left by military spouses. But according to Marina's Economic
Development Director, the replacement of the jobs lost by the closure is still very
much a concern (Goblirsch interview: February 7, 1994).
Thus, like Seaside, Marina also envisioned that its new economic base
would be embedded primarily in the local tourism industry.
6 The DoD's Priority Placement Program was created in the 1960's and 70's to re-employ
workers displaced by base closure. These personnel were placed at the top of the DoD's "list" for
civilian job openings throughout the country. Employees placed on this list were given
consideration before local residents could be hired at a base. Many civilian employees were
career military personnel, who continually relocated to follow the military employment. Civilian
Servant packages were also available to civilian personnel left unemployed by the military,
including retirement and other benefits to personnel not placed elsewhere (Ellzey interview:
August 4, 1994)
Inter-jurisdictional Relationships
The Cities of Seaside and Marina peacefully co-existed for many
decades. Because of their similar socio-economic characteristics, Seaside and
Marina shared common economic visions for the redevelopment of Fort Ord and
their cities. Accordingly, these town became formidable partners in the fight to
redevelop Fort Ord in support of their respective declining fiscal conditions.
In general, both cities pursued a development strategy that could reap the
highest municipal returns through an increased tax base, higher property values,
and more jobs for local residents. In general, they wanted to replicate the
tourism industries of Monterey and Pacific Grove; they wanted to capitalize on
what they felt was an untapped demand for additional tourist activities in the
region. In fact, it appears as though Marina and Seaside envisioned a new Fort
Ord region heavily dependent on the creation of entertainment attractions and
resort hotels (See Maps 3 & 4, Appendix B).
Other adjacent communities and the County of Monterey
At the south-western border of Fort Ord lay three other Monterey County
cities: Del Ray Oaks, Monterey and Sand City. Del Ray Oaks is a primarily high
income residential community that supported itself through local residential
taxes; Monterey, a moderate-to-high income community built its economy on a
strong commercial base centered primarily on the tourism industry; and Sand
City, with a population of less than 200 on less than one square mile. According
to local government officials, Sand City was a city incorporated under the
provision of California general law solely to support the development of a
regional discount shopping center (Potter interview: August 3, 1994, McClair
interview: August 3, 1994).7
7 Under California Redevelopment Law, a designated redevelopment project area can be
incorporated as a city. This option is typically exercised for the purpose of providing developer
incentives through the restructuring of local taxing authority. According to local city officials, Sand
City was established as a city for the purposes of a discount retail outlet mall (Potter interveiw:
August 3, 1994).
Although these three communities shared a common border with Fort
Ord, the closure was not expected to significantly impact the cities economies in
terms of relative job and revenue loss. When it came to the redevelopment of
Fort Ord, these communities were seemingly less concerned about the regional
economic impacts of the closure and more concerned about how the base
redevelopment would affect the overall quality of life in the Monterey Peninsula
region. According to a local planning consultant, these communities, as well as
other communities in the region, were concerned that a densely developed reuse
scenario at Fort Ord would, for instance, limit ground water availability, increase
traffic congestion, degrade the existing environmental and scenic quality, and
reduce property values (Brown interview: August 1, 1994).
The Role of the County. The County of Monterey's primary role in the
governance of the region was to administer state services such as the court
system, jails, welfare, healthcare and other social services. Additional County
functions are distinguished between those provided to all County residents, and
those provided only to residents living in unincorporated areas (Bell and Price:
1992, pp. 288-292). The County handles court and welfare services for all
County residents, for example, but provides law enforcement and roads for those
living in unincorporated areas. The County also acts as the unit of local
government for non-entitlement communities. As such federal or state funds
from programs such as the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and
grants from federal agencies such as the Economic Development Administration
(EDA) are administered by the County.
In the redevelopment of Fort Ord, the County is accountable for the
general welfare of all communities within its jurisdiction. According to the
Director of Inter-governmental Affairs at the County, 'while Seaside and Marina
only have to think about what was best for them, the County has to support a
reuse strategy that promises economic benefits to the whole County -- not just
the host communities of Marina and Seaside' (Ferguson interview: August 9,
1994).
Part II: Getting Started
The Fort Ord Community Task Force
In early 1990, rumors that Fort Ord would be included on the 1991 Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) list began to surface. Fort Ord was one of the
first major rural bases to be closed in the modern closure history. On February
3, 1990, one year before the closure announcement, US Congressman Leon
Panetta organized the Fort Ord Community Task Force in response to rumors of
the closing. In addition to Congressman Panetta, members included nine of the
twelve county mayors and a number of high ranking retired Army personnel
(Kirschenbaum and Marsh: 1993, pg. 54).
During its first year, the Task Force focused all of its energies on saving
the base. A 'block the closure' campaign was centered not so much around the
economic and environmental clean-up impacts that would result from the
closure, but on the military significance of the base as a premier Pacific defense
site. The closure of Fort Ord, the Task Force contended, would risk national
security by eliminating the US's largest troop training facilities (ibid.). Ultimately,
the Task Force's extensive efforts to block the closure were unsuccessful. In
April of 1991, Fort Ord was among the US military bases slated for closure on
the 1991 BRAC list.8
According to the BRAC Commission report, the primary factors
contributing to the closure included the high cost of living in Monterey County
(requiring high wages to civilian labor as well as higher living allowances to
military personnel), and the fact that environmental contamination, including
8 See Appendix A for more information regarding the federal base closure, or BRAC process.
unexploded ordinance and other hazardous waste, made it no longer safe for
training (Kirschenbaum and Marsh, 1993, pg. 54).
Before the final closure announcement was made, the Task Force
membership expanded to include four State Legislators and the remaining
county mayors. Over the course of the following year, the Task Force
membership grew to include US Congressman Sam Farr and State Senator
Henry Mello. Local representation on the Task Force was limited to
representatives from elected local city officials and membership on the Task
Force's seven Advisory Boards. Advisory Board members staffed seven
Advisory Groups: Economic Development, Education, Housing, Health,
Community and Public Services, Land Use, Environmental Pollution Clean-up
and Utility/Infrastructure (ibid.). According to local city officials, membership on
one of the Advisory Board's was the only opportunity for the general public to be
involved in the reuse planning process at Fort Ord (McClair interview: August 3,
1994). The members of the Advisory Groups were hand picked by Panetta and
other founding members of the Task Force. Members were chosen to include
representative private citizens, local business people, special interest groups,
and local and state educational institutions (Task Force Report: 1992, pp. vii-
xxii). 9
The Creation of a Regional Strategy
After the closure announcement, the Task Force began to explore ideas
for a new economic focus for the Fort Ord region. According the Task Force
Strategy Report released in June of 1992, the Task Force established its primary
goals in the creation of a new economic development strategy to include: (1) the
documentation of an economic redevelopment strategy representing the
9 Funding for the initial years of the Task Force was provided by the County and the cities as far
away as Greenfield and Gonzales on the eastern most border of the County. A grant from the
OEA granted to the County funded the operations after February of 1992 (Task Force: Strategy
Report, 1992, pg. v). Subsequent OEA planning funds, it was envisioned, would be awarded to
the official reuse planning created by the Task Force.
interests and objectives of the entire Monterey Peninsula region; and (2) the
formation of a planning body to create the land use plan based on the economic
strategy developed (Task Force Report: 1992, pp. vii-xxii).
According to the Task Force Strategy Report, Panetta believed that the
closure would environmentally and economically impact all of the communities in
the County. As such, he created the Task Force to support the interests and the
needs of all residents in the County, including the hardest hit -- Marina and
Seaside (Task Force Strategy Report, 1992, pp. 1- 2). According to the report,
Panetta saw the reuse of Fort Ord as the opportunity for the region to fulfill its
desire for a new economic sector that was not dependent on the existing military,
agriculture or tourism industries. The report infers that the intent of the
university-based economic focus was to benefit all of the communities in the
Monterey County region by creating higher skilled, higher paying jobs, and
ultimately healthier municipal economies (Task Force Strategy Report: 1992, pp.
xi-xxi). The reuse of Fort Ord was also envisioned as an opportunity to provide
additional open spaces and environmental preserves in the region (ibid.).
Identifying Closure Impacts
The County of Monterey commissioned a study in late 1991 to determine the
economic impacts anticipated in the region as a result of the Fort Ord closure.
The report was used to support the County's application for a federal reuse
planning grant, and was also used in the development of the Task Force's
economic development strategy. The study, prepared by RKG Associates of
New Hampshire, concluded that the military played a major role in the County's
economy for many years. Although Fort Ord represented only one of four major
military installations in the County, the relative magnitude of the closure impacts
were considered significant. According to the study, the loss of municipal
revenues, declining demand for local businesses, and the loss of population and
jobs were expected to affect the cities of Seaside and Marina the most (RKG
Associates, Economic Impact Analysis: 1992, pp. i-v). To a much lesser extent,
it was expected that the cities of Sand City and Monterey would also feel an
economic pinch from the closure. Due to the loss of the military population,
impacts were estimated to be felt in Sand City from decreasing retail
expenditures and in Monterey from higher housing vacancies.
General Economic Impacts: According to RKG's Economic Impact Analysis,
the loss of the 7th Infantry at Fort Ord was estimated to result in a loss of $189
million in personal incomes spent locally (from civilian and military employees
and residents relocated by the closure) -- primarily in the cities of Seaside and
Marina. In addition, local expenditures by the Army for goods and services were
estimated at $56 million before the closure (40% of the Army's total budget for
goods and services at Fort Ord). Thus, the gross direct local economic impact
resulting from the loss of these direct and indirect economic losses was
estimated at $245 million in the local region (RKG Associates, Economic Impact::
1992, pp. 25).10
According to RKG, the closure was also expected to result in the loss of
approximately 14,300 active duty military jobs and 6,000 direct and indirect
civilian jobs (2,500 and 3,500, respectively). The majority of the lost civilian
positions were predicted in the service sector, administrative support, and
marketing and sales, in descending order of magnitude. However, RKG also
estimated that the job losses would be off-set somewhat by the positions
vacated by military spouses and family members who would leave the area as a
result of the closure. This included an additional 1,500 on-base positions and
2,500 off-base positions that would be available for civilian placement (ibid., pg.
50). Therefore, according to the RKG study, short term job losses expected as a
10 The net loss of actual local expenditures were estimated to be only $120 million dollars. This
figure was estimated using a multiplier that accounted only for the percentage of the economic
base that stayed within the community -- the economic output (RKG, 1992).
result of the closure should be mitigated in the local communities.11 In addition,
the RKG study projected that employment would be phased over a period of four
years (from the beginning of the downsizing in 1993 to the scheduled for
completion in 1997), when the last of the military personnel are relocated.
Chart 2: Non-Military County Employment Statistics (1989)
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In the early 1990's, the economy in the Monterey Peninsula region
focused primarily on agriculture, and the retail and service industries; supported
by both the local military installations and tourism. According to the Economic
Development Corporation, employment in the Fort Ord region is primarily retail
and service related, while the agriculture workforce resides in Salinas and other
east County communities. The data supplied by the state employment office
showed that agriculture represented almost one quarter of the County's
employment, followed closely by the service and retail sectors. (See below.)
However, the data does not indicate what percentage of the service and retail
sectors were dependent on the tourism industry and what percentage was
dependent on the federal government sector. But the RKG study suggest that
11 However, the study does not indicate what types of jobs will be vacated by military spouses and
family members; thus, it is possible that many of these vacted jobs do not match the skill levels of
those left unemployed by the closure.
Marina and Seaside's retail and service sector cater primarily to the military
market; while the cities of Monterey, Pacific Grove and Carmel cater primarily to
the tourism industry (ibid., pg. 52).
Municipal Impacts: The RKG study also estimated that the County would lose
approximately 1% of its non-military population, and 56% of its military
population as a result of the closure. The hardest hit, Seaside and Marina were
expected to lose 27% and 55% of their residents (respectively) and 25,000
military personnel and their families who lived on the base. Consequently,
approximately one third of Marina's housing units and one quarter of Monterey's
housing units are expected to be vacated by military and civilian employees as a
result of the closing. Furthermore, as a result of the McKinney Act screening -- a
federal Act requiring that provisions for local homeless populations be included in
the military base reuse process -- homeless service providers requested as
many as 200 units of Marina housing. 12 These non-tax generating units, it is
feared, will further strain Marina's already declining fiscal situation.
Seaside was only expected to see an 8% increase in residential
vacancies. However, the city would share with Marina the greatest decrease in
general fund revenues -- including the loss of property taxes, sales taxes and
subvention moneys -- resulting from the substantial population loss.
Marina was expected to suffer the largest projected impact with a loss of
over 15% of its budget. Likewise, Seaside was estimated to lose over $1 million,
or 11 % of its budget. The impact to the municipal budgets of other cities on
Monterey Peninsula was expected to range from 3% in Monterey, to 0% in Del
Ray Oaks and in the South County city of Carmel-by-the-Sea (RKG Associates,
Economic Impact Analysis of the Downsizing of Fort Ord: 1992, pg. 60).
12 See Appendix A for information regarding the McKinney Act screening process.
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Finally, the RKG study estimated that the impact to the Monterey
Peninsula Unified School District would be severe (ibid., iv-v). The District
operated the schools on Fort Ord and in the surrounding cities. It is expected
that approximately 600 teachers and support personnel would lose their jobs as
a result of the loss of 5,000 military dependent children. It is also expected that
the decline in student enrollment would decrease revenues by 33% of the total
School District budget. These losses, however, were expected to be offset by
interim state funding to be reimbursed by the School District when local revenues
recover to pre-closure levels (Ferguson interview: August 9, 1994).
The RKG study concluded that although the region was economically
dependent on the military installations in the area, the closure of Fort Ord would
not be economically devastating to the overall region. It was expected that the
subsequent loss of population, due to the closure, would indeed reduce local
expenditures in the area surrounding the base; however, the effect of the
decreasing population on aggregate employment levels in the region would not
be as great as initially feared (RKG & Associates, Economic Impact Analysis:
1992, pg. i).
Nevertheless, the RKG study estimates that the economic impacts to the
cities of Marina and Seaside will be significant. The study supports Seaside and
Marina's fears that the loss of population and local expenditures will negatively
impact their municipal situations. In response to this situation, the state
government agreed to continue to provide military subvention to the impacted
communities until the year 2000. According to Seaside's Planning Services
Manager, this action was an attempt to bridge the short term municipal gaps until
the redevelopment of the base could provide new sources of revenue (Potter
interview: February 7, 1995).
The subventions were based on the population levels of the cities of
Seaside and Marina. When the cities annexed property on the military base in
the 1960's, the State Department of Finance agreed to pay subventions to
Seaside and Marina based on the population of military personnel and their
families living on base property within the cities' respective jurisdictions. The
subventions were to be adjusted every 10 years to reflect the latest Census
report figures (Potter interview: February 7, 1995).13
In Seaside, the on-base population was estimated at 14,200, and in
Marina the on-base population was approximately 10,600 in 1990 (RKG
Associates, Economic Impact Analysis of the Downsizing of Fort Ord: 1992, pg.
64). According to the RKG Fiscal Impact Study in 1990, the subventions to
Seaside and Marina were approximately $55 per capita. Thus, the annual
subvention subsidies to Marina and Seaside were approximately $780,000 and
$580,000, respectively; (approximately 6.5% of each cities' annual budget) (ibid.,
pg. 66).
After the closure, the State Department of Finance agreed to continue the
subventions until the year 2000 (Potter interview: February 7, 1995). At that
time, any remaining on-base population will be tabulated, and the subventions
will be adjusted. By the year 1997, however, the Army estimates that all of its
13 The Army provided the US Census Bureau with an official count of the on-base population
living with the respective city jurisdictions (Potter interview: February, 7, 1995)
military personnel will be vacated. Thus, the City of Marina is expected to lose
all of its subvention revenues by the year 2000, when the new census is
tabulated. On the other hand, the city of Seaside is expected to maintain some
of its subvention revenues to reflect a new military population proposed to
relocate to a portion of Fort Ord. Presently, the Presidio of Monterey intends to
acquire approximately 1,300 acres of Fort Ord property within Seaside's
jurisdiction to house its military personnel. However, because estimates of the
number of military personnel expected to relocate to Fort Ord has not yet been
established, Seaside's total future subvention revenues are unknown at this
time. (The Presidio relocation is discussed in greater detail in the section entitled
The Federal Screening Process).
However, according to Seaside Planning Services Manager, even with the
subvention relief, significant strategic repositioning of the cities' existing
economic bases will be required if the cities are to remain fiscally solvent.
Although documentation of the actual fiscal impacts experienced by Seaside and
Marina since the closure announcement were not available at the time of this
study, both cities fear that the loss of municipal revenues and local jobs will
threaten the fiscal viability of their cities (McClair interview: August 3, 1994;
Goblirsch interview: August 8, 1994). City officials conveyed that the opportunity
for revenue producing development within their jurisdictions will be critical to the
cities' long term fiscal health (Goblirsch interview: August 8, 1994; Potter: August
3, 1994).
Real Estate Impacts: The RKG study also estimated that a total of 4,900 off-
base housing units would be vacated throughout the County, as a result of the
closure. An additional 4,800 units of on-base housing (both single family and
multi-family) are also expected to be available for reuse. The total vacancy
impacts are estimated at approximately 8% of the County's total housing stock
and 17% of the County's rental market, the majority of which were expected to
occur in Marina and Seaside (RKG Associates, Economic Impact Analysis of the
Downsizing of Fort Ord: 1992, pg. 62).
According to a study prepared by Sedway and Associates for the Fort Ord
Community Task Force, the greatest negative housing impact associated with
the closure will occur in the city of Marina. The study estimated that
approximately 32% of all off-base private housing occupied by the military prior
to closure was located in Marina. As a result of the Fort Ord closure, the study
projects that Marina's rental vacancy rate will increase from 1.7% in 1990 to 36%
in 1996 (Sedway and Associates: 1992, pp. 6-7). Thus, the City of Marina is
expected to see as many as 2,100 new housing units added to their existing
housing stock (including off-base and on-base units vacated by military
personnel). According to Marina's City Manager Sedway & Associates projected
that only 1,700 new units would be needed to meet the projected demand over
the first 5 year period. As such, the city is worried that the new supply of housing
units will flood Marina's residential market (Longley interview: August 8, 1994).
Although the City of Monterey has the second greatest number of military
personnel living off-post, the impacts will be substantially softened as a result of
the strong demand for housing in the City of Monterey, the severe lack of
affordable housing options, and the potential demand for seasonal rentals (ibid.,
pg. 7). As such, the study also projects that the City of Seaside will experience
the second greatest impacts due to the closure. The study projects that rental
vacancy rates in Seaside will increase from 3.7% in 1990 to over 13 percent by
1996 (ibid.).
Environmental Site Conditions
A primary concern at Fort Ord is the level of environmental contamination
of the base property. Fort Ord was designated on the National Priorities List as a
Superfund site. As such, the base must be cleaned to a level accepted by this
special federal environmental legislation before the property can be
transferred. 14 According to Army officials predominant contamination on the
base is unexploded ordnance found primarily in the old training and firing range
regions of the base (Clack interview: August 4, 1994). The total area
contaminated by unexploded ordnance is estimated at more than 50% of the
28,000 acre base. Additional contamination including motor oil and organic
solvents was found in the soils near the motor pool and at various dumping sites.
Lead paint and asbestos were also discovered in some of the older buildings.
Also of environmental concern is the shortage of potable ground water in
the region. The natural ground water supply in the region has been taxed
beyond its capacity for many years. As a result, sea water began to leach into
the existing aquifer. The sea water contamination rendered many well locations
in and around the base unusable for potable water purposes. The threats to
human, animal and plant species are obvious; however, the consequence of sea
water intrusion could also lead to subsidence of coastal land and acceleration of
coastal erosion ("Water Supply May Limit Reuse Plans for Fort Ord", The
Monterey County Herald, September 12, 1992).
Part III: Federal Processes
The Federal Screening Process
The Department of Defense's primary mission is to effectively close the
bases slated for decommission, and dispose of the base properties in
accordance with an array of federal guidelines, regulations and procedures. The
federal process is divided into four primary categories: (1) Closure:
decommissioning of military activities and relocation of the troops and
equipment; (2) Cleanup: investigation and cleanup of environmental
contaminants left by the military user; (3) Property disposal: property
14 See Appendix A for information regarding the Environmental requirements pursuant to the
federal base closure process.
conveyance, including sale, lease or federal agency transfer negotiations; and
(4) Reuse: including local reuse planning support.15
The federal base screening process falls within the property disposal
category. The federal disposal process is based primarily on the procedures
established by the General Services Administration (GSA) for the purpose of
regulating general federal property disposition and purchase. The primary
objective of the screening process is to make sure that, before the property is
transferred to a non-federal entity, demand for the property does not exist
elsewhere in the Defense Department or the federal government at large.
Before a closing base is made available for transfer to local community
redevelopment efforts, the property is screened for all other federal uses. In a
two tiered process, the property is first offered to other branches of the
Department of Defense, and then offered to other federal agencies and
departments. Once other federal uses are identified, the property is conveyed at
no charge to the receiving party. Once received, however, the new federal user
can not sell the property for immediate profit.
At Fort Ord, the Navy would be the first to take advantage of the
opportunity to acquire additional land and housing units through the first phase of
the DoD screening process. In need of space for training and housing, the
Presidio of Monterey (10 miles south of Fort Ord) negotiated a transfer of
approximately 1,300 acres, including 1,800 housing units, the base PX and
goods exchange and two 18-hole championship golf courses (Black Horse and
Bayonet). This area, referred to as the POM-Annex, was located primarily within
the jurisdiction of the City of Seaside (See Map 5, Appendix B). In addition to
the POM Annex, 12 acres of property under the County's jurisdiction were
transferred to existing US Army Reserve units as a training center. A 91-acre
motor pool site was also retained by the Army.
15 See Appendix A for a detailed description of the federal reuse process.
According to the local reuse plan, approximately 16,000 acres of land
under Monterey County jurisdiction was transferred to the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) as a Natural Resource Management Area to remain in
federal ownership, in the second phase of the federal screening process. In
addition to this, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) claimed approximately
38 acres for a new Law Enforcement Training Center on land also under the
jurisdiction of the County (Fort Ord Reuse Group, Summary of Base Reuse
Plan; Preliminary Draft: 1994, pp. 7-18).
The federal screening process at Fort Ord spanned a period of
approximately one year. By the summer of 1992, defense and other federal
uses would no longer receive priority preference for military property transfer.
Once the DoD's screening process was complete, the remaining property,
approximately 6,200 acres, was declared excess for the purposes of the military.
The McKinney Act
Simultaneous to the federal screening process, the McKinney Act
screening process was initiated. The Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance
Act of 1987 was legislated during the Reagan Administration to help meet the
needs of the nation's homeless. Under the McKinney Act's Title V amendments,
excess federal properties, including military installations, were made available to
states, local governments and non-profit organizations for use to assist the
homeless.
At Fort Ord, applications from a number of Monterey County homeless
providers, including the County Housing Authority were approved by HHS. As
such, a number of small parcels were awarded for use to house, feed and train
the homeless in the region. Although the total property acres acquired under the
McKinney Act was less than 10 acres, the sites were many and scattered
throughout the developed regions of the base. Most of the sites consisted of
housing or warehouse structures located in the City of Marina's jurisdiction.
The Environmental Process
Simultaneous to the real property disposal process, the environmental
process was introduced. The environmental component of the federal base
disposal process typically follows two distinct paths. The first path is the
environmental impact analysis procedure dictated by federal environmental laws
(primarily National Environmental Protection Act -- NEPA) concerning the
contamination determination and suitability of transfer of base property. Under
NEPA the Army is required to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
The EIS is used to estimate the impacts associated with the closure and the
anticipated reuse of the base properties. The EIS identifies issues regarding the
quality and potential reuse of the existing land and what factors are impediments
to effective disposal of the property (Cornelssen: 1993, pg. 34). The information
provided in the EIS is also used to determine the level of environmental clean-up
required by the disposal agency. At Fort Ord, the Army Corps of Engineers
initiated the EIS process on February 14, 1992, with publication of 'a notice of
intent to prepare the EIS' in the Federal Register (Letter US Army Corps of
Engineers: March 8, 1993).
The second component relates to compliance with federal environmental
statues including Superfund laws. Because Fort Ord was declared a Superfund
site under federal environmental laws, the entire base could not be transferred
until clean-up is complete, or a comprehensive remediation strategy is in place
and accepted by all local, state and federal environmental agencies (Chestnut
interview: February 28, 1994).
Simultaneous to the federal environmental processes, a number of state
environmental processes were established at Fort Ord. Specifically, an
Environmental Impact Review (EIR) was required pursuant to the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Similar in scope to the EIS, the CEQA EIR
was required by the state to determine the reuse impacts in accordance with
prevailing state environmental laws. In addition, a Coastal Zone Consistency
Determination review process and hearing was also required by the California
Coastal Commission. The Consistency Determination was required to assure
that the proposed reuse would not endanger the environmental integrity of the
state coast (California Coastal Commission: 1994, pp. 2-1 through 2-3).
Initial Non-federal Property Transfers
Upon completion of property screening for defense needs, other federal
uses and assistance to the homeless, remaining property was declared surplus
to the federal government. Provided the sites were cleared of environmental
contamination restrictions, the property was then offered to state and local
governments for public benefit conveyances.
The Public Benefit Conveyance (PBC) only occurs when the federal
government agrees to transfer military property for local public uses such as a
parks, public housing, and the to accommodation of local government
institutions. Public entities receiving PBCs must prove need and satisfy strict
federal guidelines. The property is typically conveyed by the DoD without
compensation, or is heavily discounted, but can not be sold by the public entity
for profit.
However, since the federal screening process to place at Fort Ord, a
number of changes have occurred to the federal base closure and disposal
process that will affect the future transfer of land to the local communities. In
April of 1994, interim rules were written to Amend the Defense Authorization Act
of 1994, passed earlier. Included in the rules is the provision for Economic
Development Conveyances proposing that land may be transferred to local
redevelopment authorities at no cost, provided the property will be used to
develop the economy and create jobs. In this case, the land may be conveyed to
the local reuse authority, initially for free. However, if the property is
subsequently sold or leased, the division of profits will be based on net profits.
The share of profits will generally favor the local redevelopment authority (60
percent to the local redevelopment authority, and 40 percent to the DoD). 16
At Fort Ord, approximately 6,200 acres were proposed for state, local and
private development purposes: habitat reserves (+/- 490 acres), parks and
recreation (+/- 2,100), municipal maintenance and desalinization plant (+/- 70
acres), public schools and community colleges (+/- 240 acres) and a site for an
Agricultural Center (+/- 730 acres). The remaining 2,500+ acres was conveyed
for the purpose of building the new campus of California State University at
Monterey Bay, the expansion of the University of Santa Cruz's marine and
environmental research labs and related programs. Of the 6,200 acres of land
surplused by the Army, approximately 2,650 acres are slated for private
development in support of the regional economic strategy (United States General
Accounting Office: November, 1994, pp. 22-23).
University Property Transfer Property transfer to the universities was in itself
a unique process which required the passing of state legislation and an
allocation of $15 million in DoD funding. Typically, when a university acquires
property from the federal government, the property is transfer through the
Department of Education. However, at Fort Ord, both the California State
University at Monterey Bay (CSUMB) and the University of California, Santa
Cruz were able to work out a deal to accept the Fort Ord property directly from
the DoD, without the involvement of the Department of Education. This was
made possible through the creation of State Bill 900, state legislation which
created the new university property as a redevelopment district for the purpose
of accepting DoD property as a public benefit conveyance.
The state universities benefited from the direct DoD transfers in two
primary ways: The ability to structure favorable mortgage terms (15 years as
opposed to 30 required under the Department of Education), and the fact that
16 See Appendix A for more information regarding the Pyror Amendments.
the DoD would allow the university to sub-lease excess property for uses other
than education17 -- a provision that would have been prohibited had the property
been transferred through the Department of Education (Hendrickson interview:
August 5, 1994).
CSUMB requested approximately 1,300 acres with an estimated value of
$250,000.18 There were 85-90 buildings on the property that CSUMB intended
to retrofit and used for university functions, such as housing and teaching
facilities. The buildings, however, were in need of extensive upgrades in order to
meet the prevailing seismic and accessibility codes. Additionally, the
infrastructure on the property itself was in need of repair and upgrade. So the
California State University system asked for a total $136 to $150 million from the
federal government, over a 5 to 10 year period, to cover the cost of these items.
In the first year, they requested $25 million but would only receive $15 million.
The $15 million, part of the 1994 defense appropriations bill will be used to
convert barracks into classrooms, offices and dormitories at the proposed
campus ("Fort Ord Campus Funded", San Jose Mercury News: March 18, 1994).
Although this was not the full amount intended, this was an unusual
appropriation given the current trend to cut spending in Washington:
'Fighting for the [federal funding] was the hardest thing we ever did
-- getting the land was easy in comparison. I believe that the
support for the funding was attributable to the new Defense
Secretary's back ground in education and Panetta's pull in
Washington. The fact that Ord is a model base closure also helped
to move the funding process along.' -- Excerpt from interview with
Hank Hendrickson, Executive Dean, California State University,
Monterey Bay.
However, the funding received from the state and federal government,
even given the favorable provisions of SB 900, would not be enough to make the
17 This required, however, that 40% of the profits be returned to the DoD for a period of 15 years.
18 Property value of $250,000 is discounted to include the cost of environmental cleanup and
required infrastructure upgrades (Hendrickson interview: August 5, 1994).
university development feasible in the long run. According to the Executive
Dean of CSUMB, the universities requested additional state and federal
appropriations, primarily to support the operations of the campus (including staff
and faculty salaries) and for the provision of infrastructure upgrades
(Hendrickson interview: August 5, 1994).
At the time of this study, no additional funds were raised to meet CSU's
financial needs. Information regarding financial support for the UC Santa Cruz
expansion was not available at the time of this study. However, an official from
UCSC stated that the proposed expansion would be dependent primarily on
additional funding received from the University of California Administration.
Nevertheless, the property was officially transferred from the federal government
to the universities in July of 1994. (The University property transfers are
discussed further in the next section.)
Part IV: Generating Ideas and Alternatives
Introduction
The Task Force's Strategy Report established a vision for the future of the
Fort Ord region based on the creation of an education, science and technology
research center, as well as the expansion of parks, recreation, open space and
wildlife habitats. Seaside and Marina, however, did not share the Task Force's
vision for the redevelopment of Fort Ord. According to city officials in both
Seaside and Marina, the Task Force's plan did not give these cities enough
control over the Fort Ord land within their jurisdiction to create the type of
revenue producing development the cities felt they needed (McClair Interview:
August 3, 1994; Longley interview: August 8, 1994; and Goblirsch interview:
August 8, 1994). The city official's contended that the Task Force's
institutionally-based strategy did not give Marina and Seaside an opportunity to
generate the new tax revenue sources that they needed to support their city
budgets:
'The Task Force was a top-down approach loaded with an
institutional agenda -- universities, recreational parks and the arts
gobbled up the land at Fort Ord. Fort Ord was used to satisfy the
regions pent up needs for institutional uses and environmental
preservation. There was no sensitivity to economic recovery for the
impacted cities. [The Task Force's plan] is not consistent with the
City's [long term objectives]' -- Excerpt from interview with John
Longley, Marina City Manager
Marina and Seaside contended that the members of the regional Task
Force were not apathetic to their needs for short term economic recovery; but
instead wanted only to satisfy their interests and objectives through the creation
of a university and additional environmental preservation lands (From Vision to
Nightmare: 1994, pg. 1-3). Whether their speculations were substantiated or not,
Marina and Seaside contended that their needs would be better met through the
attraction of additional tourist dollars. According to the Mayor of Seaside,
tourism would allow the cities to tap into the transient occupancy taxes currently
enjoyed by the neighboring communities, such as Monterey, Pacific Grove and
Carmel (McClair interview: August 3, 1994).19
The Task Force Planning Process
The Fort Ord Reuse Plan was the product of a series of planning
processes that started with the Task Force and its seven Advisory Committees.
Task Force members were not expected to prepare specific land use plans;
these tasks were to be left to the city managers and elected officials. Instead,
Task Force members tried simply to redefine economic infrastructure and quality
of life for the regions residents; they created a collective vision plan called the
Task Force Strategy Report.
19 According to the RKG study, transient occupancy taxes constituted approximately 47% of
Monterey's city revenues and approximately 34% of Pacific Grove's revenues. Transient
occupancy taxes in Seaside and Marina constituted only 8.5% and 19% of the cities reveneues,
respectively. (RKG Associates: 1992, pg. 68).
Beginning in the summer of 1991, ideas generated by the Seven Advisory
Groups and subcommittees formed the basis for the regional economic
development strategy. In all, about 135 detailed suggestions for reuse and
redevelopment were received and thoroughly investigated by the Task Force.
The initial suggestions were considered in the context of the regions unique
attributes:
* Extraordinary natural beauty and resources;
" proximity to premier scientific research and military institutions such as the
Monterey Bay Aquarium Research Institute, Stanford's Hopkins Marine
Station, Moss Landing Marine Labs and the DoD's Defense Language
Institute;
e leadership in the development of agriculture and food processing
technologies;
* and a relatively stable population base (in-migration in the 1980's
represented only 8% of the regions growth as compared to the 44% state-
side average)(Task Force Strategy Report: 1992, pp. 12-13).
From this process, the field of possibilities was narrowed down for further
consideration. For instance, a memorandum from the Environmentally
Compatible Industry Committee (a subcommittee of the Economic Development
Advisory Group) reduced the field of possibilities to 10 industries to be seriously
evaluated as potential reuse targets. Their evaluation considered factors such
as growth trends, likelihood of success, and advantages and disadvantages to
the community. Each concept was duly evaluated based on a balance between
the number of jobs created, the short term availability of the jobs created, and
the long term viability of the economic solutions given the prevailing state of the
economy (Memorandum from the Fort Ord Task Force: March 11, 1992, pp. 1-2).
Once the concepts were further refined, the Task Forces Strategy Report
was prepared. In the Report, six Strategic Themes were described in
descending order of importance:
* Creation of an education, science and technology research center;
e continued support of the [remaining] local military missions;
* expansion the region's parks, recreation and open space'
e development major support structure to implement the economic
development strategy and land use plans;
e development supporting economic development and other opportunities such
as an agricultural center, educational conference center, aquaculture and
high tech manufacturing;
" development governmental structure to prepare the base reuse plan and
execute the Strategy (Task Force Reuse Strategy Report; 1992, xi-xxi).
By June of 1992, approximately one year after the closure announcement,
the Task Force completed a Strategy Report that would become the basis for the
physical Reuse Plan. The Strategy Report was the product of the collective
work, analysis and expertise of over 600 Task Force members and consultants
(Task Force Strategy Report: 1992, pg. vii). The economic solutions reflected in
the strategy were centered on an education, science and technology research
center, including a new state university, a research extension of the University of
California at Santa Cruz. Plenty of R&D space was envisioned to accommodate
technology transfer from these new institutional research efforts, as well as from
the existing marine related research institutions located in Monterey and Santa
Cruz Counties. The strategy also stressed the expansion of its recreational
amenities and protection of its environmental resources on the base. In general,
the Task Force Strategy Report proposed to plant new economic seeds in a
region dependent primarily on farming, tourism and the military, without
destroying the natural beauty of the undeveloped open space that exists on the
base.
California State University The new California State University was
envisioned as the seed of the Task Forces economic development strategy.
Within three days of the 1991 closure announcement, Leon Panetta contacted
the President of San Jose State University to discuss the possibility of moving
San Jose State's satellite office to Fort Ord ("Gift of Fort Ord Has Cost to CSU",
San Jose Mercury News: July 7, 1994). These discussions led to the even
bigger idea of opening an entire 25,000 student, 1,300 acre California State
University Monterey Bay (CSUMB) campus at Fort Ord.
To pursue this idea further, the CSUMB offices opened in October of
1992, almost two years before the property was actually conveyed to the
university. With a small administrative and development staff, a master plan and
academic program were developed for the new university. The academic focus
of CSUMB Monterey Bay, it is envisioned, will be marine science, marine
biology, atmospheric studies, ecology and environmental studies. An on-going
faculty search is intended to attract some of the best academic labs, researcher
and research grants. CSUMB also envisions business, arts and humanities,
social sciences and liberal arts programs to offer a more comprehensive
curriculum, characteristic of most CSUMB campuses:
'The university plans to work with the DoD's Defense Language
Institute to share programs, classes and facility. But more
importantly we want to be an educational complex that includes the
research and development aspects of science -- specifically marine
and environmental sciences. There are already about 12
institutions from Santa Cruz to Big Sur that focus on Atmospheric
and oceanographic studies. We hope to capture a synergy
between all of these institutions that will be unmatched elsewhere
in the world -- similar to Woods Hole. 20 We need to be careful not
20 Wood Hole, a small town on Cape Cod Massachusetts, is home to the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Insitute (WHOI). WHOI is a collaboration between MIT, Boston Univeristy, the
to become as elitist as Woods Hole, Stanford and the UC's,
however, because we are a state, public university and must
remain accessible to the general public.' -- Excerpt from interview
with Hank Hendrickson, Executive Dean, California State
University, Monterey Bay.
From an operational standpoint, the university hopes to utilize the
opportunities afforded to them at Fort Ord. According to Hank Hendrickson (the
Executive Dean of CSUMB) opportunities such as access to housing and
commercial/industrial space will give the university a chance to generate
revenues, above and beyond any state and federal revenues received. It is
envisioned that these revenues can be, in turn, sunk into tuition or boarding
scholarships, or even to defray the short term costs of operation. Hendrickson
envisioned that the rent for the 1,200 housing units would be tied to the market
and rented to staff and faculty for a profit. This will give many students the
opportunity to attend the university who may not have been able to do so for
financial reasons (Hendrickson interview: August 5, 1994)
Accordingly, CSUMB began renting the campus housing in the summer of
1994. Early estimates show that, based on current market rents, the university
could create up to $750,000 in revenues from the housing units in the first year
alone (Goblirsch interview: August 8, 1994).
The STEP Program: The University of Santa Cruz (UCSC) prepared a proposal
for the creation of the Multi-Institutional Center for Science, Technology,
Education, and Policy (or STEP program) to be located at Fort Ord. Heralded as
the "cornerstone of the Fort Ord Military Reservation economic conversion plan",
this effort offered an opportunity for regional economic stimulus and
environmental solutions for the world (A Multi-Institutional Center for Science,
Technology, Education and Policy at Fort Ord -- Vision Statement; Santa Cruz:
University of California, November, 1993). As participants of the original Fort
National Oceanic and Atmostpheric Administration and other institutions for the purpose of
furthering the exploration of oceanic and marine related sciences (Kildow lecture: 1994).
Ord Reuse Task Force, UCSC staff has played an integral part in the conception
and development of this regional partnership between the state university and
the Task Force. Discussions between Panetta and the Director of Governmental
Research Affairs and Regional Economic Development at UCSC began as early
as the fall of 1991, months after the closure announcement (Martin interview:
August 9, 1994). Accordingly, UCSC assembled project staff to oversee the
redevelopment of Fort Ord and to implement the plans for the STEP Center.
In November of 1993, UCSC released its Vision Statement to support the
university-based economic development concept proposed in the STEP
program. The goal of this strategy is to create a synergistic relationship between
all of the existing and proposed science and technology institutions and natural
resources, from Monterey Bay to Santa Cruz, to become the one of the worlds
premiere marine and environmental science regions. Existing local institutions
include UC Santa Cruz, California State University Monterey Bay (opening Sept.
1995), the Naval Postgraduate School, Oceanographic Center and Research
Labs, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the
Monterey Bay Aquarium Research Institute (MBARI), CSU's Moss Landing
Marine Labs, Stanford University's Hopkins Marine Station, and the US
Geological Survey Branch of Pacific Marine Geology. Physical proximity to the
Silicon Valley and San Francisco Bay Area are also cited as a catalyst. This
network, it is hoped, will foster economic growth and prosperity throughout the
region; the technologies, resources and ideas generated from the organizations
will be the basis for new institutional and commercial partnerships (A Multi-
Institutional Center for Science, Technology, Education and Policy at Fort Ord --
Vision Statement; Santa Cruz: University of California, November, 1993):
"[T]he area has the real estate and the talent necessary to make
this region more dynamic than Woods Hole. Because we have
access to a wider variety of institutions, it has the potential to be an
international center for environmental and marine studies." --
Excerpt from interview with Lora Lee Martin, Director of
Government Research Affairs and Regional Economic
Development - UCSC.
The "Visioning" processes at Fort Ord
Concurrent to the creation of the Task Force, the communities of Seaside
and Marina began their own planning process from which they generated their
'visions' for the future of the Fort Ord region. As discussed in a earlier section,
Seaside and Marina did not feel as though the university-based Task Force
Strategy sufficiently addressed their needs for municipal revenues and jobs. The
university components of the Task Force Strategy seemed to promise jobs and
revenues to the local communities by replacing the military demand with
university-based demand. In ten or more years, CSU anticipates a student
population of 25,000, to replace the 25,000 soldiers that occupied Fort Ord
before its closure (Hendrickson interview: August 5, 1994).
However, in a position paper entitled From Vision to Nightmare: CSU
Monterey Bay, Marina's Mayor expressed his city's concerns regarding the
development of the new CSU campus. According to the Mayor, the city of
Marina was concerned primarily about the loss of potential property tax dollars
on the 1,300 acres university campus, and the lack of short term local
expenditures and jobs associated with the university population in the near term.
According to CSU's Executive Dean, only 1,000-2,000 students are expected to
be enrolled in the first few years following the CSU's anticipated opening in the
fall of 1995 (ibid.). This small student population, the cities fear, will not offset
the economic losses experienced from the closure of Fort Ord (From Vision to
Nightmare: CSU Monterey Bay: 1994, pg. 1-2). Marina's Mayor was also
concerned that the high initial capital expenditures required to develop the
university (an estimated $136 million) would absorb all of the potential state and
federal financial assistance available for non-university related development
(ibid.).
To Marina, it was obvious that their city would have to absorb more than
their fair share of non-revenue generating regional users, primarily the
universities -- certainly more that the rest of the Peninsula region, and even more
than Seaside. This, they feared would leave them less land for revenue
producing private development. However, it does not appear as thought the
university siting was chosen to intentionally to harm Marina. According to CSU's
Executive Dean, the site was chosen primarily because of the buildings and
facilities that were located on the 1,300 acre parcel, and because the property
was considered relatively environmentally clean. That is, the presence
hazardous contaminants, such as unexploded ordnance were not found in this
location (Hendrickson interview: August 5, 1994).
In addition, the City of Marina would have to absorb the majority of the
new housing that would come on the market once the base was officially closed.
This, it was feared, would not only reduce the cities' property values and tax
revenue potential, but would actually require additional public expenditures for
schools and other services to support the new residents:
"Mr. Panetta's approach [to create a university-based economy]
was effective because it reassured the Monterey Bay community
that it was not drifting into economic oblivion because of the
closure.. .While the proposed university may have helped with
election year public relations for [Panetta], it created an expensive
implementation problem.
The Task Force's desire for the University became so strong that it
choked out or diminished other Fort Ord reuse visions. It became
the big tree in the forest.. .[but the University will certainly cost the
impacted Cities its potential for new property tax revenues]. Not
only would [Marina and Seaside] be impacted by the most difficult
features of the University, including traffic and potential crime, they
would also be paying an unequitable share of the freight, with very
little say [in its development]." -- Excerpt from "From Vision to
Nightmare: CSUMB Monterey Bay" by Tak Takali, Mayor of Marina.
Thus, reflecting the Mayor's protests, the cities of Seaside and Marina,
continued to pursue their own economic planning process, based primarily on
tourism-related uses. Through planning processes that have come to be known
as the "visioning processes", Seaside and Marina created more intensely
developed, municipally profitable reuse plans for their cities.
In the fall of 1991, Marina and Seaside each set out to develop their own
individual reuse 'visions'. The Vision Plan would be later incorporated into a
single vision reflecting the needs and objectives of both cities.
Seaside's Visioning Process: At a cost of approximately $10,000 of their own
funds, the City of Seaside worked to create its own "vision" for the economic
development at Fort Ord. In November of 1991, in-house staff members and
City Officials were divided into groups and asked to describe "what they thought
should happen at Fort Ord" (Potter interview: August 3, 1994). There were no
restrictions or criteria placed on the planning effort in the beginning -- the primary
objective was to flush out any and all ideas regardless of how crazy they seemed
-- the details were to be worked out at a later date (ibid.). Seaside's Planning
Services Manager stated: "[T]his was not a reality test, this was the idea test."
At the initial meeting, a map was placed on the wall , and city staff
members were given yellow post-its to mark the location of various "ideas" as
determined by the staff (ibid.). From this process the first version of Seaside's
Vision Plan was created. Then, a second workshop was held for the public and
other local entities. The second workshop was conducted much like the first;
resulting in the creation of a second version of the city's Vision Plan. According
to the Seaside Planning Manager, the two versions of the Vision Plan were very
similar; thus, incorporation into a single reuse "vision" was easy (Potter interview,
1994). The resulting Vision Plan was then reviewed by key city officials,
including the Mayor, to determine the economic feasibility of the ideas. After
only a few small changes, the Seaside Vision Plan was adopted by the City
Council in November of 1991 (ibid.).
In general, the city of Seaside targeted the hotel and tourism industry as
the focus of its economic strategy, anchored by a "Disneyland-like" theme park,
film studio, golf course resort and vineyards. In addition, the plan incorporated
some commercial uses (including office space and a central business district),
R&D/industrial and new residential. Seaside demonstrated cautious acceptance
of the university-based Task Force plan by also incorporating a small amount of
university related uses such as a research and development park. (See Map 3,
Appendix B).
Marina's Visioning Process: Also in the fall of 1991, the City of Marina held an
economic development workshop facilitated by a member of the planning faculty
at the University of California at Berkeley. Professor Ed Blakely, a researcher
specializing in the areas of rural development, community development and local
economic development, facilitated the process. The workshop was attended by
community residents and city representatives (approximately 50 residents were
in attendance). In a "town meeting fashion", issues such as existing
infrastructure, municipal and management capacity, existing labor force
assessment, capital and natural resources were articulated and debated
(Longley interview: August 8, 1994). Again, markers and a map were used to
document ideas. From this process Marina's "vision" strategy took shape.
The primary objective in the visioning process was "to fill the [base] land
with new economic generators to provide a renewed economic livelihood in
Marina -- but without the cost of significant job retraining" (ibid.). This objective
was reflected in the City's initial reuse strategy that included uses such as a
theme park, film complex, health spa, resort and campground, amphitheater, golf
courses, general aviation airport and hotels, in addition to a central business
district -- or 'downtown', medical center, a national weather station, new housing,
commercial, R&D/light industrial facilities and open and recreational spaces.
Like Seaside, Marina ultimately incorporated some university/research related
uses. (See Map 4, Appendix B).
Striving for a Collective Reuse Strategy Concerned for the future of their
municipality, Marina and Seaside city officials appealed to the Task Force for
greater consideration of their Vision Plan. But according to Monterey's City
Manager, and founding Task Force member, the Task Force questioned the
fundamental economic viability of their Vision Plans. Specifically, the Task Force
did not feel that given the waning local tourism industry, existing tourism demand
could support the creation of more tourist attractions, hotels and restaurants -- at
least not to the scale that Seaside and Marina had envisioned in the plans.
(Meurer interview: August 9, 1994). Accordingly, the Task Force turned down
the cities requests to incorporate the Vision Plans in the regional strategy. But
Marina and Seaside did not give up the fight. They upheld their tourism-based
approach to economic development until the fall of 1993 when the Army
announced that the university land transfers had been approved.
But despite their unsuccessful attempts to incorporate their Vision Plans
into the regional strategy, Marina and Seaside continued to be involved with the
Task Force and its Advisory Groups. According to city officials, the cities did not
want to lose their "foot-hold in the regional reuse efforts -- from our stand point,
we saw it as a way to [maintain ties with] the Monterey County power structure"
(Potter interview: August 3, 1994):
"[Marina and Seaside] went along with the university focus because
so many in the region were behind it -- that's where the power lies.
But a university will significantly change this city. We are going to
have to gear up for some dramatic social and economic changes." -
- Excerpt from interview with John Longley, Marina City Manger
Accordingly, Marina began to pursue a new approach to local economic
development in their city. The city first addressed short term job creation by
pursuing a campaign requiring the Army to commit more of its reuse-related
contracts to local contractors and consultants. This would allow for additional
short term employment opportunities for local construction and maintenance
contractors, as well as planning and technical consultants.
For instance, the City of Marina pursued federal CDBG (Community
Development Block Grant) money for a study that looked at the development of
a local incubator program designed to foster industries spun-off from local
marine-based and environmental research (Goblirsch interview, 1994). After
receiving the CDBG commitment, Marina began develop a program in
conjunction with the University of Santa Cruz's STEP project. The STEP project,
it was envisioned, promised to benefit Marina's economy in the short term by
focusing on the technology transfer of research efforts already underway at UC's
campus in Santa Cruz. Under the program, Marina hoped to benefit from the
provision of commercial/industrial space and local labor to support these
ventures. A feasibility study (authorship unknown) later commissioned by the
City of Marina revealed, however, that because there was so much industrial
space already on the local market, this project would not be prosperous, at least
not until the university had a chance to grow (Goblirsch interview: August
8,1994).
Nevertheless, the City of Marina applied for and received approximately
$900,000 in federal grants from the Economic Development Administration
(EDA), for the purpose of creating the STEP Center. According to Marina's
Economic Development Director, the EDA money was to be used to begin to
build the facilities necessary to support the STEP Center (ibid.).
It was envisioned that the STEP center would be developed in joint
partnership with private sector entities. Accordingly, Marina began immediately
seeking private developers interests. But according to Marina's city officials,
their efforts to date have been hampered because the city does not have site
control of the land at Fort Ord on which the STEP Center is envisioned. It is not
surprising to imagine that private investors can not afford to wait for a long period
of time before the federal property is sold or leased for development. Thus, until
Marina can gain site control of the property at Fort Ord within its jurisdiction, the
attraction of private developer interests is not likely.
Seaside also continued to pursue their tourism-based development
strategy. In fact, throughout my interview with Seaside's Planning Services
Manger was the constant sound of a pile driver securing the foundation of the
new Embassy Suites hotel under construction just down the street from the city
offices. The new 50+ room hotel had been in the works since before the closure
announcement. However, to Seaside this structure was believed to be a symbol
the their economic future (Potter interview: August 3, 1994).
Part V: Forming an Official Reuse Planning Entity
Despite opposition from the surrounding cities, the Task Force completed
its economic development Strategy Report in June of 1992. By this time,
Panetta had left his post as the Chairman of the Task Force to become the
Director of Management and Budget, and later the Chief of Staff under the newly
elected Clinton Administration. He was succeeded as both US Congressman
and the Chairman of the Task Force by Sam Farr. Under Farr, the Task Force's
first order of business was to create a planning entity to develop the physical
reuse plan and land use bylaws, in accordance with the provisions of the
university-based reuse strategy. The challenge was in creating a reuse planning
entity that could balance the economic development objectives of Seaside and
Marina with those of the Task Force. Accordingly, a number of different
organizational structures were proposed, each with a different mix of
jurisdictional representation and authority.
Emerging Joint Powers Authorities
The cities of the Monterey Peninsula region first tried to create a
Memorandum of Understanding in which the land use planning of Fort Ord would
be undertaken by the communities with jurisdiction over the property on the
base. However, regionally defined and prescribed planning guidelines would be
strictly followed to assure that the university-based strategy was supported in the
Reuse Plan. Not surprisingly, this agreement did not receive support from all of
the neighboring communities. Marina and Seaside charged that the agreement
did nothing to address their needs and concerns regarding the negative impacts
to their communities as a result of the university-based strategy. So, they
created a counter proposal; a formal reuse planning entity to be controlled only
by those with land use jurisdiction on the base -- Marina, Seaside and the
County.
In November of 1991, Seaside and Marina created the Fort Ord Economic
Development Authority (FOEDA). FOEDA was organized as a Joint Powers
Authority (JPA) for the purpose of governing the implementation of the local
Vision Plans. A JPA is a collective entity of governmental institutions recognized
under state redevelopment law for the purpose of pursuing regional
redevelopment projects. Each JPA is written as a separate piece of state
legislation that allows for joint land use planning and political power. The JPA
entity is empowered to designate redevelopment districts, and is vested with the
power to create special taxing districts to finance redevelopment projects, such
as tax increment and state bonding finance.21
The FOEDA JPA was created for the purpose of utilizing state bonding
authority to help fund the redevelopment of Fort Ord on behalf of Marina,
Seaside and the County. According to the Mayor of Seaside, Lance McClair, the
21 Tax Increment Financing, or TIF, is a taxing structure that allowed municipalities to use the
increased taxes derived from successful redevelopment projects. By establishing a taxing base,
that was tied to the value of the property prior to redevelopment, the municipality used the
increase in taxing value to pay down the debts associated with the project. Similarly, California's
Mello-Roos bill was created in 1982 by Senator Henry Mello in response to the passing of
Proposition 13. It was created to provide a practical way to finance infrastructure in
redevelopment situations that exceed the Proposition 13 tax cap. It created a special taxing
district over a certain geographic location, determined by the extent of those impacted by the
infrastructure project. Proceeds from the tax were used to back the bonds that were floated to
fund the project.
purpose of the FOEDA JPA was to give Marina and Seaside more direct
influence over the control of the Fort Ord redevelopment.
In November of 1991, the state legislature recognized the FOEDA JPA as
legal redevelopment authority pursuant to California redevelopment law (McClair
interview: August 3, 1994). As such, FOEDA was empowered with the ability to
issue state redevelopment bonds. However, under California redevelopment
law, the state does not agree to guarantee the bond issues. Instead, the bonds
must be backed solely by the revenues generated from the reuse project (Potter
interview: February 7, 1995). But FOEDA did not have site control over the base
property. Without the ability to designate a redevelopment project district, their
powers as a redevelopment authority were ineffective.
The intent of the FOEDA JPA was to create an entity that could pursue
redevelopment projects when, or if, the property is transferred to the local
communities. According to Seaside's Mayor, FOEDA's primary goals included
the pursuit of economic development opportunities that promised to return
revenues and jobs to the communities most negatively affected by the closure. It
was envisioned that these goals would be carried out through the pursuit of the
primarily tourism-based Vision Plans created by both Seaside and Marina.
Marina and Seaside also asked the County to join them in their effort to
take control of the reuse planning process. The County, however, was not
willing to support the FOEDA JPA on the basis that FOEDA's decision-making
structure did not allow for input from other communities in the region to which
they were also accountable:
"[FOEDA] met regularly for a couple of years, and actually got one
federal grant from the FAA to develop the [Fort Ord] airfield in
Marina. But without the County they were not able to say they
represented all of Fort Ord. The voting structure was to be one
vote for each Marina, Seaside and the County. The County
rejected this proposal because it meant they would be out
numbered by the Cities -- it has been a constant struggle for
control." -- Excerpt from interview with Joe Cavanaugh, FORG
Project Coordinator.
FOEDA operated as a planning entity independent of the Task Force for
one year from November 1991 until November 1992.
The creation of the Fort Ord Reuse Group (FORG)
The Fort Ord Reuse Group was created in October of 1992 by the Task
Force. The primary purpose of the entity was to prepare a physical reuse master
plan to be used as the basis for the Army's EIS. Timely completion of the EIS
was critical at Fort Ord case, because without the EIS, the university properties
could not be transferred. But in order to accomplish this, a cooperative working
relationship would have to be established between the communities surrounding
the base. Recognizing the potential for future inter-jurisdictional conflicts
between Marina and Seaside's and the other communities in the Monterey
Peninsula, the Task Force tried to create a cooperative planning forum in which
the interests and objectives of all of the communities could be articulated and
negotiated.
The Task Force first tried to create a formal reuse planning entity that
gave more weight to the communities who physically abut the base property.
Thus, in the spirit of compromise, a cooperative planning effort by five cities and
the County was proposed through the creation of the Fort Ord Reuse Group
(FORG).
According to a study conducted by Kirschenbaum and Marsh of the
University of California at Berkeley, the organizational structure of FORG was
based on a three tiered system. Planning and land use decisions were made in
a forum of city majors and leaders from the County government. The decision-
making structure reflected a majority vote system with one vote for each member
city: Monterey, Del Ray Oaks, Sand City, Seaside, and Marina. The County was
also given three votes. The actual physical planning was done by a Working
Group comprised of city planning staff members from the five cities. A Managers
Group, comprised of the member city mangers, worked to coordinate between
these two groups (Kirschenbaum and Marsh: 1993, pp. 61-63). Finally, a project
coordinator, Joe Cavanaugh, was hired to facilitate the three-tiered planning
forum and to handle the day-to-day operations of FORG. Not surprisingly,
Cavanaugh reportedly spent most of his time mediating conflicts between the
member entities (Cavanaugh interview: August 3, 1994).
However, the FORG structure was still unacceptable to Marina and
Seaside because it still placed them in a minority voting position -- out numbered
by three cities and the County. Marina and Seaside did not want the other cities
in the regions telling them what to do with "their land". They contended that it did
not seem appropriate to give Sand City -- a city of less than 200 residents -- the
same voting power as Seaside, a city of almost 40,000, in decisions that will
most directly affect Marina and Seaside.
As a form of protest, Seaside and Marina tried to exercise land use rights
over the land at Fort Ord falling within their respective jurisdictions. According to
Seaside city officials, their rights included the ability to make decisions regarding
the use of land within their jurisdiction, and the ability to generate revenues from
the development of the land (Potter interview: February 7, 1995). This, they
contended, gave them the additional power in the FORG decision making
structure necessary to pursue their minority interests and objectives. However, it
was feared that the potential for legal challenges by the cities would delay the
development of the Reuse Plan. According to a representative of State Senator
Henry Mello's office, the cities did, in fact, pursue a number of legal actions
against the Task Force; however, the details of the legal conflicts were not
available at the time of the study (LaGraff interview: July 28, 1994).
Thus, in an effort to mitigate the reuse planning gridlock resulting from
Marina and Seaside's unwillingness to cooperate with the prevailing reuse
organization, FORG tried to create an alternative decision-making structure.
FORG crafted yet another JPA agreement, this time using a weighted voting
system aimed at giving the cities more direct, but not complete influence in the
decision-making process. Over a period of about 18 months, negotiations
regarding the new FORG proposed JPA took place. Through countless meeting,
discussion regarding the new organization's structure often resulted in heated
inter-jurisdictional arguments between Seaside and Marina and the other
members of FORG. Finally, fed up with FORG's lack of progress in creating the
reuse plan, State Senator Henry Mello stepped in to mediate the conflict. In
February of 1994, he introduced Senate Bill 899.
State Intervention and the Introduction of SB 899
By the Spring of 1994, State Senator Henry Mello (D-Watsonville) had
replaced US Congressman Sam Farr as the Chair of the Fort Ord Community
Task Force. As his first order of business, Mello publicly rejected the proposed
FORG JPA, on the grounds that it did not completely meet the interests and
objectives of all of the communities in the region. Mello also condemned the
effort to incorporate Marina and Seaside's economic development strategies as
unrealistic given the objectives of the Task Force Strategy (LaGraff interview:
July 28, 1994).
As an alternative, Mello proposed Senate Bill 899 (SB 899) establishing
new decision making authorities through the creation of a new reuse entity called
the Fort Ord Redevelopment Authority (FORA). It was envisioned that FORA
would carry out the future development and long term implementation of the Fort
Ord Reuse Plan. Fearing that the delays in the creation of a viable Reuse Plan
would interfere with the transfer of the university sites, scheduled for July of
1994, SB 899 was quickly passed by the Senate on May 9, 1994:
"Mello offered proposed bill (SB 899) that would create the reuse
entity FORA to carry out the redevelopment of the base property.
SB 899 passed, however, some key issues were pulled out of the
bill for further debate -- these issues were to be incorporated in a
subsequent bill. SB 899 is the governing authority without all of the
whistles and bells to make it complete and useful in its entirety.
But it served a purpose by breaking up the local planning gridlock
at Fort Ord.
SB 899 opened the reuse process up to other surrounding
communities to support the creation of a reuse entity that looked
more like Panetta's original Task Force." -- Excerpt from interview
with Kevin LaGraff, Legislative Consultant to Senator Mello.
The primary difference between SB 899 and the existing structure of
FORG was that it re-introduced the membership of non-adjacent regional
communities such as Carmel, Pacific Grove and Salinas. Under the legislation,
the reuse authority would be governed by a board of 13 members: one member
appointed by each of the cities of Marina, Seaside, Monterey, Sand City, Del Ray
Oaks, Pacific Grove, Carmel-by-the-Sea and Salinas; and five members
appointed by the County of Monterey. SB 899 also established FORA as the
physical planning and zoning and permitting board for the base redevelopment:
'[FORA was] simply a new state organization -- caretaker of a city
the size of San Francisco. [FORA was] tasked with figuring out
how to use all of the state and federal laws available to assist them
in the redevelopment, while also considering issues of
infrastructure and private sector interests. They must set a course
for redevelopment regardless of who the elected officials will be --
this is the key to reuse... FORA's [newly hired] staff will be critical
here; we need to give the city managers a break so they can attend
to issues other than the Reuse Plan.' -- Excerpt from interview with
Jack Barlick, Chair of FORG and FORA, Mayor of Del Ray Oaks.
After Senator Mello introduced Senate Bill 899 in April of 1994, FORA was
expected to adopted the original FORG Reuse Plan with only minimal changes.
The Final Draft Reuse Plan to be adopted by FORA clearly reflected the Task
Force's economic development strategy that had been create three years earlier.
The final plan still reflected the Task Force's original university-based strategy
including the attraction of emerging marine and environmental technologies, and
research and education (through the California State University and University of
California extension), an agricultural processing center, and recreation and
environmental open space. (See Map 5, Appendix B.)
The Legislation also requires that Seaside and Marina amend their
general city plans, including zoning and other implementing ordinances, to
conform with the final FORA Reuse Plan. According to SB 899, Seaside and
Marina's land use plans, bylaws, and other planning ordinances must be in
conformity with the FORA plan for the properties that are located on former Fort
Ord land. It is envisioned that the impacted cities would still hold planning and
zoning authority regarding compliance to the Reuse Plan. However, a permit
issued by Seaside, Marina or the County, for instance, will be appealable to the
FORA Board by any citizen or organization in the region. In other words, any
citizen or organization who disagree with Seaside or Marina's compliance
decision, could request a subsequent review by the full FORA board. This, of
course, was extremely troubling to Seaside and Marina, but the new state
legislation left them without legal grounds on which to contest the new structure.
This, it would appear as though the creation of FORA eliminated any hopes that
the cities would ever fully realize their tourism-based economic development
strategies:
"Essentially, FORA functions as a super-regional appeal board.
We don't necessarily like this process because we still have to deal
with the regional political overlays -- but we did not have the horses
in Sacramento to derail [SB 899]. We wanted majority control on
the FORA governing board but did not get it. [Instead, the entities
with land use jurisdiction on the base] were given two members (or
two votes) on the board, instead of one [as originally proposed] --
but we are still out numbered [in the decision-making process]." --
Excerpt from interview with Dennis Potter, Seaside Planning
Service Manager.
Finally, FORA was also created as a forum to work out some key
elements left out SB 899. SB 1600 was later created to define the Reuse Plan
implementation and redevelopment operations. Items covered by SB 1600
include the formation of redevelopment project districts, or economic
development zones; long term municipal financing systems; a short term
financial mechanism to cover the cost of much needed infrastructure upgrades;
housing, and public school issues (Status Report, SB 1600 and Housing Issues:
June 29, 1994, pp. 1-4). In essence, SB 1600 is Marina and Seaside's last
chance to retain any level of local control of the long term redevelopment
process:
'The cities and the County [were] trying to negotiate among
themselves, a strategy for structuring the redevelopment authority
created by SB 899 -- how many redevelopment areas will there be,
and what will be the principal municipal finance structure. If they
can not come to a consensus, it is likely that Mello will come in
again and impose his own version of [SB 1600] that he feels best
addresses the situation from the State's perspective. Mello is, at
this point, the primary state link in the process. He is not running
for office again so he does not have to worry about re-election
pressures and was able to cram 899, and if need be SB 1600 down
everyone's throats.' -- Excerpt from interview with Judith Brown,
The Judith Brown Company (local planning consultant to the Army
Corps of Engineers -- See section entitled Testing the Plan).
Not surprisingly, the passage of SB 899 and the creation of FORA was
met with little opposition outside of Marina and Seaside. The urgency to get on
with the productive redevelopment of the base and the creation of new jobs and
municipal revenues echoed throughout the region:
"899 was the culmination of a natural progression of a government
strategy. Starting form a broad-based citizens groups, [Panetta's
Task Force] considered regional issues and came up with a reuse
strategy -- to FORG [the entity] that created a land use plan based
on the strategy -- to FORA a reuse authority [that would] implement
the plan and govern the operations of the development" -- Excerpt
from interview with Joe Cavanaugh, Former Director of FORG.
Inevitably, the ideological conflicts between the cities of Seaside and
Marina are still breeding disagreement between the local communities. It was
not long before FORA became the next battle field in what was turning out to be
a war between the two cities who possessed annexed property at the base, and
just about every one else involved with the reuse planning process. Immediately
after FORA was endowed by SB 899, Seaside and Marina tried to 'kill the bill'.
They hired lobbyists in Sacramento and in Washington, challenging the
constitutionality of the pre-emptive state legislation; the City of Seaside even
began legal proceedings against the State's actions. In response to these
defensive actions, Mello threatened to introduce legislation that would de-annex
Seaside and Marina from Fort Ord "so that the other communities could go on
with the reuse planning effort" ("Disputes Won't Halt Most Ord Land Deals",
Monterey County Herald, January 20, 1994).
In July of 1994, Marina and Seaside backed down and signed on with
FORA in July of 1994. But resentment between the two cities and FORA still
lingers on.
An emerging State-wide role
In January of 1994, a report was prepared for the Governor's Office by the
California Military Base Reuse Task Force. The State Task Force was a group
of public administrators and corporate representatives created by California
Executive Order W-50-93 to identify impacts, propose solutions and promote the
speedy conversion of closing military bases in California. The report presented a
consensus finding regarding the State's role based on three principal
conclusions: (1) clear responsibility must to be fixed for oversight of the reuse
process at each base; (2) existing state regulatory barriers to growth and
development must be revised to that they are less burdensome on the military
base conversion efforts; and (3) toxic clean-up at all closing bases must remain a
priority concern for the state (Report to Governor Wilson: 1994, vii-xxii).
In general the Governor's Task Force considered military base closure to
be of economic concern to the entire state, but that the reuse decisions should
be made at the local level. 22 As such, the Report specifically recommended
State involvement to be limited to the following: local dispute resolution, state
environmental clean-up process and requirement reform, information collection
and dissemination, financial support through additional state bond funding, and
general regulatory streamlining to facilitate private sector development at closed
bases.23
The Report was primarily an investigative effort. At the time of this
Report, the Governor had not taken steps to implement any of the ideas or
provisions set forth in the Governor's Task Force report. Most of the
recommendations made were merely conceptual and would require further
debate, and possibly legislative action, before they could be carried out. As
such, the effort did not enlighten or influence the reuse planning process at Fort
Ord.
The Office of Economic Adjustment
The Office of Economic Adjustment was created by the Department of
Defense in response to the closure rounds of the 1960's and 70's. OEA's
primary purpose was to financially assist, educate and advise closure
communities on how to prepare reuse plans and strategies.24 The OEA staff
was located in Washington and at regional headquarters throughout the country.
Although not continually involved with the local reuse processes, the staff was
22 The Report states specifically that "the State should intervene in those unusual cases where
critical airport or seaport resources might not be preserved by the local planning entity (pg. x).
23 By the Spring of 1994, the terms of specific legislation in support of the new state role emerged.
Proposed state legislation included: Weggeland/Presely (AB 3769), amending state
redevelopment laws to help finance base infrastructure; Honeycutt (AB 3755), recognizing a
single reuse authority to which all state agencies are directed to consult with prior to submitting
any public benefit conveyance requests to the federal government (i.e., McKinney requests); and
Bergson (SB 1971), amending CEQA base closure legislation so as to reduce the need for
lengthy and duplicative NEPA/CEQA requirement for environmental reviews.
24 The OEA was incorporated into a broader federal economic assistance program in 1970. As a
result, financial support for local economic reuse planning for military bases was diluted
significantly. Deeper federal spending cuts and the closure of more bases was expected to
reduce federal planning aid even more by the mid-1 990's (Kirschenbaum and Marsh: 1993, pp. 6-
7).
called on for assistance as requested by local reuse groups. In addition, OEA
staff prepared general guidelines and how-to manuals that described the federal
closure process and general planning guidelines to facilitate timely federal
property transfer (Kirschenbaum and Marsh: 1993, pp. 6-7).
OEA's planning funds were administered to a single governing agent
overseeing the reuse planning process. In total, $1.4 million in OEA grants were
awarded to the Fort Ord redevelopment efforts. In the early days of the Task
Force, the OEA recognized the County of Monterey as the receiving agency.
Once FORA was created as the official reuse planning agency, funding
recognition was transferred to FORA. But beyond providing the planning funds,
the OEA remained a silent player in the reuse planning process. With the
exception of the review of FORG's status reports and an occasional trip to the
base, the regional OEA staff members remained silent partners throughout the
planning process (Potter: August 3, 1994).
Service Branch Involvement
Pursuant to the 1988 and 1991 federal Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) legislation, the Department of Defense was responsible for the closure
and disposal of its military installations. In turn, the DoD delegated much of its
responsibilities to the individual service branches who physically occupied the
bases. At the installation level, the individual service branch was tasked both
with decommissioning its troops (i.e., shutting down base operations and
relocating or terminating individual soldiers tours of duty), and dealing with the
day-to-day issues of the reuse and disposal process.
At Fort Ord, the first task was handled by Garrison Commander Colonel
Tom ElIzey, who was responsible for packing up the "boys and the toys" and
concluding the Army's mission at Fort Ord. His predecessor to the job, Colonel
Fore had been at the base since WWII. In fact, Colonel Fore, who had literally
built the base at Fort Ord, found it too difficult to tear it down. Thus, after four
years of service in the closure mission, he requested a transfer to an operating
base.
Accordingly to Colonel ElIzey, it is the Army's job, specifically the on-site
BRAC office, to provide information to the communities regarding the federal
base closure and disposal process. The Fort Ord BRAC office was responsible
for working with the communities, the state and other federal users toward a
smooth transition of the base property from federal to civilian use. According to
ElIzey, the BRAC office coordinates all of the clean-up efforts and works with the
communities to find out what their issues are; they give guidance where
necessary and, of course, control the Army's closure process.
ElIzey acknowledged that cooperation with the local reuse planning
process is also very important, especially when it comes to issues of
environmental clean-up, citing that the sooner the EIS and cleanup provisions
are in place, the sooner the Army can begin transferring property back to the
communities (ElIzey interview: August 4, 1994). The BRAC office will remain in
operation until the last of the Army troops are completely moved out. This is
anticipated to take place in 1997.
The Army Corps of Engineers: The Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE) is the
entity tasked to oversee the environmental impact process, and the creation of
the Property Disposal Plan (PDP). The PDP becomes the Army's reuse plans
from which future land transfer negotiations are based.25 Accordingly, ACOE is
involved with land use negotiations to both federal and non-federal entities.
ACOE also oversees the maintenance of property not yet transferred from the
Army.
At the time of this study, ACOE was involved primarily with the creation of
the Environmental Impact Study (EIS) required under federal environmental
laws. Although participation in the local reuse process is typical under the
25 See Appendix A for more information regarding the federal base reuse process.
federal EIS process, ACOE's involvement with the local reuse process at Fort
Ord was minimal (Memorandum from Joe Cavanaugh to Leon Panetta's office:
1994). It is unclear why the ACOE chose not to be involved with the local reuse
planning process. However, the ACOE's lack of cooperation with the local
communities in the EIS process ultimately led to a conflict between the Army and
the local entities. (This is discussed in greater detail in the next section)
The Base Transition Coordinator Implemented by Presidents Clinton's Five
Point Plan for revising the federal base reuse process, the Base Transition
Coordinator (BTC) position was created to cut through the red tape of the Army's
bureaucracy (Department of Defense, "Revitalizing Base Closure Communities
and Community Assistance": 1994). It was envisioned that the BTC's would
make the decisions necessary to expedite both the local and the federal reuse
processes. The BTCs were typically senior military or government officials who
were given the power to seek council directly from the Secretary of Defense's
office (Hasse interview: July 29, 1994).
In the summer of 1993, a group of Transition Coordinators were trained in
Washington in all aspects of the federal closure process -- closure, cleanup,
disposal and reuse -- and dispatched to bases throughout the country (ibid.).
Fort Ord would receive its first Transition Coordinator by the fall of that same
year. However, according to accounts by members of the Fort Ord Reuse
Group, the Army has been primarily an invisible player. Specifically, the Base
Transition Coordinator's ability to "cut through the Army's red tape" has not been
effective in helping the local reuse efforts at Fort Ord (Potter interview: August 3,
1994).
Part VI: Assembling the Collective Reuse Plan
In October of 1992, FORG was created to develop the base Reuse Plan.
With the Task Force's Strategy as its template, FORG began to identify the
individual base parcels by specific land uses. The plan, however, was not
created in a public process. As described earlier, the Task Force Strategy was
created in a publicly represented forum, in which members from the local
communities were appointed by the Task Force to participate in the creation of
the Task Force Strategy. According to FORG's Project Coordinator, the Task
Force reasoned that an additional public process was unnecessary in the
creation of the Reuse Plan itself (Cavanaugh interview: August 3, 1994).
FORG was created simply to prepare a land use plan based on the Task
Force's economic development strategy. Land use decisions, it was thought,
were better left to the city officials. So, the reuse planning process was
administered through a series of closed-door working sessions in which
community representation was reflected only through its membership in FORG.
But because of the contentious inter-jurisdictional relationships between the
members of FORG, the land use decision-making process was continually mired
in conflict.
By mid-October, FORG had assembled an initial "conflict" map that
identified 70 areas in which collective agreement could not be reached between
the parties involved. While these inter-jurisdictional conflicts were being worked
out, the outline for the Preliminary Draft of the Initial Base Reuse Plan (Reuse
Plan) was slowly assembled. The Initial Base Reuse Plan was approved by the
FORG members for submittal to the Department of Defense in March of 1993 for
consideration in the EIS process. But Because FORG's Reuse Plan had not
been completed in time for formal EIS consideration, the Army Corps of
Engineers created its own local reuse plan based on its estimation of an
environmental compatible reuse plan.
The Army's plan contained the university transfers and all of the federal
uses determined by the federal screening process, but did not calculate a build-
out population that was as dense as FORG had initially envisioned. Specifically,
the Army's anticipated local reuse plan allowed for development to sustain the
creation of approximately 60,000 new jobs. The FORG plan, on the other hand,
anticipated a build-out to accommodate 180,000 new jobs (Reimer, Paul
interview: January 19, 1994). So FORG was forced to revise the scope of its
Reuse Plan to better align with the Army's plan in order to avoid future
complications with the Army. Under the current federal base reuse process, any
uses not accounted for in the EIS would not be incorporated in the Army's
Record of Decision (ROD). Any proposed land uses not designated in the
Army's ROD were subject to a new EIS process. This meant possible delays in
future conveyances of up to 2 years (ibid.). (This issue is discussed further in
Chapter Four in the section entitled The EIS Process).
The revised Reuse Plan reflected approximately 2,000 acres of base
property transferred to the Presidio of Monterey Annex (POM Annex), 2,400
acres to the new California State University campus and UC Santa Cruz STEP
Center (for primarily research related purposes), and more than 16,000 acres
committed to nature preserves and habitat resource management (Fort Ord
Reuse Group, Summary of Base Reuse Plan: 1994, pp. 7-15). In addition to
land for schools and municipal facilities, approximately 2,650 acres remained for
private development. (ibid.).
Secondary uses include a regional airport, commercial office space, retail,
residential, conference space and tourism. In addition, the Army's retention of
the POM/ANNEX will continue to provide demand for local products and
services. In general, the regional approach reads to be a more environmentally
sensitive approach than the Marina and Seaside vision plans, with less intensive
development, more concern for regional resources such as air quality, and water
quality and availability. (Cavanaugh interview: August 3, 1994).
Testing the Plan
In the spring of 1994, the Army Corps of Engineer's commissioned a
study to determine the "marketability" of the Fort Ord Reuse Plan. The Duffy
Report was prepared by Denise Duffy and Associates in collaboration with a
number of independent planning and economic consultants. The impetus for this
study was the anticipation of the request by FORG to acquire the Army
surplused property (Denise Duffy & Associates: 1994, pp. 1-5). Based on an
economic analysis of market demand and development opportunities, the report
evaluated the potential reuse of the base and made recommendations for the
highest and best use of parcels not yet designated for use. Essentially, the Duffy
Report provided the Army with the information it needed to set a fair price for the
remaining surplused land.
Under the Economic Conveyance provisions of the Pryor Amendment to
the National Defense Authorization Act, the Army is allowed to convey property
to the local reuse authority at little, or no cost, provided the property is used for
economic development purposes (i.e., to create jobs and local revenues). The
Economic Conveyance provisions also give the Army the opportunity to share in
future profits made on the property through sale or lease.26 Accordingly, the
Duffy Report provided the Army with the information it needed to determine the
profit sharing potential of the property as developed under FORG's Reuse Plan
(Brown interview: August 1, 1994).
However, the report also addressed property disposition issues, timing
and methods of land conveyance, and priorities and strategies for marketing
specific parcels. According to one of the planning consultants involved with the
creation of the Duffy Report, it was not the intention of the Army to use the Duffy
Report as a way to undermine FORG's progress on the plan. Instead, it was the
Army's intention to prepare a realistic projection of the market demand for the
properties over the next twenty years in order to get a better idea of the
disposition timing of the property (Denise Duffy & Associates: 1994, pp. 2-4).
Based on FORG's Preliminary Draft Initial Base Reuse Plan, the Duffy
Report took a 20 year look at the general demographic and employment trends
and projected demand for commercial, industry, retail, educational, and
residential space. The economic trends and market absorption findings were
26 See Appendix A for more information regarding the Pryor Amendments and the Economic
Conveyance provisions.
applied to the Reuse Plan, and recommendations regarding appropriate land
uses for the market-driven parcels were made over three phases of plan
implementation: the first five years, first ten years and first twenty years
("Highlights of the Report", The Monterey County Herald: July 21, 1994).
The study concluded that not all of the market-driven parcels incorporated
in the Reuse Plan would be absorbed over the first 20 year period. In fact, the
Duffy Report estimated that only one fourth of the office and light industrial
development envisioned in the Reuse Plan can be absorbed given the prevailing
market conditions ("Ord Plans Questioned", Monterey County Herald, July 25,
1994). Moreover, the study also projects that the Reuse Plan overestimates the
demand for retail space over the next 50 years.
Part VIl: Conclusion
Looking to the Future
It was expected that FORA would officially adopt the FORG Reuse Plan
with only minor changes; many of which came about as a result of the findings of
the Duffy Report. At the time this study was conducted, FORA was in the
process of conducting a nation-wide search for its new Executive Officer, and
would hire a, full-time planning and operations staff. The prevailing issues of the
day concerned the details of SB 1600, which was expected to go before the
State Assembly sometime in the Fall of 1994. As proposed, SB 1600 included
directive for issues such as replacement housing, public school financing, and
the details of the prevailing redevelopment laws.
An Operations Plan was conceived in the spring of 1994, by FORG, that
focused on three elements: the preparation of a market feasibility study, an
infrastructure operations plan and a public service plan. The Operations Plan
represented the groundwork for long term development authority, municipal
governance and financing (Fort Ord Reuse Group, Operations Plan: Scope of
Work: April, 1994). The details of the operation plan were also to be
incorporated into SB 1600, however, were not available at the time of this study.
Satisfaction of the first element was met through the creation of the Duffy Report,
however, additional market feasibility analysis would be required to consider the
creation of FORA's financial and marketing structures. The infrastructure
financing and operations plan would be necessary to initiate the Operations
Plan, including the administrative structure, conveyance procedures, financing
alternatives and a physical upgrade schedule. The Public Service Plan would
consider issues of staffing and operations, cost revenue analysis and financing,
and efficient public service delivery (ibid.). These items are presently being
considered.
FORA's First Meeting: The first publicly attended meeting of the Fort Ord
Reuse Authority (FORA) was called to order by Senator Henry Mello on May 20,
1994. Leon Panetta and his wife were the honored guests. Colonel Ron Perry,
former head of the on-site BRAC Office returned to launch the commencement
of the new entity. Representation from the State Planning and Research Office,
as well as the state legislature were there to mark the occasion. Upon the
election of the new Officers and assembly of new sub-committees, the meeting
was underway. There was a call for public comment, at which time members of
the Restoration Advisory Board and Citizens Advisory Group and others spoke of
hopes for new directions for FORA that warranted more public participation and
access to information. Finally, the new FORA By-laws detailing the structure and
authority of the new entity were presented for debate.
Chapter Three:
The Case of Fort Devens, North Central, Massachusetts
Part I: Introduction
North Central Massachusetts is an outlying region of Boston and the
Route 128 high-technology area. Dotted by turn-of-the-century industrial cities
such as Lowell, Fitchburg and Leominster, this region has suffered the effects of
a long term industrial decline. Aside from the pockets of industrialization, the
North Central region is characterized by rolling hills, open green spaces and lush
green forests. Fort Devens encompassed approximately 9,000 acres at the
center of this region on land purchased by the military in 1917 from private land
owners and local municipalities.
In 1917, Camp Devens was constructed to train military draftees from all
over New England, many of whom were ultimately sent to Europe to fight in the
first World War. By WWII, the post population grew to 65,000, most of whom
were sent to Fort Devens to train for combat missions before being sent
overseas. By the end of the war, over 350,000 WWII veterans were discharged
through Fort Devens. The base was eventually reactivated for the purpose of
training troops during the Korean Conflict, and would remain open until the
closure announcement in 1991. At the time of the closure, Fort Devens was
home to the Army Intelligence School, 36th Medical Battalion, 10th Special
Forces Group (Airborne), the 187th Infantry Brigade and other training units.
Fort Devens was developed by the Department of Defense under the the
Acts and Resolves of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which required
private land holders to surrender property upon request for the purpose of
national defense (Terner: 1965, pp. 1-10). The Army designed Fort Devens such
that its layout and public works facilities were operated in isolation, rather than
integrated with the surrounding communities. In essence, the land became an
island unto itself with its own individual economic, physical and social
infrastructures.
The property at Devens, although technically owned by the Department of
Defense, remained within the jurisdictions of the four surrounding towns from
which it was originally purchased. The towns of Ayer, Harvard, Shirley and
Lancaster would continue to have an interest in the property at Devens.
However, they were not responsible for the provision of municipal services to the
base property or its residents, and did not collect property tax revenues from the
large federal property owner. Land use jurisdiction was maintained in
anticipation that someday the base would close and the land would revert back
to the towns.
Each of the four surrounding towns developed unique physical and social
characteristics that reflected the segregated settlement patterns of factory
owners and workers. The working class towns of Ayer and Shirley grew primarily
to support the needs of the military installation, as well as the manufacturing
sector that emerged in the North Central region in the early and mid 1900's. The
towns of Harvard and Lancaster, were primarily residential communities settled
by the region's wealthier classes.
Physical Description
Fort Devens was located approximately 35 miles North West of Boston,
near the intersection of Interstate 495 and State Route 2. It was approximately
25 miles northeast of the City of Worcester. The base consisted of 9,311 acres
in the North, Main and South Posts. Separated from the South Post by State
Route 2, the Main and North Posts were the primary subject of the Land Bank's
reuse planning process. Together these parcels accounted for approximately
4,400 acres of the base land, and over seven million square feet in over 1,000
buildings. 27 The remaining 4,883 acres of the South Post consisted primarily of
open space historically used by the military for training purposes. The South
Post was also adjacent to the existing, federally maintained Oxbow National
Wildlife Refuge.
At the time Fort Devens was announced for closure, the infrastructure and
municipal services on the base included roads, utilities, water and sewer,
life/public safety (military police, fire-fighting, etc.), educational institutions
(elementary, secondary and post-secondary), and commercial and retail
complexes (including a gym, a Burger King and a cinema). The base housed a
permanent population of over 10,000 in over 1,700 housing units (exclusive of
barracks and other dormitory style housing). At its peak during WWII, the Base
employed over 15,000 people (5,000 of which were civilian), (ibid.).
The Town of Ayer
Much of Ayer's town history and character reflects the presence of the
military base. Before the closure of Fort Devens, Ayer was a "blue collar,
patriotic town" with a large constituency of military retirees, enlisted military
personnel and active veterans organizations (Higgins interview: August 25,
1994). The town was very supportive of the troops at Devens, seeing them
through many wars and homecomings.
Ayer's mainstreet reflected the presence of its military neighbors and the
railway passing through it. The traditional New England industrial town center
looked as if it had not changed since the WWII era -- the aged mainstreet was
lined with red brick and wooden clapboard structures, weathered and in need of
repair. At one time there were six rail lines passing through Ayer. With 43 tracks
in use, Ayer was home to one of New England's largest rail junctions (Terner:
27 The Moore Army Airfield, Base wastewater treatment facility and open space is located in the
North Post (900 acres). The Main Post (3,528 acres) consists of all base housing, community
services, administrative functions, recreational areas, and operation, maintenance and support
facilities (Earth Technology Corporation, BRAC Clean-up Plan (Version I); prepared for the US
Army Environmental Center, April 7, 1994).
1965, pp. 1-10). The town was established as a commercial center catering to
businesses that were primarily rail related: storage, distribution and military
supply. A tanning factory represented the second largest industry in Ayer, which
in the 1950's and 60's employed a large portion of Ayer's residents.
A sizable portion of Ayer's residents were classified as racially mixed,
working poor, many of which were struggling families of enlisted servicemen
facing limited incomes and the high cost of living in Massachusetts ("Ayer
Struggles Against the Burdens of History", Sentinel and Enterprise: 1992). Ayer
had the highest poverty rate of all of the surrounding communities, even before
the impacts of the closure were felt. This was due primarily to the regions
declining manufacturing sector. But employment reliance on the base was
becoming more and more evident as additional troops moved out. In the years
following the Devens closure announcement in July of 1991, the unemployment
rate in Ayer continued to increase. This was due in part to the persuasiveness of
the New England recession but was certainly exacerbated by the closure of
Devens.
A significant portion of the town's economic base was supported by the
military at Fort Devens. The military created a natural market for the town.
Many businesses and services emerged to meet the military's supply needs, as
well as the soldier's demand for the products, services and entertainment that
could not be met by the on-base facilities. Moreover, because Devens was so
far removed from any large urban areas, the soldiers and their families spent a
large portion of their incomes in the local economies. As such, the local retail
sector grew substantially in the post WWII period with the proliferation of general
merchandisers (including furniture, automobiles and clothing), restaurants, pizza
parlors and taverns. There had also been a significant increase in the
construction of multi-family rental housing, to meet the growing demand for off-
base housing for military personnel and their families (ibid.).
Following the closure in 1991, the town began reporting significant losses
in local sales revenues, employment and an escalation in housing vacancies.
Accordingly, the community's primary objective in the reuse of Fort Devens was
the attraction of new industries into the region to create new markets for their
businesses and housing units, as well as new employment opportunities for their
residents.
Ayer's municipal government was conducted by town meeting, in which all
registered voters were eligible to attend. Fifty-two non-partisan municipal
officials were elected to town government, including the Board of Selectmen, the
School Committee and the Board of Pubic Works. The Town Administrator was
one of only a few full-time hired positions in the town governance.
Municipal services such as police, fire, the typical range of public works --
streets, sidewalks and sewers -- and schools were provided by the town. The
cost of these services was covered primarily through the town's general
revenues, primarily property taxes and excise taxes. But a substantial proportion
of Ayer's public education services were supported by federal subsidies paid by
the military. The subsidies were paid on a per student tuition basis in return for
the provision of public education for the students of the military personnel on the
base. Because approximately seventy percent of Ayer's public school
population, before the closure, consisted of military dependent children, Ayer's
School Department was heavily dependent on the Army subsidies. Because
Ayer's fiscal budget was so tight even before the closure, the town feared that
the loss of the military subsidies would significantly reduce the quality of
education that they could afford to provide its remaining residents.
According to Ayer's former Town Administrator, no organized special
interests groups emerged to represent the town's residents. However, individual
residents emerged who had their own agenda's for the Fort Devens reuse.
These residents remained involved the reuse planning process at Fort Devens
throughout, however, did not significantly influence Ayer's reuse decision-making
process (Higgins interview: August 25, 1994).
The Town of Harvard
The Town of Harvard grew as a residential community for the region's
wealthy land and industry owners. At the time of the closure, Harvard had
become a prominent bedroom community for employees of Boston's high tech
region and premier academic institutions. Large family farms and residential
estates were common in this quaint New England community. Prior to the
closure, Harvard's small commercial economic base was supported primarily by
the orchards and small businesses including medical practices, real estate
offices and home-based high technology consulting services. According to a
Harvard town Selectman, the town relied heavily on its residential tax base, and
volunteer help from local residents to support the provision of its municipal
services. Changing economic and social conditions, however, made it no longer
possible to rely solely on the resident tax base and volunteer staff:
"Even without the closure of Devens, it was becoming apparent
that Harvard would need to attract non-residential revenue to
support the [fiscal needs of] the town. The closure of Devens
presented an opportunity for an increased non-residential tax base,
but also put additional strain on the municipal budget with the
promise of new residents." -- Excerpt from interview with Dana
Owens, Harvard Selectman.
Like Ayer, Harvard's municipal government was conducted by town
meeting, and was governed by elected town officials including the Board of
Selectmen. The town did not have any full time town planning or management
staff; many town functions were carried out by resident volunteers. The Board of
Selectmen were the town's official decision-making entity when it came to
matters of the Fort Devens reuse planning process. However, a number of
individual residents, special interest groups, and community advocacy groups
emerged in Harvard to help in the Devens redevelopment on behalf of the town's
residents. These groups included the Housing Alliance, the Fort Devens Task
Force, and Coalition for Informed Voting by Impacted Citizens, formerly, the
Citizens to Protect Residential Harvard (Owens interview: February 8, 1995).
According to Harvard town Selectman Dana Owens, the most prominent
of these organizations were the Fort Devens Task Force and the Housing
Alliance. The Fort Devens Task Force was formed as an advisory group to the
Harvard's Board of Selectmen. The Task Force researched the various issues
regarding the reuse of Fort Devens and made recommendations to the Board of
Selectmen. According to Owens, these recommendations were used to make
decisions in the reuse planning process on behalf of the town's residents. The
Task Force also developed a municipal "wish list" to determine the future use of
the land at Fort Devens. The Task Force collected requests for property from all
of the town departments: the School Department, Parks and Recreation, etc.
Based on the responses collected from each of the town departments, the wish
list was compiled. Requests for property were made primarily by the Department
of Parks and Recreation. According to Owens, the Parks Department requested
property for public tennis courts and playing fields. In addition, the Harvard
School Department requested approximately 100 acres for the expansion of their
existing school system to handle to new residents of Devens (Owens interview:
February 8, 1995).
According to Owens, the Task Force and the Board of Selectmen worked
to balance the needs of the town with the opportunities for new development at
Devens. Specifically, they worked to balance Harvard's shrinking municipal
revenue base with the communities desire to preserve its high socio-economic
structure and quality of life (ibid.).
The Housing Alliance of the towns of Ayer, Harvard, Lancaster, and
Shirley was a local special interest group whose objectives included the
evaluation of the area's housing needs, and an analysis of the opportunities for
affordable housing at Devens (Housing Alliance Mission Statement: December
1992, pp. 1-3). According to the Housing Alliance's Mission Statement, the
group supported a concept of scattered site, economically diverse housing that
was sensitive to the regional needs for open space. They were also concerned
that housing be compatible with the housing in the surrounding communities --
they did not want the affordable housing to look like traditional public housing;
they did not want Devens housing to become a "ghetto" area for the regions
affordable housing needs (Housing Alliance Mission Statement: December 1992,
pp. 1-3). According to Owens, the members of the Housing Alliance were very
vocal in the Harvard reuse decision-making process; they attended every town
meeting and lobbied hard for the creation of affordable housing at Devens.
The towns of Shirley and Lancaster
Shirley was a moderate income, blue-collar community whose economic
base had historically been farming, rail-related activities, and light industry. The
town's base reuse objectives were driven primarily by the need to create more
jobs for the 113 Shirley residents left unemployed by the Devens closure. Like
Ayer, some community businesses had become dependent, in part, on the
income derived from the military and personnel expenditures from Fort Devens.
The town's industrial base had also been waning over the years due to the
declining regional manufacturing base and the general recessionary New
England economy. However, Shirley was not as dependent on the military
expenditures as Ayer was, and as such, was less concerned about the prospects
for the reuse of Fort Devens.
Adjacent to the south side of Fort Devens was the residential town of
Lancaster. Lancaster's socio-economic strata fell somewhere between that of
Harvard and Shirley. It was a residential community of primarily middle-class
professionals working in the high tech region and family farms and orchards.
Lancaster officials did not pursue development opportunities at the site because
the majority of the land within the town's jurisdiction had been retained by the
Army Reserves who proposed to use most of the South Post as training grounds.
Fish and Wildlife also proposed that a portion of the South Post be used as an
extension of the existing Oxbow wildlife habitat. However, at the time of this
study, Fish and Wildlife's proposed acquisition had not been approved by the
Army. As such, Lancaster remained a relatively silent player throughout the
reuse process (Seidman interview: February 6,1995).
The Nature of the Inter-jurisdictional Relationships
Although the town of Shirley was expected to be economically impacted
by the closure of Fort Devens, the town chose a slightly lesser role in the
community reuse effort. (The estimated economic impacts on the surrounding
towns are discussed in the section entitled Identifying the Closure Impacts).
Lack of staff and revenues were cited as the towns primary reason for not taking
a lead role in the redevelopment effort. Likewise, because Lancaster was not
directly impacted, nor stood to benefit from the Devens closure, the town chose
to play the least role in the reuse planning effort at Fort Devens. But local
residents, fearing that potential inter-jurisdictional conflicts between Ayer and
Harvard might delay the redevelopment process, appealed to Shirley and
Lancaster to remain involved with the reuse effort. As neutral parties, it was
hoped that Shirley and Lancaster could balance the collective interest and
objectives represented between the towns:
'Traditionally, Harvard and Ayer never got along -- there was good
reason to believe that conflicts over the redevelopment of Devens
could be very counter productive to the regions chance for
economic recovery. Lancaster and Shirley were in a position to
bow-out of the [collective local reuse effort] -- neither had a real
stake in the reuse efforts at Devens and did not want to get
involved with the expensive redevelopment undertaking. But many
local residents appealed to the town to stay involved and act as the
mediators of conflicts that may arise between Ayer and Harvard. It
was hoped that [the Shirley town representatives] could provide
stability and balance in the decision-making processes and avoid
counterproductive delays due to petty conflicts between Ayer and
Harvard' -- Excerpt from interview with Peter Fohlin, former Shirley
Town Selectman
Ultimately, the town of Lancaster would remove itself entirely from the
land use decision-making process, due to its lack of direct development interest
in the land at Devens. Shirley on the other hand, would remain involved with the
Reuse Planning effort; and as such was able to play the mediators role in the
reuse planning process to come. According to a Shirley town Selectman, the
fact that Shirley did not perceive the redevelopment of Devens to be as
important to the future of the town as it appeared Ayer and Harvard did, Shirley
was able to maintain a more objective position throughout the reuse planning
process. This made it easier for them to mediate any inter-jurisdictional conflicts
that may arise between Ayer and Harvard (McDonald interview: September 16,
1994).
Part 11: Getting Started
The Land Bank
The Massachusetts Government Land Bank was formed in 1973 by the
State for the purpose of handling five bases closed in Massachusetts during the
Nixon Administration. In April of 1973, the Department of Defense announced
the closure of three military installations the Commonwealth: South Boston
Naval Shipyard, Charlestown Navy Yard and the Chelsea Naval Hospital. Two
Air Force bases, Otis and Westover, were also significantly reduced (Sass: 1993,
pg. 41) Pursuant to its enabling legislation, the Land Bank was granted the
authority to hold title to (or "bank") surplused public property, negotiate property
redevelopment and transfer and finance redevelopment projects. After
successfully assisting the local communities in redeveloping three of the military
installations in the 1970's (Westover, the Chelsea Naval Hospital and the South
Boston Naval Shipyard), the Land Bank went on to pursue economic
development and affordable housing development throughout the state during
the Carter and Reagan Administrations. The Land Bank is a small agency,
supported by approximately 25 employees (including those involved with the Fort
Devens project), and a $2.3 million operating budget. The agency was originally
capitalized by $40 million raised through state general obligation bonds (ibid.).
Executive Order 312: In anticipation of the 1991 round of base closures, the
Land Bank positioned itself as the lead state agency to handle the new rounds of
military base closures in Massachusetts. In 1988, Fort Devens had first been
named to the list of potential closure by the Pentagon. Although the base was
ultimately removed from the 1988 closure list, it was a wake up call for the Land
Bank that new closure projects may be on the horizon. So the Land Bank's
Executive Director, Tim Bassett, initiated early discussions with members of the
Governor's Administration to lay the ground work for the Land Bank's
involvement in the redevelopment(s). The Land Bank also prepared a briefing
paper addressing the issues that the Governor's office would need to be
prepared for in the event that one of the state's major military installations was
listed for closure in future BRAC closure rounds. At risk were the South
Weymouth Naval Station (approximately 15 miles south of Boston), the
remaining portions of the Westover Air Force Base (near Springfield) and Fort
Devens (Seidman interview: February 6, 1994; Knapp interview: June 13, 1994).
In 1991, when Congress announced that Fort Devens would close, the
Land Bank sent a formal proposal to Governor William Weld requesting authority
to oversee the redevelopment of the Fort Devens property. Following some
minor negotiations with the Governor's Administration and some minor revisions
to the scope of the Land Bank's proposed authority, Governor Weld issued
Executive Order 312 establishing the Land Bank as the lead state agency at
Devens (this is described in greater detail in Chapter Four, in the section entitled
Inter-jurisdictional Conflicts). Executive Order 312 did not specifically name the
Land Bank as the developer of the Devens property, but tasked the Land Bank
to set up a joint state, regional and local reuse process, and to coordinated the
state's interaction with the federal process (ibid.).
The Executive Order did not mandate that a specific planning process be
carried out by the surrounding towns, but emphasized and encouraged the
creation of a cooperative planning process that addressed the needs and
interests of all of the surrounding communities, as well as the region and the
state. In order to assure that the local and regional interests would be met, the
Executive Order also created The Fort Devens Redevelopment Board. The
Redevelopment Board was a eleven member board, appointed by the Governor
to oversee the Land Bank's progress and to facilitate public input from the
immediate and surrounding communities in the reuse planning process.
Assembled as required by Section 9 of Massachusetts Executive Order 312, the
Redevelopment Board was appointed by the Governor to include membership
from the local communities as well as various fields of expertise: one member
from the North Central Region, one member from each of the fields of housing,
finance, industrial development, transportation and environmental law, and one
member from each of the four adjacent towns (Knapp interveiw: June 13, 1994).
Beginning in December of 1991, the Board began publishing periodic
reports to the Governor for the purpose of documenting and evaluating the
progress made by the Land Bank and the local communities. It was intended
that the Redevelopment Board remain in existence only as long as it took to
prepare the collective reuse plan. It was not envisioned that the Board would be
involved with the implementation and operation phases of the Devens
redevelopment project (Simon interview: March 24, 1994).
The Creation of a Reuse Strategy
By September of 1991, the Land Bank began by hiring a redevelopment
staff. The Land Bank called back Jeffrey Simon, former Executive Director of the
Land Bank during the earlier closures, to head up the new Fort Devens Division.
Since his departure from the Land Bank in the early 1980's, Simon had been
working as a successful private real estate developer. With his past experience
in both private development and military base closure processes, the Land Bank
found Simon to be the ideal candidate for this position. In the months to follow,
additional members of the project team were hired to begin preparing a reuse
planning strategy and economic development plan.
As their first order of business, the new Devens redevelopment staff
began to assess the economic and environmental impacts of the closure on the
surrounding towns and regions. The team began to develop a reuse planning
strategy that considered not only the economic and environmental opportunities
and constraints, but also the needs interests and objectives of the local, regional
and state entities. However, initial attempts to establish a cooperative working
relationship with the four surrounding towns was a difficult task. Fearing loss of
control over the base property within their jurisdiction and the potential siting of a
major airport, the towns were initially unwilling to join forces with the Land Bank.
Joint Board of Selectmen
For many of the residents in the surrounding communities, Fort Devens
had always been a part of their lives. The base was an important source of
market demand for the local economies, especially in Ayer. Many businesses
emerged to cater to the spending habits of the military personnel; pizza, fast food
restaurants, bars, and retail clothing stores dotted Ayer's commercial districts.
So when the region was first threatened by the closure in 1988, the towns had to
decide whether to channel their energies into building a new economic base or
maintaining the economic status quo.
According to Ayer's former Town Administrator, the towns initially chose to
fight the closure and launched a campaign to attract the Department of
Defense's Information Systems Command facility to Devens. The DoD was
looking to expand and relocate all of the functions of the Command facility to one
location, and Devens was short listed as a potential site. If the Command facility
had chosen Devens as the site of its new headquarters, it would have replaced
the civilian jobs and local expenditures lost due to the Fort Devens closure.
However, for reasons not disclosed, the DoD chose not to relocate the facility to
Devens; choosing instead to remain in their present facility in Arizona (Higgins
interview: August 25, 1994).
Accordingly, the impacted communities surrounding Fort Devens began to
focus their efforts on the inevitable closure and economic restructuring process
that laid ahead. The communities formed a small committee of local officials and
began to weigh their options for redevelopment. In 1990, the Joint Board of
Selectmen (JBoS) was formed in response to the rumors that Fort Devens would
be named to the 1991 BRAC closure list. The JBoS was formed as a
collaborative effort between the towns of Ayer, Harvard, Shirley and Lancaster
for the purpose of planning for the reuse of the base (ibid.).
After the loss of the Information Systems Command Center, The JBoS
prepared a collective Mission Statement as the basis for their economic planning
strategy. The Mission Statement reflected the common goals and objectives
established between the four towns through the JBoS, and provided direction
from which future collective decisions would be made (Owens, February 8,
1994). Specifically, the Mission Statement stressed the importance of local
control in the reuse process by establishing local zoning and by-law regulations
for the property within each towns jurisdiction. Cooperation between the four
self-proclaimed "diverse" communities, the creation of a collective long term
economic development solution were considered critical to the success of the
Mission Statement. The specific goals included: the creation of new high paying,
high skilled jobs; new municipal revenues; better public education; and the
preservation of environmental and historic qualities in the region (The Joint
Boards of Selectmen: Mission Statement: date not given).
The Airport Agenda: The creation of the JBoS was a surprise to many local
residents because they had come to know the four towns as typically not seeing
eye-to-eye on most social and economic issues. This level of uncharacteristic
cooperation stemmed primarily from the fear that the State Administration had
proposed the siting for a second major regional airport at Devens. At the time, it
had been rumored that, should the base close, the Governor would favor Devens
as the site for an airport to handle the overflow from Boston's Logan International
Airport.
The threat of a new major airport at Devens became an issue of mutual
interest among the towns of Ayer, Harvard, Shirley and Lancaster, as well as
may other towns in the region. Shortly after the closure of Fort Devens was
made public, the Massachusetts Aeronautical Commission (MAC) announced
that they would commission a study to evaluate potential sites in Massachusetts
to locate the regions second international airport. One of the sites chosen was
Fort Devens (Seidman interview: February 6, 1995).
The towns feared that the airport would bring to the region primarily low
skilled jobs, noise and a substantial increase in local traffic (Higgins interview:
August 25, 1994). Thus, fearing a diminished quality of life, the residents of
many of the towns surrounding Devens vehemently protested the airport siting.
However, because the airport had been proposed for the Main Post, the towns of
Ayer, Shirley and Harvard stood to be most negatively impacted. According to
Ayer's former Town Administrator, many local residents viewed the JBoS
primarily as a vehicle to stop the airport, paying less attention to the declarations
of the Mission Statement (Higgins interview: August 25,1994).
The Creation of a Local Economic Development Strategy. The JBoS
immediately began to consider options for a new economic-base for the
immediate Fort Devens region. In order to do this, the JBoS had to better define
how the closure would impact their communities; they also needed to define
what types of new industries should be targeted to replace the jobs and
municipal revenues lost due to the closure. But first, the towns had to decide
how to pay for the planning and redevelopment of the base property.
The JBoS was reluctant to join forces with the Land Bank because the
towns were unsure of the Land Bank's motivations for involvement in the Devens
redevelopment. The communities speculated that the Land Bank had a hidden
agenda in the redevelopment of Devens -- to develop a new regional airport at
Devens:
'The towns assumed that the Land Bank was the wolf in sheep's
clothing. They were convinced that the Land Bank was in favor of
the airport going in.. .The towns were [also] skeptical that any
government agency could develop Devens as quickly as the private
sector. They were skeptical that the appropriate level of local
control would be included in the planning process; and they were
concerned that the Land Bank would be too politically driven by
conflicting State interests, such as the airport. They felt that if they
went with a private sector developer that the decisions would be
more economically driven.' -- Excerpt from interview with Peter
Fohlin, former Shirley town Selectman.
The JBoS was also ill-at-ease that a public sector entity should be in
charge of the base redevelopment. The physical redevelopment of the base,
they reasoned, should be left to the private sector (Fohlin interview: September
16, 1994). Moreover, the towns thought that a private developer could provide
for the financial resources and staff that the towns needed to successfully
redevelop the base. So the JBoS solicited responses from interested private
developers.
According to a former Shirley Selectman, the towns were willing to let the
market guide their decision making process regarding the economic reuse of the
base property. The JBoS envisioned that the land would be purchased from the
federal government by a private developer, at a price dictated by the market.
The property at Devens would revert back to the towns with jurisdictional
boundaries on the base. The towns envisioned that the new development would
just become a part of their existing towns, divided by the existing jurisdictional
boundaries on the base. They assumed that redevelopment would be governed
by the respective town's permit and zoning by-laws. However, they did not
anticipate the high cost of infrastructure improvement necessary at Devens to
bring the property up to a standard that would attract private developers (ibid.).
The communities soon realized that in order to make the base property
attractive to private developers, base improvements such as housing,
commercial space and infrastructure would have to be upgraded in order to meet
market standards. Realizing that the cost of base improvements was too great
for the four towns to absorb in the short term, the JBoS began to reconsider a
joint partnership with the Land Bank:
'The JBoS recognized that they needed the resources -- the state
funding and technical expertise -- that the [Land Bank] could offer,
and ultimately did not resist the Land Bank's participation in the
reuse planning effort. This attitude reflected the JBoS's primary
objective to develop the base and return it to the economy as soon
as possible, and as smoothly as possible -- people just wanted to
see some ground breaking and some jobs opening.' -- Excerpt from
interview with Tim Higgins, former Ayer Town Administrator.
Other Players in the Reuse Planning Process:
The Army Upon official BRAC announcement of the closure, the Army
immediately began to coordinate both the troop relocation and base
decommissioning processes. Tending primarily to their own reuse efforts, the
Army participated in the local reuse planning process only through their
obligatory representation at the local planning meetings. Thus, with the
exception of the interim lease negotiations (including the lease to Guilford
Industries), and the location of the Army Reserve Enclave, the Army process
was carried out completely independent from the local reuse process.
In 1994, however, the Army and the Land Bank began joint negotiations
to support the creation of a Master Lease transfer in which the Land Bank and
the Army would work collectively to clean, redevelop and transfer the federally
surplused base property. At the time of this study, however, the details of the
Master Lease agreement had not been considered.
Federal Funding Agencies: The Land Bank applied for and received a total of
over $3.8 million in planning grants and assistance from a variety of federal
agencies:
" September of 1993, the Land Bank received almost $1 million in OEA
planning grants.
" In November of 1993, Labor Secretary Robert Reich announced that Fort
Devens will receive a $2 million federal grant to retain civilian employees and
help them to find new jobs. The Devens allocation is one of the largest to be
awarded in the county from the joint DoD/Department of Labor $57 million
program.
* In December of 1993, the Economic Development Administration approved
$825,000 in grants to support a regional micro-loan fund to help regional
businesses that were impact by the closure.
County/Regional governance: County or regional entities in Massachusetts
typically did not play a significant role in the governance of the state and local
communities, aside from the implementation of the state prisons and court
system. Accordingly, the impacted communities and the state represented the
primary land use powers in the redevelopment of Fort Devens. The
Montachusetts Regional Planning Commission and the North Central Region
Chamber of Commerce, however, were actively involved with the reuse process.
The former participated heavily in the public planning process; members of the
Planning Commission often served on various task forces, commissions and
panels. According to testimony by one of the Commission's members, the
Planning Commission's primary objectives in the reuse process reflected their
desire to maintain the environmental and historic elements of the base.
The North Central Regional Chamber of Commerce also emerged as an
organization that was very much involved with the redevelopment of Fort
Devens. The personal interest of its Chairman, David McKeehan was
considered the impetus behind the organization's extensive involvement in the
reuse process ("Renewal Under Way in Region's Business Sector"; Sunday
Sentinel & Enterprise: June 14, 1992). McKeehan's involvement included an
appointment to the Fort Devens Redevelopment Board and a working
relationship with the JBoS. Seemingly McKeehan became the voice of the
regional interests in the redevelopment of Fort Devens. He believed, because
the economic impacts were felt in communities throughout the region, the
opportunities for new jobs and economic prosperity should benefit the entire
region:
"The closing of Fort Devens was the equivalent of a plant closing in
each of the towns of Fitchburg, Leominster, Ayer and Shirley.
There [were] 230 civilian employees from Leominster and 175 in
Fitchburg who lost their jobs to the closure. So we have to look at
[the Devens closure] as a whole series of plant closings throughout
the region. So the redevelopment of Fort Devens is important to
the region because of the opportunity it presents. There are
[thousands] of acres of land and buildings that will be available for
reuse. And that provides an unusual opportunity to site a whole
variety of job-producing uses for the region." -- David McKeehan,
President of the North Central Massachusetts Chamber of
Commerce. Excerpt from Renewal Under Way in Region's
Business Sector (Sunday Sentinel & Enterprise, June 14, 1992)
Identifying Closure Impacts
The Land Bank and the Army both commissioned impact studies to
determine the economic and environmental consequences of the closure on the
surrounding Devens region. The Army was required under federal
environmental law to identify the impacts due to the closure and the reuse of the
base, including how the reuse will affect natural and cultural resources,
demographics, traffic and infrastructure, noise, water supply, land use patterns,
and the site remediation process (United States Army Corps of Engineers, New
England Division: materials not dated). Likewise, the Land Bank was concerned
how the closure would impact the regional economy (jobs, income and market
demands), the local real estate markets and municipal fiscal conditions in the
host communities. So the Land Bank commissioned RKG & Associates to
prepare a Fiscal Impact Analysis to determine the cost of the Devens
redevelopment to the surrounding towns. In August of 1992, the Land Bank also
commissioned a study by Mount Auburn Associates to estimate the economic
impacts of the Devens closure on the region surrounding Fort Devens.
According to the Mount Auburn report, the socio-economic structure in
Harvard has always been very different from that of Ayer and Shirley, and even
Lancaster. As such, it was expected that the impacts to each community would
vary, depending on the community's economic reliance on the former military
neighbor. For instance, Harvard was a residential community of middle-to-upper
class professionals who typically commuted to the metro-Boston or Worcester
areas. Fifty five percent of the employed residents of Harvard were in executive,
managerial or professional occupations. In contrast, Ayer and Shirley were
represented by a more blue-collar work force, most of which worked in the local
manufacturing plants or at the military base. In fact, only one quarter of Ayer
and Shirley's employed residents were in managerial, executive or professional
fields (Mount Auburn Associates: 1993, Pg. 2-4). Instead, the primary
employment industries for the residents of Ayer and Shirley were manufacturing,
retail, and education and health services, in descending order of magnitude.
The median household incomes in Shirley, Lancaster and Harvard were
all above the state median of $36,952 (1993 dollars). Ayer's average income, on
the other hand, was only approximately 80% of the states median household
income. Moreover, 7% of Ayer families were living under the state's poverty
level, compared to less than 4% in the other three towns (ibid.).
General Economic Impacts: The results of the Mount Auburn study, released in
March of 1993, were used by the Land Bank as the basis for their economic
development strategy. The Land Bank wanted to know just how many jobs were
lost, what the expenditure losses to businesses were, and the extent to which
the impacts would be felt in the greater Devens region. Accordingly, Mount
Auburn's analysis considered: the reduction of employees on-base; the impact
on local firms doing business with the base; spending by base employees in the
local economy; the impact on the regional economic base; significant industry
trends and regional institutional resources.
The report found that there would be substantial employment and earning
losses experienced by local residents due to the closure: approximately 2,800
civilian jobs, both on-base and off-base positions, were dependent on the
military's direct and indirect spending in the region. 28 However, because many
of the civilian and military personnel lived in towns outside of the primary four
town region, the employment loss was not projected to be as great as the towns
originally feared. The majority of the civilian employees at Devens resided
primarily in the nearby cities of Fitchburg and Leominster. Only one quarter of
the civilian jobs lost due to the closure were held by residents in the four towns
immediately surrounding the base. (Mount Auburn: 1993, pp. 2-2 through 2-3).
The severity of the employment loss was mitigated further by the low level
of military base dependency in the region. Fort Devens was located on the outer
ring of Massachusetts' high-tech region, Route 128. Many residents of the
base's neighboring towns were employees of the region's many high-tech firms
such as Digital Equipment Corporation, Raytheon, Stratus and Wang, all located
within a 15 mile radius of Fort Devens. The four town area surrounding the base
itself was home to 26 small-to-medium size high-tech manufacturing businesses
such as hardware and equipment manufacturing for the construction, computer
and factory automation fields. As such, the report concluded that no overall
"devastating" effect on the regional economy will result in the short term from the
closure. This projection was later backed by a study prepared by RKG &
Associates that estimated the adjacent manufacturing and high technology
28 In addition to the 2,800 civilian jobs, 5,120 military jobs will be lost due to the closure. By
1996, it was projected that only 209 military jobs and 366 civilian personnel jobs will remain to
support the Army Reserve Enclave (Mount Auburn Associates, 1993, pp.(iii-v).
industries would absorb some of the employment losses due the closure of
Devens; assuming that the regional high tech sector does not continue to decline
in the 1990's (RKG Associates, Non-Residential Market Research: 1993, pp. 46-
48).
However, despite its less-than-devastating employment findings, the
Mount Auburn Report advised that the most difficult task for the economic
redevelopment of the base would be the provision of alternative markets for retail
and service businesses dependent on the base population. The report
suggested that the greatest impact on local spending power would result from
the out-migration of military personnel. This loss of income generating military
personnel meant the loss of $180 million in potential expenditures to the local
communities. This loss would be difficult to replace in the short term without a
new primary employment base. The Mount Auburn study concluded that the
towns of Ayer and Shirley were projected to feel more of the negative economic
impacts associated with the base because the military expenditures represented
a greater relative percentage of their economic base.
Municipal Impacts: Finally, the Land Bank contracted a study to determine the
municipal fiscal impacts to the four surrounding towns as a result of the closure.
That is, just how much was it going to cost the four towns to upgrade the existing
infrastructure and provide municipal services to the property at Fort Devens The
study, prepared by RKG Associates, Inc., examined the incremental municipal
costs and revenues likely to be associated with the reuse of Fort Devens. The
analysis identified the level of capital expenditures necessary for the
redevelopment of Fort Devens, assessed the budgetary impacts on the
surrounding communities, and estimated the time frame in which revenues and
expenditure could be expected. The study concluded that given constrained
local budgets, the redevelopment of Fort Devens would have to occur in phases
over a period of 20 years or more. This would be necessary to obtain the local
fiscal expenditures necessary to bring the base property up to current
development standards, and to provide services to the new residents and users
(RKG & Associates, Municipal Fiscal Impact Analysis: 1993, pp. 1-1 through 1-
2).
The estimated cost for primary improvements -- the replacement of a
substandard sewage treatment facility and transportation and access
improvements -- was $43 to $63 million. 29 Of course, it was no surprise that the
tax revenues generated in each community at the time of the study were
insufficient to fund this level of expenditures. Initial municipal operating deficits
were projected to exceed $20 million over the first ten year period. The most
significantly impacted, Harvard's incremental increase in operating and capital
expenditures alone would be $3.4 to $4.8 million per year for a 20 year period.
The study made three recommendations for funding future base related
expenditures: (1) to seek additional non-municipal planning funds (OEA, and
state funds) to reduce local planning costs; (2) to explore new opportunities for
municipal cost sharing options such as the consolidation of school, police,
sewer/water and other related services; and (3) to carefully phase the project to
both coincide with the market realities and the municipal abilities in order to
absorb the redevelopment costs (ibid.).
Real Estate Impacts: In contrast, the residential real estate markets were
projected to more severely impact the greater Devens region. Specifically, the
town of Harvard, relatively unaffected by the initial loss of base personnel,
anticipated a residential market flood through the acquisition of an estimated 470
new units to be preserved in the Devens Reuse Plan (Massachusetts
Government Land Bank, Housing Report: 1994, pg. 1). Because residential
uses typically produce the least amount, if not negative amounts of municipal
revenues -- primarily due to the marginal increase in the cost of educating
29 The study concluded that the provision of a new sewage treatment facility and the
improvement of regional access to the redevelopment area would be the most essential elements
of the base redevelopment (RKG & Associates, Municipal Fiscal Impact Analysis: 1993, pp. 1-1
through 1-2).
resident children -- the additional revenue drain may prove crippling to an
already ailing fiscal budget in the town of Harvard. Likewise, high vacancy rates
in the town of Ayer and Shirley, due to the out-migration of military families living
off-base, were expected to negatively impact the value of the residential bases in
those communities (Mount Auburn Associates, Economic Impact of Fort Devens
on the Regional Economy: 1993).
In May of 1994, the Land Bank commissioned Byrne McKinney
Associates to prepare a housing study to determine the future demand for
housing in the four town region. From this information, the Land Bank got a
better sense of how the closure would impact the residential markets in the
region. The purpose of the study was to analyze housing needs and to assess
the impacts of the Devens closure in the towns of Ayer, Harvard, Shirley and
Lancaster. Accordingly, the report considered existing and projected housing
supply and demand conditions in the towns. The report also considered how the
new residential developments at Devens would fiscally affect each town (Byrne
McKinney & Associates: 1994, pp. 1-2).
In the report, housing demand was projected to be modest, at best, even
given aggressive projections for employment growth from the Devens
redevelopment with a 10% capture rate of new housing demand created. The
study predicted only 97 new households would result from new demand in the
region (both background and reuse generated): 65 owner occupant units and 32
renter occupant units (ibid., pp. 4-26).
The Byrne McKinney report does not indicate which town will be most
greatly impacted by the new housing supply. However, because so much of the
Devens housing falls within Harvard's jurisdiction, it appears as though Harvard
will suffer the greatest fiscal impacts as a result of the closure, if the property
reverts back to the towns. Specifically, the recapture of Harvard's land at
Devens would add hundreds of new housing units to the town's large residential
market. Given the moderate-to-sluggish demand for housing in the region,
Harvard residents feared that the increase in new housing stock would dilute the
value the town's residential base (Owens interview: February 8, 1995).
Moreover, the new units at Devens were also projected to result in a net loss of
municipal tax revenues -- typically the cost of providing services for a single
residential unit generally exceeds the tax revenues collected on that unit. The
Byrne McKinney study estimates that it will cost Harvard an additional $6,500 in
town revenues per unit;30 thus, the additional 479 units that have been
established for reuse within Harvard's jurisdiction would cost the town an
additional $3.11 million dollars per year in expenditures (Byrne McKinney &
Associates: 1994, pp. 27-29).31
The Byrne McKinney study also estimates the municipal impacts in the
towns of Ayer and Shirley to be approximately $150,000 and $1.6 million,
respectively (ibid.).
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Source: Massachusetts Government Land Bank Housing Report: 1994, pp. 1-3.
30 The Byrne McKinney study estimates that it will cost the town approximately $9,692 education
expenditure per unit. With a tax revenues estimated at $3,222 per units, the study projects a
$6,470 per unit deficit in the town of Harvard. (Byrne McKinney & Associates: 1994, pp. 28-29)
31 According to Land Bank estimates, a total of 1,300 housing unts presently exist within
Harvards jurisdiction of Fort Devens. However, the Land Bank estiamtes that only 479 are in
marketable condition, suitable for reuse.
On the supply side, the study reflected the high vacancy rates
experienced primarily in Ayer as a result of military out-migration. The high
vacancy rates meant that an adequate number of units already existed to meet
any short term demand for both owner occupant and rental housing arising from
reuse or general employment growth in the region. Moreover, the on-base units
slated for preservation in the Reuse Plan were estimated as sufficient to satisfy
10 years of total demand in the primary market area (ibid., pp. 1-2).
As a result, the prospects for new housing development were risky;
contingent primarily on the ability to attract new residents from outside of the
immediate area. The newly vacant units in the four town region were not
projected to satisfy the niche demand segments for affordable and
elderly/special needs markets; however, many on-base units were considered
sufficient to meet up to 50 years of demand for affordable housing (both owner
occupant and rental) (ibid.).
Developable Acres per jurisdiction:
Town Dev. Acres %/base Total s.f. Bldg. space
Ayer 152 11% 2.1 million s.f.
Harvard 933 69% 11.2 million s.f.
Shirley 271 20% 3 million s.f.
Lancaster n/a 0
Total 1356 acres 100% 16.3 million s.f.
Source: RKG Associates, Fort Devens Municipal Impact Study: 1993, pp. 111-7
through Il-11).
Existing commercial properties at Devens consisted primarily of the PX
and Commissary stores, a movie theater, gas station and some existing
administration buildings. The existing commercial space on the base, however,
was not considered to be Devens' most valuable asset. Instead, it is the
potential for future commercial/industrial development that is the focus of the
Devens redevelopment plan. Acres of green, flat easily accessible sites are
expected to produce the greatest financial returns. However, with the regional
recession and the decline of both the high tech and the traditional manufacturing
sectors, the Land Bank tried to anticipate how much commercial and industrial
space the greater region could absorb.
To do this, Jeff Simon, the Director of the Land Bank's Fort Devens
Division and a former real estate developer, began to conduct some research of
his own. He worked with representatives from Leggett McCall (brokerage and
investment), the North Central Chamber of Commerce, and Dick Reynolds a
former partner to Gerald Hines and Spaulding and Slye developers (Simon
interview: August, 22, 1994). Together they conducted regional surveys of all of
the local real estate development opportunities. They listed all of the existing
commercial and industrial uses along the Route 495 corridor in order to identify
the competition. From the developers perspective, they considered issues of
utilities, marketing and construction -- items that would attract businesses and
developers to the Devens site.
From this research, the Land Bank was able to get a better picture of the
commercial/industrial reuse opportunities that were possible at Fort Devens. In
general, they found that the existing market for both high tech and manufacturing
space was over saturated. Vacancies in the Route 495 region were very high.
Although the real estate market information was discouraging, it also gave the
Land Bank a great sense of the market competition (ibid.). (The non-residential
market economy is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four in the section
entitled Achieving Market Competitiveness).
Environmental Site Conditions
Although Fort Devens was named as a Superfund site, initial studies
indicated that the extent of contamination on the base was not extraordinary.32
In all, the Army identified more than 50 sites requiring further investigation such
as soil testing or well monitoring. In addition to the environmental damage that
occurred due to normal operations of the base, a number of leaky underground
fuel tanks, several landfills and buildings laden with lead paint and asbestos
were found. No exotic or experimental toxic substances were uncovered on the
North or Main posts at Devens.
The South Post, contained unexploded ordinance and hazardous waste
sites. But despite this level of contamination, the South Post still prospers as a
habitat for hundreds of species of plants and animals. Accordingly, one potential
option for the reuse of the South Post, the US Department of Fish and Wildlife
Services proposed to assume responsibility for the maintenance of this site. At
the time of this study, the Department of Fish and Wildlife had not yet received
approval for the land transfer from the Army. As such, the Army retained
ownership of all of the land at the South Post; and because the land was not yet
surplused, the land on the South Post had not been designated for clean-up
(Seidman interview: February 6, 1995).
Part III: The Federal Screening Process
Army Reserve Enclave
Immediately following the closure announcement in 1991, the first phase
of the federal screening process began. 33 The formal DoD screening period
lasted from June of 1992 until November of 1992. During this process, the Army
32 See Appendix A for more information regarding the evnironmental processes required for
Superfund sites.
33 See Appendix A for more information regarding the federal screening processes.
requested retention of a significant portion of Fort Devens for their new Army
Reserve Headquarters. Other DoD agencies also expressed interest in
relocating to Devens to take advantage of the prospects for new housing, cheap
land and access to on-base commercial properties such as the PX and
Commissary facilities. Some of the agencies requesting property included the
DoD's Criminal Investigation (military police) and the Army/Air Force Exchange.
With the exception of the Army Reserve Enclave, the Secretary of Defense
denied the other initial requests for property. (Fort Devens Redevelopment
Board, Report to the Govemor July, 1992, pp. 4-6).
In November of 1992, the DoD approved a subsequent request by the Air
Force to utilize some of the residential units at Devens to house families of Air
Force personnel stationed at Hanscom AFB in Lexington, approximately 25 miles
east of Fort Devens. The request was approved as a cost saving measure that
would reduce DoD expenditures to families paying high off-base rents in the
affluent Lexington/Lincoln suburbs of Boston (Hunt interview: August 25, 1994).
In the summer of 1992, the DoD's General Offices Steering Committee
held a press conference to brief the State and local communities on what
properties the DoD would retain, and how the Army planned to carry out the
remaining phases of the base closure and disposal process. In addition to the
Air Force units, the Army proposed to retain a portion of the South Post and
some housing and training sites on the Main Post as the site for the new regional
headquarters for the Army Reserves (ibid.).
Although the Land Bank did not have any formal authority to oppose the
proposed Army use, the Land Bank and the JBoS were concerned about the
impacts associated with the Army's retention of the some of the Devens parcels.
Specifically, the Army proposed to maintain a portion of the Main Post known as
the "600 block" as the Reserves Ammunition Supply Point. This was considered
problematic to the potential reuse plan because it was located in the central
portion of an area considered to be valuable for both commercial and residential
reuse purposes. The Land Bank and the JBoS contended that the Army's
retention of this site would not only significantly reduce the economic value of the
Main Post but was also a potential public safety issue (Fort Devens
Redevelopment Board, Report to the Governor July, 1992, pp. 4-6).
A number of other issues were also raised concerning the Army Reserve
Enclave proposal related primarily to the anticipated environmental
consequences and the desire for the Army to operate the Enclave as a closed
post. In response to these issues, the Land Bank the JBoS asked the Governor
to send a letter to the Army outlining the local concerns. In May of 1992, the
Army formally responded by agreeing to the majority of the requests including
the relocation of the Ammunition Supply Point to a remote portion of the South
Post (ibid.). (The Army Reserve Enclave acquisition is discussed in greater
detail in Chapter Four, in the section entitled the Federal Screening Process.)
The Federal Prison Complex
It was the local communities who initially solicited the Federal Bureau of
Prisons to develop a regional prison and medical facility at Fort Devens. The
communities claimed that the prison was a compatible reuse option because it
fulfilled their objectives for job creation, economic development and
environmental sensitivity (Fort Devens Redevelopment Board, Report to the
Governor December 1992, pp. 12-14). But the JBoS had an underlying
intention for the prison siting. The JBoS hoped that the siting of the federal
prison on the Main Post would block the development of a regional airport there.
If successful, the attempt to lure the federal prison complex to Devens would
reduce the feasibility of siting the airport at this location.
During the fall of 1992, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBoP) informally
committed to locating a low security federal correctional institution, a federal
detention center and a medical facility on 250 acres of the Main Post. The
proposed site encompassed the existing Cutler Army Hospital and the majority of
the existing golf course. (See Map, Appendix B.) The medical center was
proposed to house 350-500 inmates, the low security facility to house
approximately 1600 inmates and the detention center to accommodate
approximately 500 federal detainees awaiting trial or sentencing (ibid.).
The prison was expected to bring many benefits to the regional economy.
Once operational, the prison complex would employ 600-800 full time employees
including health care workers, food service providers, correctional officer and
maintenance positions, at an average salary of $26,000 annually. The prison's
annual operating budget was expected to be $30 million dollars (ibid.).
Furthermore, development of the new $120 million facilities was also expected to
create short term construction jobs.
The McKinney Act
In August of 1992, the Department of Health and Human Services
approved the first application for Devens property conveyed under the McKinney
Act. The application was approved for the Life for Little Ones, an established
homeless provider from Boston's North Shore region (Fort Devens
Redevelopment Board, Report to the Governor; December, 1992, pp. 18-19).
The organization proposed to provide single sex transitional housing and
supportive services for homeless and/or pregnant women, mothers with young
children and female victims of abuse. It was envisioned that the property would
be used to house functions such as the organization's administrative offices,
classrooms for training, child care, medical clinic, multi-denomination religious
services, shelter and emergency housing space, and housing for staff members.
The programs proposed required that clients spend two years in residence free
from drugs or alcohol (Life for Little Ones, program brochure, materials not
dated).
The residents would be required to perform work functions in return for
housing and services. Revenue to support the program were provided by
charitable private corporate contributions, private foundations, church groups
and personal contribution by the organization's Executive Director. Rental
payments estimated to be $200-225/month were projected to be partially paid for
by the residents welfare payment and other income (Fort Devens
Redevelopment Board, Report to the Govemor December, 1992, pp. 18-19).
Although McKinney Act conveyances typically provoke opposition from
the surrounding communities, the Life for Little Ones request was not
challenged. However, a request by a Boston homeless assistance provider
would become the center of much controversy. In April of 1993, the Greater
Boston Adult Shelter Alliance (GBASA) proposed to take over all of the DoD
surplused property pursuant to the McKinney Act statutes. According to Land
Bank staff, the organization envisioned the utilization of the Devens property to
create a comprehensive homeless center (Archer interview: March 23, 1993).
The Center would include transitional housing, permanent housing, job training,
alcohol recovery assistance, and general education for homeless people
throughout the state. Many were concerned that GBASA's endeavor would just
become a warehouse for the state's homeless problems. However, homeless
advocates apparently saw this as one of the few opportunities afforded to the
fight against homelessness, and as such wanted to take full advantage of this
federal benefit (ibid.).
Under the provisions of the McKinney Act, qualified homeless providers
could propose for any and all land deemed excess by the federal government.
Moreover, the Act required local communities to provide services to the residents
of the new homeless assistance programs. For the communities struggling to
maintain their economies in the face of military disinvestment, this responsibility
seemed unfair, if not infeasible -- the local communities would need to take
advantage of revenue bearing property uses in order to pay for the municipal
services extended to the new resident population brought to Devens under the
provisions of the McKinney Act. Not surprisingly, this fueled a heated debate
over the efficacy, or appropriateness of the federal laws established by the
McKinney Act (ibid.).
Eventually, the GBASA backed down from their intent to acquire the entire
base. Seemingly, the State Administration threatened to reduce state
administered funding to the homeless advocacy group (ibid.). Thus fearing
political and financial repercussions from the state, the GBASA retreated from
their bold position to prepare a new proposal for the base property. At the time
of this study, however, the organization had not made a formal request for any of
the property at Devens. According to Land Bank staff, there was some
speculation that perhaps the GBASA just used their advantageous position in the
Devens situation to negotiate with the federal and local governments to meet
their needs elsewhere (ibid.).
Ultimately, a number of other local organizations submitted requests for
property acquisition under the McKinney Act. These organizations, however,
requested only small portions of the base property for the provision of specific
assistance functions such as medical aid to the homeless, job training and food
storage. As such, the Somerville Homeless Coalition, the Worcester County
Food Bank, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health Substance Abuse
Program and the South Middlesex Opportunity Council, also requested base
property at Devens. Although not all of the proposals had been approved by
Department of Health and Human Services at the time of this study, the federal
General Accounting Office reported that approximately 20 acres will be
transferred for use to assist the homeless, including a total of 82 family housing
units (General Accounting Office: 1994, pp. 26-27).
The Oxbow National Wildlife Refuge Expansion
The US Department of the Interior requested from the Army approximately
450 acres of property on the South Post as an expansion area for the existing
Oxbow Wildlife Refuge. Before granting this sizable request for land, Congress
requested that a report be commissioned in order to evaluate the significance of
the site's wildlife resources. The report concluded that the entire South Post and
some area north of Route 2 adjacent to the existing Oxbow Refuge, contained
wildlife habitat recognized as a priority for protection by both federal and state
laws. However, the property has not yet been approved for conveyance to the
Department of Fish and Wildlife.
The Job Corps
There was one federal use that did not emerge until after the federal
screening process was complete, but would become an important federal tenant
at Devens. In September of 1993, the Land Bank and the JBoS submitted a
proposal to the federal government to make Devens a new site for the federal
Job Corps program. The Job Corps was a major national training and
employment program administered by the Department of Labor to address
barriers to employment faced by disadvantaged youth in the US.
The program required that its participants remain in residence while
attending the program. The length of the program varied depending on the field
of interest the student pursues. AFDC and Medicaid recipients between the
ages of 16 and 24 were eligible for enrollment in the Job Corps programs. The
program provided outreach services to identify and encourage enrollment of
under-privileged youth throughout the County. Enrollment criteria were defined
as youth who were "economically disadvantaged". Once enrolled, the youth
were pre-screened for identification of career training interests and sent to the
Job Corps training center that best suited their interests. The federal program
pays for tuition, room and board and the cost to relocate trained youth to meet
placement opportunities (Job Corps Overview Statement: 1993 pp. 1-3).
The Land Bank proposal for the new Job Corps site considered the
specific training programs to be offered at the Devens Job Corps site. These
decisions were based on research of the local market labor demand (current and
projected) and predominant youth career interests. The Land Bank ultimately
wanted to maintain flexibility in the training programs offered in order to meet the
needs of future industries who site at Devens. According to Land Bank staff,
some of the initial programs identified were computer technical services,
environmental technologies (lab work and testing), plastics manufacturing and
biotechnology (Archer interview: June 23, 1994).
The Land Bank envisioned future involvement with the Job Corps program
to include the development of an industrial network to identify and accommodate
the labor needs of the new commercial users at Devens. In fact, the Land Bank
hoped to use the newly trained labor supply as an incentive to attract new
businesses to Devens. In the short term, it was envisioned that some of the
youth trained would be employed in the fields of construction, administrative and
technical assistance in support of the Devens redevelopment efforts (ibid.).
The Land Bank's proposal was short listed in November of 1993. As
such, they were required to submit an expanded proposal by February of 1994.
In the final proposal, the Land Bank coordinated with the federal Department of
Health and Human Services, the Department of Education and many other
federal and non-federal services to incorporate other programs that might
enhance the Job Corps center at Devens. This strategy was intended to
efficiently utilize the benefits of other human service and education programs
available, making the Job Corps siting at Fort Devens economically attractive to
the Federal government (ibid.).
In March of 1994, Devens was chosen as one of nine sites to receive a
federal Job Corps training facility. The program's proposed location was on 27
acres in the Verbeck housing area on the Main Post. The demolition of existing
housing units was paid for by the Land Bank, but twenty million dollars in federal
Job Corps funding would pay for the development and construction of the new
residential and training facilities. It is envisioned that the Job Corps operation
and management would be contracted to a private management company. The
Job Corps is expected to employ 100-120 administrators, teachers and
counselors (ibid.).
The program initially evoked a lot of knee-jerk reactions in the surrounding
communities who were concerned that 300-350 inner-city youth would negatively
impact local safety. However, the promise of new teaching jobs to offset those
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lost by the contraction of the local public school system seemingly mitigated the
extent of a public decry of the program. However, according to one observer:
"The communities did not want inner city youth in their back yards -- even if they
were training to be productive in society; but the criminals who will be detained at
the federal prison -- well, they're just about ready to invite them for dinner."
Environmental Process
Fort Devens was declared a Superfund site under federal environmental
laws. This status made the base-wide cleanup eligible for special funding from
the DoD. However, in addition to NEPA, which requires agencies of the federal
government to consider the environmental consequences of their actions, the
Army is also subject to the requirements of the Superfund regulations. Under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) and Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA), the property at Devens was listed as a contaminated site of national
priority and was subject to an inter-agency review process separate from the
NEPA EIS process. The inter-agency process required a cooperative cleanup
effort between federal, state and local environmental agencies. But according
to Land Bank staff, the state environmental agency (Massachusetts
Environmental Protection Agency -- MEPA) refused to sign the inter-agency
agreement on the basis that it would relinquish the state's right to take legal
action against the former federal property owners, should contamination be
found after the property was transferred (Kohn interview: June 13, 1994).
So in an unprecedented decision by the Army, the federal and local
interests continued to negotiate an interagency review process without
cooperation from the state's environmental entities (Knapp interview: June 13,
1994). In the spring of 1993, Land Bank, JBoS and US Fish and Wildlife
Services applied for, and received Cooperating Agency Status with the
Department of the Army in the preparation of the federal EIS process.
Cooperating Agency Status allowed the Land Bank and the JBoS early access to
101
information and the right to participate in all of the federal decisions made
regarding the EIS. More importantly, it required that the EIS process consider
the local Reuse Plan as the basis for the impact study (ibid.).
Fort Devens was the first Army base of the 1988 and 1991 BRAC
closures to receive Cooperating Agency status with the Army:
"The Reuse Plan is being used in its entirety in the EIS -- the Army
Corps of Engineers will not be allowed to create its own reuse plan
in order to accommodate its finding from the environmental impact
analysis. This agreement may have been made easier because
the Land Bank, with the direct backing of the state, may have had
all of the political support necessary to facilitate such an
agreement" -- Excerpt from interview with Judy Kohn,
Environmental Coordinator for the Massachusetts Government
Land Bank/Fort Devens Reuse Center
Even without direct involvement in the Cooperating Agency Agreement,
the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection continued to work
closely with the federal environmental process. By August of 1992, the property
was designated as a "Major and Complicated Project" under state law by the
state Secretary of Environmental Affairs. This designation would allow for a joint
EIR/EIS process required under NEPA, thus reducing the redundancy of similar
state and federal processes (Kohn interview: June 13, 1994). Also as part of the
designation, the Secretary of Environmental Affairs required the creation of an
Citizen Advisory Committee (CAC) to oversee and advise the environmental
clean up process. It was the CAC's mission to assure that local public interests
were fairly represented in any decisions undertaken by the joint federal/state
cooperating agency (The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive Office of
Environmental Affairs, Certificate of the Secretary of Environmental Affairs on the
Environmental Notification Form; February 8, 1993).
102
Initial Non-Federal Property Transfers
In addition to the property acquired by other federal agencies during the
federal screening process, a number of proposals were entertained for non-
federal uses. Specifically, a proposal by the Boston & Maine/Canadian Pacific
railroads required the negotiation of an interim lease with the Army, and requests
for property by local Native American tribes were also considered before the
Land Bank's local reuse process began.
The Boston & Maine/Canadian Pacific Railways: Thirty-four acres of rail and
freight handling facilities presently existed at Fort Devens. In the spring of 1992,
the Boston & Maine Railroad and the Canadian Pacific Railroad expressed
interest in the redevelopment of the railway and facilities. The railroad did not
propose to undertake the redevelopment themselves, however, was willing to
commit to expanding their operations to utilize Devens as a major intermodal
center (Fort Devens Redevelopment Board, Report to the Governor December
1992, pp. 15-16).
The intermodal center -- or Inland Port, as it would later be named --
would connect Devens to the Port of Boston and would serve as both a regional
distribution and storage center for goods shipped into Boston. Devens' proximity
to a network of major state and interstate highways made the intermodal center
attractive for regional truck distribution. Access to large on-site storage facilities
allowed for interim and transfer container storage and the implementation of 'just
in time' supply services (ibid.). 34
The new Inland Port promised the immediate creation of 80 to 100 new,
primarily low skilled jobs for the region. Moreover, because Boston was
presently serviced by only one railroad (Conrail), monopolistic pricing reduced
34 The practice of 'just in time' supply delivery has increased in recent years in response to rising
storage costs. The practice is based upon the coordination of input purchases such that
necessary supplies arrive 'just in time' to be utilized in production. This reduces a firms need to
stockpile huge inventories on site and thus reduces warehouse and storage expenditures.
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the shipping activity at the Port of Boston. Competitive pricing in New York,
made it more attractive for shippers to unload in New York and truck their
contents to the New England region. Thus, the competition introduced by the
new Boston & Maine routes would lower the rail transport rates and attract more
shipping business to Boston. This, in turn, would create jobs throughout the
state (Bassett lecture: January 14, 1995).
In July of 1992, the Weld Administration announced that the Boston &
Maine/Springfield Terminal Railway Company, as a wholly owned subsidiary of
Guilford Industries would operate an intermodal freight center in partnership with
the Canadian Pacific Rail System. The agreement enabled the two companies
to provide domestic and international intermodal transportation and distribution
services with direct rail access to the Port of Boston. The addition of Canadian
Pacific's worldwide business would provide railroad access from the Pacific Rim
to Europe (Fort Devens Redevelopment Board, Report to the Governor
December 1992, pp. 15-16).
Guilford Industries began its operations in 1993, under a 12 month interim
lease agreement with the Army, secured by the Land Bank. According to the
Deputy Commander on base, the first property lease on the base, was
negotiated even before the troops had moved out (Hunt interview: August 25,
1994).
The Native American Coalition: The Abenaki Indians were a local tribe that
possessed dual citizenship with both the US and Canada. Although their dual
citizenship made them ineligible to claim ancestral lands under US law, the tribe
was a vocal member of the regional Native American coalition who collectively
proposed to utilize space at Devens for a Native American TV station, job
training center, and housing for tribal and homeless veterans. At the time of this
study, an interim lease was executed to provide office space for the coalition,
however, no official property transfers were made (Knapp interview: June 13,
1994).
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The Airport Revised: According to the Massachusetts Aeronautical
Commission (MAC) study completed in November of 1992, the Main Post at
Devens was determined to be one of the best location for the site of the new
airport, partly because of its direct access to state Route 2. The other potential
site considered was located in the town of Winchendon, approximately 30 miles
northwest of Fort Devens. According to a report filed by the Fort Devens
Redevelopment Board in November of 1992, the MAC hired Arthur D. Little to
conduct a study to assess the demand for additional air transportation in the
New England region.
According to the Redevelopment Board's report, the Arthur D. Little study
focused on assessing the needs for a second regional airport and included
issues such as: increased utilization of existing regional airports and
transportation alternatives such as high speed rail (Fort Devens Redevelopment
Board, Report to the Governor: December, 1992, pp. 20-21). Based on the
results of the Arthur D. Little Study commissioned by the MAC, no real demand
existed to support the need for a second regional airport. The report concluded
that existing transportation options reduced the demand for air travel in New
England. As such, the MAC concluded its feasibility study process (Seidman
interview: February 6, 1995).
Part IV: Forming a Collective Reuse Strategy
The Fort Devens Reuse Center
By the summer of 1992, the official federal screening process was
complete. Prior to that time, the Land Bank had spent most of its time preparing
its reuse strategy for Fort Devens, and coordinating with the federal
government's reuse process (refer to previous section). As such, the Land Bank
had little time to negotiate a cooperative reuse planning process with the JBoS.
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In August of 1992, however, the Land Bank and the JBoS created the Fort
Devens Reuse Center.
The Reuse Center was located on the base, in close proximity to the Base
Commander and the Army's on-site BRAC staff. The Reuse Center was staffed
by Land Bank personnel, and a full time project manager employed by the JBoS.
According to Land Bank staff, the physical proximity of the two entities, it was
thought, would serve to foster better lines of communications and facilitate a
more cooperative reuse planning process (Knapp interview: June 13, 1994).
There was a library, meeting space and office equipment from which the day-to-
day operations of the reuse planning process were conducted. Although an
official cooperating relationship had not yet been negotiated between the JBoS
and the Land Bank, the creation of the Reuse Center was the first step toward a
collective state and local reuse process.
The Reuse Center operated for a period of approximately six months
without a formal cooperating agreement between the Land Bank and the JBoS.
Activities at the Reuse Center during that time, included early discussions with
potential future users for Devens, including the Boston & Maine and Canadian
Pacific Railroads. Additionally, the State environmental impact review process
also got underway (ibid.).
Throughout the fall of 1993, the JBoS continued to pursue their own
agenda. In addition to their efforts to stop the airport development and to bring
the federal prison to Devens, the JBoS worked to create an inter-municipal
project review process to govern the redevelopment of Fort Devens. This
process, which included the development of an expedited zoning and permitting
process for interim projects, was created to insure timely approval of short term
economic development projects on the base. The new Interim Planning Overlay
District (IPOD) zoning classifications were drafted to cover the base property for
a period of two years, after which time the land use jurisdiction would revert back
to the towns (Fort Devens Redevelopment Board, Report to the Govemor
December, 1993, pp. 4-22). The IPOD zoning would allow the approval of
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interim projects by a collective special permitting process involving the three
participating towns of Ayer, Harvard and Shirley. This process was intended to
avoid lengthy zoning amendment negotiations required between individual land
use authorities when a proposed site falls within more than one jurisdiction
(Higgins interview: August 25, 1994).
In addition to the creation of the IPOD, the four towns continued to work
together under the leadership of the JBoS. Task groups were established to
monitor and accelerate the development of a new federal prison complex, to
provide small business assistance to local residents, to monitor the airport
feasibility study, to review federal and state environmental documents, and to
propose the creation of a community development corporation to foster the
development of affordable housing at Devens (ibid.).
Concurrently, the JBoS drafted their own legislation to create the Fort
Devens Redevelopment Corporation and Redevelopment Authority. Seemingly,
the local communities were not comfortable with the idea of letting the state
control the future development of their region (Higgins interview: August 25,
1994). Through the new legislation, the four towns proposed that a new locally
represented Redevelopment Authority be created to oversee the redevelopment
of Fort Devens. The proposed Redevelopment Authority was envisioned as an
eight member board (consisting of two members from each town), with funding
provided by the state (ibid.). But despite numerous attempts by the communities
to persuade the decision-makers on Beacon Hill, the bill was never seriously
considered by State legislators. The bill ultimately died in the last session of the
State Legislature in January of 1993 for reasons not identified. The JBoS's
proposed legislation was refilled for the following legislative session, but was
never reconsidered.:
"The JBoS tried to pass their own legislation for redevelopment
because they felt more comfortable with local control. But this
legislation did not include involvement by the Land Bank. The
airport issue still left many local residents questioning the Land
Bank's true intentions in the redevelopment process. The local
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communities are concerned that local involvement and control will
fade away over time if the they do not maintain a pro-active
approach to the reuse process." -- Excerpt from interview with Tim
Higgins, former Ayer Town Administrator.
Meanwhile, the Land Bank was busy hiring an architectural consultant to
study the feasibility of the proposed prison complex and its impact on the
Devens' Reuse Plan. Also during the fall of 1992, the Land Bank authorized the
creation of the MassResource Center -- a one stop office for information and
technical assistance to local businesses affected by the closure (Fort Devens
Redevelopment Board, Report to the Governor December, 1993, pp. 4-22).
Of the major events taking shape outside of the Reuse Center, the
Massachusetts Aeronautical Commission (MAC) continued to debate whether or
not to pursue the siting of the regional airport at Devens; and in February of
1993, MAC reported that there was no real need for a second major airport in the
Boston area.
The Creation of The Devens Enterprise Legislation
By the spring of 1993, the Land Bank began to draft new legislation to
create a state recognized "enterprise zone" at Devens. The primary objective of
the legislation was to "successfully redevelop Fort Devens through a
consolidated regional approach, offsetting the adverse impacts of the base
closure on the regional economy" (Devens Enterprise Commission Legislation -
Executive Summary, January, 1994, pp. 1-2). The DEC legislation defined the
roles and authorities of both the Land Bank and the JBoS throughout the
planning, development and long term operations of the Devens reuse project.
Essentially, the DEC Legislation created a new town, with its own zoning, by-
laws and municipal services system, and the Land Bank acting as the local
government for a period of 40 years.
In April of 1993, the Land Bank hired the planning firm of EDAW,
Inc.Nanasse Hangen Brustlin, Inc.(EDAWNHB) to begin to lay out the physical
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reuse process. EDAWNHB was tasked with the development of preliminary
plans and drawings of what the future Devens site might look like.35 The initial
plans incorporated the sites already acquired during the federal screening
process, as well as the non-federal uses such as the railroad facilities. In June
of 1993, the JBoS acknowledging defeat of their Fort Devens Redevelopment
Corporation Legislation had formally agreed to support the Land Bank's creation
of the Devens Enterprise Commission (DEC) Legislation.
The Legislation: Provision for the new DEC Legislation stated that for the first
40 years, the political and administrative powers and authority at Devens would
be apportioned between the Land Bank and the towns of Harvard, Ayer and
Shirley (Devens Enterprise Commission Legislation: Executive Summary:
January, 1994, pp. 1-2). Pursuant to the DEC Legislation, the Land Bank
received authorization to issue $200 million in bonds and development
responsibility for the Devens property with specific responsibility for the following:
" Acquisition of sites from the Army as they become available;
e All on-site infrastructure improvements (including the construction of a new
regional sewer plant);
" Development of the site in accordance with the Reuse Plan (to be
development jointly with the local communities);
" Development and implementation of a marketing plan;
e Negotiations with potential public and private development (including
financing by the Land Bank);
" Staffing the day-to-day management and operations of the redevelopment
project;
35 In addition to EDAWNHB, a team of real estate, legal and technical consultants were
subcontracted through EDAWNHB including, RKG Associates, and John Lynch. Other
consultants were employed by the Reuse Center to create altneratives for the waste water
treatment facility, and to study the environmental planning issues.
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* The provision of all public services on the property either directly or by
contract. (Police protection to be carried out either through the military police,
the state police, or by contract with the towns), (ibid.).
At the time of the study, it was unclear how the authorized DEC bond
issue would be secured. According to the Land Bank's Deputy Director Karl
Seidman, the DEC Legislation only authorized the bond issue, it did not explicitly
state how the bonds would be secured; that is, whether the bonds would be
backed by the full faith and credit of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts or by
the revenues and assets held by the Land Bank. According to Seidman, the
Land Bank does not currently have enough capital assets to guarantee
repayment of the $200 million bond issue. As such, the Land Bank intends to
pursue additional legislation that will authorize a state guarantee on the bonds
(Seidman interview: February 6, 1995).
In the short term, the primary responsibility of the three towns will be to
approve the Final Reuse Plan and Bylaws as produced through a cooperative
planning process facilitated by the Land Bank. The Devens Enterprise
Commission will be responsible for regulating private land uses pursuant to the
approved Bylaws. The Land Bank, on the other hand, will oversee the
redevelopment of the base property in accordance with the Reuse Plans, once
they are approved by the four surrounding towns. According to the Land Bank's
Executive Director, the Land Bank will govern the property at Devens as if it were
a new municipality (Basset lecture: January 14, 1995). This includes the
creation of a new municipal tax structure.
Although the details of the Devens tax system have not yet been worked
out, the Land Bank anticipates that revenues generated from the future Devens
development will be fee-based (Knapp interview: June 13,1994). According to
the Land Bank's Senior Development Coordinator, the benefit of a fee-based tax
structure is that it allows the Land Bank to collect revenues from government or
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non-profit users, such as the prison, the Job Corps and the homeless
organizations (ibid.).
Under current Massachusetts law, there were only two primary tax
sources from which to collect community revenues: property taxes and auto
excise taxes.36 However, municipal tax revenues are limited by Proposition 2
1/2 which reduced municipal tax bases to 2 1/2% of underlying residential asset
values. In most Massachusetts communities, these local revenues comprise up
to 60% of the towns total revenues, with state and federal aid making up the
difference. The DEC Legislation allowed the Land Bank to seek alternative
methods for funding the general services to the new residents of the Devens
community, including police, fire, water and sewer and public education.
Finally, the Enterprise Zone legislation created a full time staff at Devens
to oversee the Reuse Plan implementation as well as the day-to-operations of
the new Devens development. The full time staff would be available to
accommodate all development inquiries and proposals in a timely and efficient
manor. Given the part time nature of most of the planning and operational staff
in the surrounding communities, it was not likely that these functions could be
handled by the local municipalities.
Although many of the details of the long term operation and management
of the Devens redevelopment had not been worked out at the time of this study,
the DEC Legislation allowed the Land Bank to design a new tax structure, the
revenues of which would be used to provide municipal services to the new
businesses and residents at Devens. For the purpose of political and public
school districting, the surrounding towns will continue to respect the on-base
jurisdictional borders.37 The towns will not, however, collect tax revenues from
the new residents and businesses of Devens.
36 Hotel and jet fuel taxes are also collected by the state and rebated to the communities based
on a population formula, however, these revenues do not constitute a significant source of local
revenues.
37 The Devens Enterprise Commission Legislation removed the towns' ability to tax residents who
will live at Devens, but did not address the responsibility and expense for educating the children
The DEC Legislation stated that by the year 2033 permanent governance
of the property would be reconsidered by the Legislature. At that time, the
property will revert back to the local towns, continue to be operated by the Land
Bank, or be incorporated as a new autonomous municipal entity pursuant to the
Acts and Resolved of the Commonwealth.
In general, the DEC Legislation created an opportunity to remove the
impediments common in the local reuse and redevelopment of closed military
installations, including municipal finance barriers, and a lack of professional
planning expertise and political muscle. Through the DEC Legislation, the Land
Bank assumed the financial and operational responsibilities that the communities
could not undertake. In addition to the $200 million in project capitalization
funds, the Land Bank also had access to the states Emerging Technology Fund,
which the Land Bank was responsible for administering state-wide:
"[The creation of the Enterprise Legislation] was the best thing that
could have been established for the redevelopment of Fort Devens.
By making Devens an autonomous land entity, independent of local
politics in the future development decision-making processes, gives
the locals the greatest chance of fostering private sector
development here. By allowing one cooperative entity to take
control of the redevelopment early disbursement of OEA planning
money was facilitated." -- Excerpt from interview with Carter Hunt,
Deputy Commander, Fort Devens Headquarters.
The Devens Enterprise Commission: The towns' representation in the
governance of the property at Devens was limited through membership in the
Devens Enterprise Commission (DEC). All members of the DEC would be
appointed by the Governor and limited to four year terms. Six of the members
would represent the three towns (nominated by the Board of Selectmen of the
residing at Devens. In Decmeber of 1994, the state legislature passed a bill regarding the funding
of public education for the new residents at Devens. The new legislation gave the Land Bank the
financial responsibility for the cost of educating students residing at Devens (Seidman interview:
February 6, 1995).
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respective towns), three other members would reside in the Fort Devens region
and the other three would be chosen at the Governors discretion.
According to the DEC Legislation, the three town's responsibility is to
approve the Reuse plan and the Bylaws and to participate in the Devens
Enterprise Commission. The process set forth in the DEC Legislation first
required that a Reuse plan and land use Bylaws be prepared collectively by the
towns and the Land Bank and submitted for a majority vote by special town
meetings in the towns of Ayer, Harvard and Shirley. In order to get the
necessary majority vote, the towns had to all agree on the provisions of the
physical Reuse Plan and Bylaws in their entirety. However, a number of issues
began to emerge regarding the provision of municipal services and the general
operation of Devens that threatened a majority vote among the communities.
Issues such as the provision of public services and funding for public education
were at the center of the debate. Solutions discussed included state legislation
for tuition funding that would cover the cost of the students of non-tax generating
families and the provision of public safety contracts with the local towns:
"The JBoS's biggest concerns in negotiating the legislation were
cops and kids. [The towns] wanted to make sure that the Land
Bank could meet its security service provisions with [what the
towns call] "incapable" private sector police. They wanted the
security of their own publicly trained officers. They also wanted to
make sure that some money would be available for education
funding to their public schools. Had these provisions not been
worked out to the satisfaction of the towns, the Enterprise
Legislation would not have worked." -- Excerpt from interview with
Jeff Simon, Director Fort Devens Division, for the Land Bank.
The primary function of the Devens Enterprise Commission will be to
issue all local licenses and permits. According to the Legislation, the
responsibilities of the DEC consist of:
* One-stop permitting of all local licenses and permits, with the powers of:
planning board; zoning board of appeals; conservation commission; board of
health and historic district commission;.
* Development and adoption of a set of regulations relating to zoning,
subdivision control and conservation commission regulatory powers;
" Administration and enforcement of the Reuse Plan and Bylaws;
* Review of all applications for local permits and licenses for all individual
development proposals at Devens (Devens Enterprise Commission
Legislation: Executive Summary: January, 1994, pp. 2-3).
Fundamentally, what was at stake for the local communities was the loss
of control over the base land within their jurisdictions. According to Harvard town
Selectman Dana Owens, the towns felt as though the DEC Legislation did not
give the local towns enough control over future decisions regarding the Devens
redevelopment. It was unclear in the DEC Legislation whether or not the Land
Bank would be able to revise the approved Reuse Plan and Bylaws at some
future date. The DEC Legislation, the towns feared, relinquished their control to
the Land Bank (Owens interview: February 8, 1994). Given the 40 year duration
of the DEC Legislation, many local residents were concerned that they might not
ever regain control over their land within their jurisdiction.
However, most had acknowledged that without the financial incentives
and expertise of the Land Bank, the property within their jurisdiction would be
worth little to the local communities (Higgins interview: August 25, 1994). In fact,
RKG's Municipal Fiscal Impact study revealed that it would cost the local
communities as much as $20 million dollars collectively in additional
expenditures over the first five to ten years of development, and would require
new full time staff be employed in each town to handle the development process
(RKG Associates, Inc., Municipal Fiscal Impact Analysis": February, 1993, pp. 1-
1 through 1-2).
The Passage of the DEC Legislation: During the fall of 1993, before the bill
went to Beacon Hill, the communities set up a committee consisting of one
Selectman and one Planning Board member from each of the three towns to
review and comment on the draft legislation created by the Land Bank.
Proposed changes were negotiated with the Land Bank before the legislation
was sent to Legislature for passage. The bill supporting the creation of the
Devens Enterprise Commission (DEC), passed quickly in January of 1994.
Part V: Generating Ideas and Alternatives
The Public Planning Process
In the first step toward this new cooperative relationship, the Land Bank
and JBoS team, instituted the provision of monthly workshops to give local
residents a chance to influence the reuse planning and decision making process.
In August of 1993, the first workshop was held. Although the DEC Legislation
had not yet been passed, this process laid the ground work for a truly public
participatory planning process.
According to the Report To the Governor prepared by the Fort Devens
Redevelopment Board, the strategic reuse process at Devens was an effort in
public participatory planning. Although the Land Bank had ultimate control over
the process, public forums were conducted such that public ideas and concerns
became central to most of the major decisions made in support of the Reuse
Plan. From the communities' perspective, the public workshops would be their
first chance to see what had come of the joint Land Bank/JBoS efforts of the
previous years. More importantly, the JBoS realized that the public input
process was critical because it would be the communities only chance to
influence the redevelopment of Fort Devens. Pursuant to the DEC Legislation,
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future local community involvement in the planning process would be minimal
(Higgins interview: August 25, 1994).
Beginning in the spring of 1993, even before the JBoS had agreed to take
part in the DEC Legislation, the Land Bank's physical master planning process
was underway. In the initial planning phase EDAWNHB began by developing a
statement of goals and objectives that would become the central focus of the
reuse planning process; this statement would represent the consensus "vision"
of Fort Devens. Generally, the Statement called for a "visionary planning effort
grounded in environmental, social and economic reality". Specifically, the goals
reflected a desire to develop an economically diverse project that balanced
economic needs with the need to maintain and enhance existing environmental
resources, reduce single industry dependence, coordinate local, state and
federal interests, and create an economy that would be viable over the long run
(Fort Devens Redevelopment Board, Report to the Govemor December, 1992,
pp. 4-6).
Three categories of objectives accompanied the goals above: economic,
cultural and social, and environmental. The economic objectives included the
creation of at least as many jobs as were sustained by the military base in 1990,
to utilize the skill base of the existing labor force, to foster a mix of viable
industries, and to expand the regions economic base. The protection and
enhancement of Devens historical resources, the quality of life of the local
citizens and the provision of education and training were atop the cultural and
social objectives. Finally, the environmental objectives reflected the need to
ensure effective, expeditious and efficient clean-up efforts, to protect the local
ecological and natural resources, to minimize off-base impacts from
development (including traffic, viewsheds, noise, etc.) and to foster and attract
businesses which enhance the environment through technology (ibid.).
In the public planning process, a series of five, day long community
workshops were held over an eight month period to create a forum for public
participation in the planning process. The workshops were facilitated by
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EDAWNHB and members of the Land Bank and JBoS. The earlier workshops
were coordinated to discuss the physical constraints and attributes of the Devens
property, and the marketing constraints and attributes of the economy in the
surrounding region. The meetings were not conducted in a conference like
fashion. Instead, individuals were asked to form small work groups to address
issues of social, environmental and economic relevance and were later brought
together to discuss and coordinate findings. Ideas were typically expressed
using markers and maps. This information was later used by EDAWNHB to
further develop the physical development plans. Rarely were changes
incorporated in the reuse plan that were not openly discussed in the public
forum. Closed door planning sessions with the planning consultants took place
only as necessary to coordinate with the ongoing federal reuse process (Simon
interview: August 22, 1994).
By the third workshop, in October of 1993, EDAWNHB had produced
three alternative reuse plans based on the ideas and alternatives generated in
the previous workshops. The plans were presented and debated in an open
public forum in which specific questions were solicited and addressed. The final
two meeting were similar in that revised reuse plans were presented based on
the finding of the previous meetings. In December of 1993, the Final Reuse Plan
was presented. This Plan would become the basis for the Reuse Bylaws and
would ultimately be held up for vote at the Super Town meeting, then scheduled
to be held in October of 1994 (Fort Devens Redevelopment Board, Report to the
Govemor December, 1992, pp. 4-6.
In general, the meetings were well attended. The Land Bank and the
JBoS were hopeful that level of participation accurately represented the general
public sentiment toward the effort. By involving the residents in the planning
process, the Land Bank and the JBoS hoped to avoid public opposition at the
Super town meeting:
'All meetings are wide-open to public participation. Consultant
reports are available at all local libraries; there is ample opportunity
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for public debate at the town meetings and reuse planning
workshops... So far, there has been high citizen involvement
throughout the process -- especially by the residents of Harvard.
However, general participation levels grow and subside depending
on the issues at hand. We will have to wait until the Super Town
meeting to find out what the real public consensus is' -- Excerpt
from interview with Tim Higgins, former Ayer Town Administrator.
Assembling the Reuse Bylaws
By January of 1994, the collective goals and objectives of the state and
adjacent communities were documented and the consultants were putting the
final touches on Reuse Plan. The next step was the completion of the
accompanying land use Bylaws. The Bylaws were assembled primarily by
members of the Fort Devens Reuse Center. The provisions of the Bylaws were
based on the Final Reuse Plan produced through the public workshop process.
In June of 1994, the Bylaws were distributed for public review and
comment. Throughout the summer, monthly planning workshops were
sponsored by the JBoS and the Land Bank to refine the Reuse Plan and Bylaws
before they were put to vote at the Super Town meeting. According to Land
Bank staff, although most of the prevailing local issues were worked out at the
public workshops, some opposition still emerged from a number of local special
interest groups. During a series of pubic hearings regarding the draft Bylaws,
residents representing groups such as the Montachusetts Regional Planning
Commission, and the Citizens for Residential Harvard voiced their concerns. Of
interest to these groups was the opportunity to incorporate more historical
elements (including representation of the local Native American culture),
disturbance of the view shed through the approval of the new commercial
building heights and control over future changes made to the Devens site. Also
represented were individual citizens concerned about issues such as traffic, the
future role of the towns once the forty year legislation expires and the possibility
that a new casino project would be sited at Devens.
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Community skepticism would always be a reality. At the time this study
was conducted, the local papers were filled with public comment and criticism
regarding the Devens Reuse Plan, the Bylaws and even the Land Bank for their
pre-emptive role in the Devens redevelopment. Most notably, the towns
remained concerned about their lack of control over the redevelopment of the
base for the next 40 years. Moreover, they were concerned about who was
going to pay for the public education of the school aged children living at Devens
("Devens Grassroots Efforts Spring Up on all Sides", Harvard Post, November
11, 1994). The DEC Legislation, in it current form, did not include a public
education provision. The towns were concerned that they were going to be
paying to educate the new Devens children (ibid.).
Although the DEC Legislation passed in January of 1994, the legislation
would not go immediately into affect. Ultimate approval for the Fort Devens
redevelopment was placed in the hands of a single yes/no vote put before the
four adjacent towns. The Super Town Meeting, set to take place in December of
1994, represented the culmination of four years of economic and physical
planning for the reuse of this 9,000+ acre former Army training base. Put to vote
was a physical master plan designating future uses of the base property and
accompanying land use by-laws painstakingly created through an extensive
public planning process orchestrated by the Land Bank.
The Super Town Meeting
The primary field study research for this study was conducted between
June and September of 1994. However, since that time, a new chapter has
been added to the story of the Fort Devens reuse. According to Land Bank staff,
community skepticism of the Devens Reuse Plan and Bylaws emerged in the
months before the Super Town meeting. In fact, for a time it appeared as though
the Devens Enterprise Legislation might not be passed at the Super Town
Meeting, originally slated for October of 1994. In September the vote was
postponed in order to further consider a number of key issues that the towns did
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not feel comfortable with in the current legislation (Owens interview: February 8,
1995). But on December 7, 1994, the towns approved the plan; overwhelmingly
in Ayer and Shirley, and by a 3-to-1 margin in Harvard ("Devens Grassroots
Efforts Spring Up on All Sides", The Harvard Post, November 11, 1994). Now,
with the Super Town Meeting behind them, the Land Bank and towns can begin
the economic healing process necessary to bring prosperity back to the region.
In the final months before the Super Town meeting several provisions of
the DEC Legislation were revised to accommodate the local interests. One such
revision allowed the towns to change the approved Reuse Plan and Bylaws as
necessary to accommodate a land use in the future. Under the revised
provisions, the towns' right to appeal the plan was clarified with a revision to the
legislation that requires a majority vote by town meetings in Ayer, Harvard and
Shirley to approve amendments to the Reuse Plan and Bylaws (ibid.). In
addition, the State Legislature passed legislation directing the Land Bank to
enter into a contract with the local school districts for the education of the school
age children residing at Devens; or. as a last resort, to establish its own schools
on the base (Seidman interview: February 6, 1995). In either case the towns
would be relieved of the responsibility of providing education for the children
living at Devens ("Education Could Break Town if Reuse Plan Fails"; The
Harvard Post, December 2, 1994).
Other factors such as the results of a community sponsored fiscal impact
study may have also contributed to the success. In addition to the public
planning process, the town of Harvard initiated its own municipal fiscal impact
study, the results of which convinced many Harvard residents that they could not
afford to vote the plan down. 38 According to a Harvard town Selectman, this
event may have won the votes needed to support the Reuse Plan in Harvard.
38 The study indicated that a 40% increase in local revenues would be necessary to support
schools and services to residents of the former base property that lies within Harvard's jurisdiciton
("Devens Grassroots Efforts Spring Up on All Sides", The Harvard Post, November 11, 1994).
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Similar factors may have also contributed to the ultimate success of the Reuse
Plan in Ayer and Shirley (Owens interview: February 8, 1994).
In summary, if the Reuse Plan had not been passed, the towns of
Harvard, Ayer and Shirley would not only be responsible for providing education
and other services to the residents living on the base property within their
jurisdiction, but would also have to fund the infrastructure upgrades necessary to
bring the property up to market standards. This would require a significant
increase in individual tax rates.39 Thus it appears as though the towns realized
that they simply could not afford to vote the Reuse Plan down.
Testing the Strategy
Testing the viability of proposed uses in the Reuse Plan was a practice
implemented from day one of the Land Bank's planning effort. Even before the
conceptual plans were brought before the public planning process, the Land
Bank had exercised reality testing methodologies that allowed them to make
more informed decisions based on the general business and economic climate in
the region.
First, the Land Bank worked closely with the state government on the
creation of the state-wide economic development strategy, Choosing to
Compete, published by the Commonwealth in May of 1993. Much of the
research that was required to make recommendations for state economic
development were useful to the Fort Devens planning process. Data such as
labor pool characteristics, population trends, available technology and the
existing state business infrastructure were useful input to the Land Banks initial
planning process (Memorandum from Karl Seidman to Land Bank Board of
Directors: May 13, 1993).
39 This would, of course, require a Proposition 2 1/2 override referendum. However, because
state legislation limits the total override amount to 2 1/2% of a towns aggregate asset values, the
override still may not have been enough to save the three towns from fiscal insolvency.
The Land Bank also employed Meredith and Grew, a large regional real
estate brokerage and development firm, to provide guidance as to the types of
industries who were looking for space in the region. Simon also spent time
meeting with local industry leaders to get a better idea of the commercial viability
of the Devens Reuse Plan. According to Jeff Simon, Director of the Land Bank's
Fort Devens Division, the purpose of this informal research was to get a sense of
the industries that will emerge in the next century (Simon interview: August 22,
1994). For instance, Simon met with the Chairman of the Massachusetts
Biotechnology Council and the CEO's of some of the large local bio-tech
companies in the area, and asked them what it would take to get them to locate
biotech at Devens. According to Simon, one of the most notable responses he
received was that the firms needed certainty of land use regulations, fairly
applied. Many of the firms surveyed expressed frustration by the inconsistency
of regulatory determinations applied in some communities; they contended that
the creation of a more streamlined regulatory and permitting process would help
to attract bio-tech firms to the Fort Devens development (Simon interview:
August 22, 1994). (This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four in the
section entitled Attaining Market Competitiveness.)
The culmination of all of this input would be the basis for the Reuse Plan,
as well as the future operational and governance structure established in the
DEC Legislation. Specifically, the Land Bank created the one-stop permitting
process in response to the comments received through its market research:
"This process created a platform for economic development.
Government can not create jobs; all they can do is steer the private
development community to the sites that they want developed.
They can create a fertile ground through tailoring regulatory
processes to meet the needs of the private sector." -- Excerpt from
interview with Jeff Simon, Director Fort Devens Division, for the
Land Bank.
122
Finally, in the Fall of 1993, EDAWNHB commissioned a series of four
new studies to be conducted by RKG & Associates. According to Land Bank
staff, the purpose of these studies was to provide additional information to
support the public reuse planning effort that began in the Summer of 1993.
These studies included:
* The Preliminary Financial Analysis of the Operations and Redevelopment of
Fort Devens to Civilian Reuse: the purpose of this report was to present the
results of RKG's "initial financial analysis of the costs and revenues
associated with the acquisition and redevelopment of Fort Devens into a
mixed use facility which emphasizes innovation and technology" (RKG &
Associates, Preliminary Financial Analysis of the Operations and
Redevelopment of Fort Devens to Civilian Reuse: December 1993, pg. 1-1).
* The Non-Residential Market Research report: the purpose of the report was
to evaluate the socioeconomic characteristics of the regional and local
economies; analyze the near term and longer term prospects within several
industries identified in the planning process; and evaluate the supply and
demand in local and regional non-residential real estate markets (RKG &
Associates, Non-Residential Market Research: December, 1993, pp. 3-2
through 3-3).
* The Real Estate Market Analysis: the purpose of this report was to analyze
key supply and demand characteristics of the real estate market within a
defined market area surrounding Fort Devens (RKG & Associates, Real
Estate Market Analysis: January, 1994, pg. 4-1).
. The Implementation report: the purpose of this report was to address the
issues of implementation of the Reuse Plan and Bylaws including: marketing,
project finance and acquisition (RKG & Associates, Implementation report:
January, 1994, pg. 5-1).
Part VII: An Overview of the Economic Strategy and the Final
Reuse Plan
The Land Bank's approach to economic development was to create an
environment that would attract and create innovative and technology businesses
and additional rail-related activities. Ultimately, the underlying economic
development strategy in the DEC legislation intended to blend the revival of
traditional jobs that will reduce short term unemployment with the creation of new
jobs that would protect the region from future single industry shocks, such as the
closure of Fort Devens:
"We are not looking to steal businesses from local communities,
but there may be some conflict in businesses moving from
Fitchburg, Leominster, etc. This just adds to the competitiveness
of local businesses. Devens' goal is to start new and attract jobs,
not just shuffle the net jobs in the area around. [The Land Bank]
acknowledges that this philosophy will be difficult to sustain in
practice, but the reuse effort will bid for existing local companies
only if there are threats that the business will go south because of
the high cost of business in this region." -- Excerpt from interview
with Ken Willette, Economic Development Coordinator for the Land
Bank.
As the central economic theme, the attraction of businesses pursuing
innovative technologies would be critical to the long term success of the Reuse
Plan. Banking on the State's traditional strengths in the development of new
technologies, they had hoped to find users who could capitalize on the unique
attributes of both the large affordable development sites and access to academic
research and a highly skilled labor force (Willette interview: June 13, 1994).
The Land Bank focused on one idea, in particular, that would attract firms
from the emerging environmental technology industry. The Land Bank felt that
environmental technologies was a growing field with a potential for high future
demand through increasing global and national environmental requirements and
regulations. To attract these firms, the Land Bank is pursuing the idea of making
available some of the 50+ Superfund sites existing on the base to environmental
research firms for product testing and development. At the time of this study, the
details of this idea -- such as who will pay for the cleanup -- had not yet been
worked out. However, if successful, the Land Bank hopes to provide a model for
future bases as a method for attracting economic development, remediating
environmental contamination on the base property and promoting the
development of cleanup technologies to be used at other federal and non-federal
sites world-wide (Simon interview: March 24, 1994).
Finally, several mechanism were pursued by the Land Bank to provide
support for the attraction and creation of new enterprises at Devens. The
MassResource center was created to provide assistance to existing businesses
impacted by the closure, while the new Innovation and Technology Center was
created to incubate start up technology ventures. Finally, the DoD's
Environmental Technology program gave the Land Bank an opportunity to foster
environmental technology enterprises at Devens, as well as establish a link with
some of the research institutions in the state.
The Reuse Plan assembled in the public process reflected the Land
Bank's economic development strategy. In addition to the federal users -- the
prison complex and the Job Corps -- the final plan focused primarily on the
creation and attraction of innovative and technology business that had been a
seemingly successful strategy for this region in the past (Vanasse Hangen
Brustlin, Inc. Devens Reuse Plan: 1994, pg. 1). Most importantly the final Reuse
Plan reflected the needs, interests and objectives of the state, regional and local
communities by implementing an economic redevelopment strategy that focused
on the realities of the prevailing economic and environmental conditions.
The final Devens Reuse Plan highlighted uses categorized by three major
themes: (1) innovation and technology business; (2) rail and trade-related uses;
and (3) open space and recreation, resource protection, and enhancement. The
central economic theme of the Reuse Plan is based on the state's "traditional
strengths in the development of new technologies through the academic and
research base of greater Boston." (ibid.). The goal is to attract new or growing
technology businesses in the hopes of fostering a new technology region in
Massachusetts, not dependent on the existing mini-computer and semi-
conductor technology sector presently waning in the Route 128 region.
The MassResource Center In November of 1992, the Land Bank authorized
the provision of the MassResource Center. The MassResource Center was
created by the Land Bank to provide a single location in which the functions of
several government agencies such as the Industrial Services Program, the Office
of Business Development, the Small Business Center and the Department of
Employment and Training would be consolidated. Local participants included the
Ayer Chamber of Commerce, the Ayer Industrial Commission, the Bay State
Skills Corp. (nonprofit worker training program), Service Corps of Retired
Executives and the Montachusetts Economic Center. The purpose of the Center
was to provide a variety of consulting services to individuals and businesses
affected by the closing and to foster new ideas and uses at the Devens
development (The Massachusetts Government Land Bank, MassResource
Center, November, 1992, pp. 1-2).
The MassResource Center also took a proactive approach to soliciting
interest in the Devens project through the creation of seminars on a wide range
of topics geared toward both individuals and businesses interested in siting at
Devens. In addition, skill building workshops were formed to address topics from
resume writing and interviewing techniques, to small business tax issues and
how to structure worker compensation packages (ibid.).
The Innovation and Technology Center In support of this economic
development and marketing strategy, the Reuse Plan incorporated an Innovation
and Technology Center to be sited centrally in the Vicksburg Square area (the
former central parade grounds). The Center would be staffed to identify and
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foster emerging technologies at the state's universities and institutions, and bring
them to Devens. It was envisioned that the Center would attract existing firms,
as well as foster new firms to develop and market these technologies (Willette
interview: June 13, 1994). In support of this, the Center intended to provide
resources, such as low cost incubator lab and office space, and technical
assistance to small business start-ups, focused on bringing new technologies
from the research laboratories to the market-place (Vanasse Hangen Brustlin,
Inc., Devens: Reuse Plan: 1994).
The DoD's Environmental Technology Program: Finally, in June of 1994, the
DoD requested proposals for its new Environmental Technology program. The
purpose of the program was to stimulate research and development of new
technologies aimed at cleaning up the environment and provide training for
individuals at both the scientific and clean-up levels. The program envisioned
the partnership between the public, private and educational sectors toward the
goal of cleaning up military installations and generally furthering environmental
clean-up technology (Archer interview: June 23, 1994).
In response to this opportunity, the Land Bank put together a proposal
entitled the Environmental Technology Program: Hazardous Waste Site
Engineering Consortium at Fort Devens. The proposal envisioned a Consortium
of local institutions, including the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and
Lowell, Fitchburg State College, the North Central Chamber of Commerce and
Employment Board, and Haley and Aldrich, Inc., a local environmental
engineering firm. The Devens program proposed to provide funds for fellowships
for 15 graduate students from UMass Amherst to conduct innovative hazardous
waste clean-up research; 100 training slots for individuals with engineering
backgrounds to receive classroom and hands-on training on hazardous waste
site cleanup; and 100 slots for an OSHA certified training course on cleanup and
remediation techniques (Memorandum to Governor Weld: June, 1994).
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The program was considered to be the first step toward establishing
environmental technologies R&D at Devens. The proposal had three
components: (1) to provide on-site training for local students and trainees; (2) to
bring people with ideas together -- to foster innovation; and (3) to create new
research facilities in which to provide space for technology transfer and new
commercial cleanup ventures at Devens (ibid.).
The DoD funding would be awarded on an annual basis, and the Land
Bank would have to re-apply for additional funding each year. The total first year
budget for the project was approximately $1 million, and was projected to cover
only the cost of the fellowships and scholarships, and some site
accommodations and supplies.
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Chapter Four:
Case Study Analysis
Introduction
The study of the Fort Ord and Fort Devens experiences revealed a
number of issues that warrant further discussion. Although there are many
factors that contribute to the outcomes of the reuse development process, the
purpose of this section is to isolate a few of the most prominent issues as
exhibited by the reuse efforts ongoing at Fort Ord and Fort Devens. From this
discussion, I hope to shed some light on the prospects for local economic
development in the military base reuse process. The following section is
illustrated using experiences from the case studies presented in Chapters II and
Ill. The analysis is based on both my research of the military base closure
process and my knowledge of local economic development practices.
In general, the cases of Fort Ord and Fort Devens represent two different
approaches to state participation in the local economic planning processes. At
Fort Devens, for instance, the case illustrates a process in which the leadership
role is assumed by the state government. Despite the fact that Massachusetts
traditionally supports locally driven economic development efforts, the
communities surrounding Fort Devens did not have total control over the future
development of the base property within their jurisdictions. Meanwhile, at Fort
Ord, the reuse planning process was pursued as a more grass-roots, bottom-up
planning effort in which the state did not directly participate. Here, state
government involvement was not planned, but rather was used to mediate inter-
jurisdictional conflicts at the local level.
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The Fort Ord case suggests that the lack of state involvement was
intentional; reasoning that the creation of a Reuse Plan driven by local
community needs could be possible only through a process of local
representation in which the state government -- with its additional layers of
bureaucratic procedures and political agendas -- is not involved. But the case
suggests that, in fact, the state was very much involved with the reuse planning
process through its strong representation in the Fort Ord Community Task Force.
The case clearly demonstrates that this politically powerful regional planning
body shaped the reuse planning process, and was directly responsible for the
creation of the local economic development strategy.
In the Fort Devens case, on the other hand, state involvement in the
Devens reuse project was intentional, and implemented very early on in the
planning process. Even before the announcement of the Devens closure, the
Land Bank positioned itself to take the lead role in the Fort Devens reuse
process. Because the Land Bank was originally created to redevelop the federal
surplus properties on behalf of the State, the agency was already
organizationally prepared to take on the Fort Devens reuse project. Accordingly,
the Land Bank presented itself to the Governor for consideration as the state
agency in charge of the project. After brief negotiations with the Governor's
Administration, Executive Order 312 was passed formally establishing the Land
Bank as the lead state agency in charge of coordinating a joint local, regional,
state and federal base reuse process. The Executive Order did not initially give
the Land Bank development responsibilities, but instead tasked the agency with
the facilitation of an inter-agency/inter-governmental planning processes, in
which the interests and objectives of all levels of government were met through
the creation of a single redevelopment strategy.
Ultimately, it was the creation of the DEC Legislation that put the Land
Bank in the lead development position. The DEC Legislation gave the Land
Bank legal land use rights over the Devens property. Specifically, the Legislation
gave the Land Bank control over the implementation of the Devens
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redevelopment. But perhaps more importantly, the DEC Legislation gave the
Land Bank access to state financial resources to the tune of $200 million in
bonding authority. Because no other public or private development entity could
support an investment of this size, the DEC funding authorization gave the Land
Bank the power they needed to negotiate with the surrounding towns; and to
redevelop the base before long term economic impacts set in.
It is clear that different approaches to the use of state government
authorities influenced the outcomes of each case. The Devens case suggests
that the use of state government authority (both political and financial) was
critical to the Land Bank's success in developing a reuse strategy at Fort
Devens. Alternatively, the Fort Ord case suggests the use of state government
authority only as necessary to mediate local conflicts. But I can not conclude
from only these experiences that state government leadership in the reuse
process is the key ingredient to a successful base reuse planning effort in which
the needs, objectives and interests of all local and regional entities are met. For
instance, the cases suggest that the divergent political and governmental
contexts may have also influenced the outcome of the planning efforts at each
case study site.
At Fort Ord, a strong regional government structure and seemingly
powerful city governments provided a planning forum that was quite different
from the Fort Devens case. This is evidenced by the fact that Seaside and
Marina were able to influence, and even stall the public planning process until
the state stepped in to mediate the inter-jurisdictional planning conflicts.
Certainly, if Seaside and Marina were truly powerless in the reuse planning
process, the regional government would have been able to move forward with
their planning strategy, unfettered by inter-jurisdictional conflicts. Furthermore,
because it appears as though the state was indirectly involved with the reuse
efforts at Fort Ord all along, the effectiveness of a formal state leadership role is
also unclear. Thus, the case suggests that even if the state had taken a
leadership role in the early phases of the Fort Ord reuse, there is no guarantee
that inter-jurisdictional conflicts still would not have emerged between the local
entities.
On the other hand, at Fort Devens, the case illustrates a local planning
process that was focused around four small, rural towns, with no formal regional
governance. In this case it is unclear whether or not the towns of Ayer, Harvard,
Shirley and Lancaster had the political or economic influence necessary to take
the leadership role in the redevelopment of Fort Devens. The case suggests
that without the Land Bank's assistance, the four towns would not have access
to the resources necessary to redevelop the surplused Devens property.
In addition to the issues presented above, the cases also demonstrate
that there were other factors involved that may have also influenced the
economic planning process. The following section explores some of the factors
that contributed to the reuse planning processes exhibited at each case study
site. Although these factors are not necessarily exclusive of the discussion to
follow, I will hold the factor of state leadership and involvement constant. This
will allow me to highlight the general findings of the primary issues at hand,
independent of the different levels of state involvement exhibited in each case.
Inter-jurisdictional Infighting
The cases of Fort Ord and the Fort Devens demonstrate some of the
difficulties inherent in establishing a single reuse planning and development
authority in the face of divergent jurisdictional interests and objectives.
Seemingly, the Fort Ord case best illustrates the problems associated with inter-
jurisdictional conflict in the reuse planning process. In this case, two local reuse
entities emerged to take control of the base redevelopment process; each
representing the distinct community needs and objectives of its constituents.
Fort Ord: Inter-jurisdictional infighting between the regional Task Force and the
cities of Seaside and Marina consequently delayed the reuse planning process.
Seemingly, these delays jeopardized the prospects for speedy regional
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economic recovery. In the eyes of the regional majority, Fort Ord was the
opportunity the Monterey Peninsula region needed to bring its economy into the
21st Century. This objective was manifested through the membership of the
Task Force, who were responsible for the creation of an economic development
strategy that best met the needs of all of the region. These needs were
identified as: new sustainable industries; higher paying, higher skilled jobs; and
more educational institutions (Task Force Strategy Report, 1992). Ultimately,
these objectives were reflected in an economic development strategy focused on
the creation of new academic institutions and technology spin-off industries.
The Task Force was empowered by a strong regional political structure
that included state and federal government representation. Support for the Task
Force's agenda was made possible through the political connections of certain
members, such as Leon Panetta. Panetta's connections in Washington, and in
Sacramento gave the Task Force the political teeth it needed to push the
redevelopment of the base forward. Even after Panetta's departure -- to fulfill his
appointments to the Clinton Administration -- this political dynamic continued
through representation by powerful politicians including State Senator Henry
Mello. The case illustrates that it was Mello who exercised the power of state
legislation to control Fort Ord's contentious local planning and redevelopment
process.
According to Seaside's Planning Service Manager, Seaside and Marina
have always been among the poorest communities in the County, and were likely
to become even poorer in the wake of the Fort Ord closure (Potter interview:
August 3, 1994). RKG's economic impact studies projected that Marina and
Seaside were economically dependent on the military base, and as such would
be most affected by the closure. The study suggested that because a high
proportion of military and civilian personnel expenditures were spent on goods,
services and housing in Marina and Seaside, the closure may result in local
business failure, unemployment and increasing residential vacancy rates in
those communities. The loss of sales tax revenues and military subvention
133
subsidies also threaten to reduce the cities' ability to meet their respective
municipal budgets. Without some way to make up for the loss of revenues,
these communities feared significant fiscal losses (Goblirsch interview: February
8,1994).
Nevertheless, Marina and Seaside were only two of many other
communities represented in the Monterey Peninsula region, including some of
the most affluent and politically powerful in the state. Apparently, Marina and
Seaside were concerned that their economic needs were being overshadowed
by the interests of the regions "wealthy class", who they thought were being
represented by the politically powerful leaders of the Task Force:
'Panetta should have used his Washington connections to support
the needs of the most impacted local cities... Panetta's democratic
liberals are not supporting the minority and low-income populations
in this region -- they will fight for human-rights all over the world but
back-off on issues of minority liberation in their own back yards.
[Essentially] the Task Force became the bully pulpit from which the
needs of the regions wealthy could be fulfilled.' -- Lance McClair,
former Mayor of Seaside.
Seaside and Marina perceived the objectives of the Task Force Strategy
to be an attack against the two poorest communities in the Peninsula region.
They speculated that the Task Force just wanted to use the closure of Fort Ord
as an opportunity to "push out their minority, low-income neighbors" (McClair
interview: August 3, 1994). Whether substantiated or not, this belief fostered
animosity and distrust between the cities of Seaside and Marina and the other
communities in the region.
The Task Force contended that they were not out to hurt the two cities but
that they had to think about how the Fort Ord redevelopment would impact the
entire region in the long run. Their strategy for a university-based, high tech
economy, it was envisioned, would eventually benefit the cities of Seaside and
Marina through new jobs and municipal revenues (Meurer interview: August 9,
1994).
However, the reality was that these benefits could not be realized in the
short term. Thus, Marina and Seaside's immediate fiscal needs could not be
met under this strategy. Certainly, it would be years before the university-based
economy could generate new sources of local revenues for the impacted
communities. In the meantime, the cities of Marina and Seaside, were left with
no other choice but to fight for whatever share of the limited planning and
redevelopment resources they could get in order to continue running their
cities.40
Fort Devens: In the Devens case, it was the fear of the airport siting at Devens
that bound the local community interests together. Initially, the local
communities' desire to block the airport overshadowed all other jurisdictional
needs and interests. As such, serious inter-jurisdictional conflicts among the
communities were not apparent in this case. However, the case illustrates a
potential for ideological conflicts between the towns of Ayer and Harvard. Had
the Land Bank not stepped in to facilitate a cooperative reuse effort early in the
process, it is easy to imagine how these towns might have found themselves at
odds over issues such as the density and economic focus of the new Devens
development. In fact, the case suggests the Land Bank's ability to control the
reuse planning process was critical to the success of the reuse effort at Devens.
The Land Bank's position as the lead redevelopment entity required
significant political and financial planning and maneuvering. The Land Bank's
intentions to be involved with the Devens project surfaced even before the base
was announced for closure in 1991. The case illustrates that preliminary
discussions were held with members of the State's Administration that paved the
way for the Land Bank's formal proposal to Governor Weld. Ultimately,
40 Moreover, although the new university-based economic promises to create 'better" jobs, these
jobs do not match the existing skill base of many of Seaside and Marina residents. According to
the County of Monterey, there is not a lot money available in Monterey County for job training at
this time. Therefore, many of these residents will be forced out of the region to find work more
suitable to their skills (Ferguson interview: August 9, 1994).
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Executive Order 312 reflected the Governor's approval of the Land Bank's
proposal naming them as the lead coordinating agency in the redevelopment of
Fort Devens.
However, Weld's acceptance of the Land Bank's proposal was not
automatic. The Governor wanted to be careful not to exert too much authority
over the local communities -- to make sure that the State's position would be
politically acceptable to delegates from throughout the state. After all,
Massachusetts was a 'home rule' state in which the State government typically
stayed out of matters concerning local development; the Governor wanted to
make sure that state oversight for such a localized project would not be politically
damaging. So the Governor used Executive Order 312 as a sort of 'trial balloon'
to float the idea before the public ("Governance By Trial Balloon"; Worcester
Business Journal, February 1, 1993).
As expected, press coverage, both negative and positive, gave the Weld
Administration an opportunity to monitor the political waters before exerting
additional State authority in the Devens reuse project. The first signs of political
trouble came when critics proposed that the State's commitment to the Devens
project was just a way for the Governor to put another political feather in his cap:
"They're willing to spend whatever's necessary through the Land
Bank to keep the airport option viable [at Devens]"... "[Weld] just
wants this opportunity to produce economic results before the next
election year..."
"You won't see the real story [behind the State's commitment to the
Devens project] in the Boston media, but once things move ahead
and [the Devens] plans begin to take shape, people are going to
wonder how [Weld] got so far so fast. So, now's the time to take a
long hard look at what he's saying and call him on the stuff that just
doesn't make any sense." -- excerpt from Governance by Trial
Balloon, Worcester Business Journal: February 1, 1993.
The media and the public spent the next few years debating the Weld
Administration's intention for the redevelopment of Devens. Sporadic
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occurrences of media coverage, especially in the greater Devens region, allowed
Weld to keep his finger on the pulse of the political issues surrounding the
Devens project. Meanwhile, the towns of Ayer, Harvard, Shirley and Lancaster
were also critical of the Land Bank's involvement in the reuse process. An air of
skepticism regarding the states motivation for pursuing the Devens project set
the stage for the next round of political maneuvering initiated by the Land Bank.
The case illustrates, that in order to get the votes they needed to pass the DEC
Legislation, the Land Bank underwent extensive negotiations with members of
the Governor's Administration, the Legislative delegation and the Selectmen
from the four towns themselves.
Approval from the towns would be the most difficult to obtain. The Land
Bank anticipated that the Legislative Assembly would defer such a local matter to
the Devens regional delegation. Certainly, the delegation would not approve
anything without the consent of the Joint Board of Selectmen (JBoS). But the
JBoS had clearly displayed their distrust for the state agency -- fearful that the
surrounding towns would lose all of their land use authority on the base if the
Land Bank were to get involved ("Devens Grassroots Efforts Spring Up on All
Sides", The Harvard Post, November 11, 1994). So the Land Bank pursued with
the JBoS an open public planning process in which the interests and objectives
of the local communities could be articulated and incorporated into the Devens
redevelopment strategy (Seidman interview: February 1, 1994).
The Devens case suggests that because the towns could not afford to
take the financial risks associated with the Devens redevelopment themselves,
the Land Bank was able to rally cooperation among the local communities to
support the DEC Legislation. Specifically, RKG's Fiscal Impact study projected
that the towns could not afford to bring the base property up to a level of
marketability without incurring significant fiscal debt. Thus, it did not appear that
the towns would have been able to profitably redevelop the base without the
$200 million in bonding authority made available through the DEC Legislation, at
least in the near term (RKG & Associates; Fiscal Impact Analysis: 1993, pp. 1-3
through 1-8). This suggests that perhaps the potential for inter-jurisdictional
conflicts were reduced because the DEC Legislation met at least some of the
needs and interests of the local communities.
General findings
In both cases, it appeared as though a collective local reuse plan could
not have been developed if state government entities had not stepped in. But
the solutions applied by the state in each case were fundamentally different.
Clearly, the role of the state government was critical to the success of each case
-- regardless of whether it was top-down or bottom-up. At Fort Ord, state
government authority was used to mediate inter-jurisdictional disputes. Because
Marina and Seaside showed no signs of giving up the fight for their economic
strategies, it appears as though a pre-emptive state role was necessary to
negotiate the conflict. The Land Bank, on the other hand, was established in the
initial phases of the reuse to control the local planning process. Here, the Land
Bank intentionally rallied the power of the state government to support the needs
for economic redevelopment in the state and in the North Central region.
Through the DEC Legislation, the Land Bank was able to negotiate a long term
planning agreement in which the interests and objectives of the state, the local
communities and the Land Bank were met. By politically engaging the State
Government Administration early in the process, it appeared as though the Land
Bank was able to reconcile the various government interests. This maneuvering
paved the way for the passage of the DEC Legislation and $200 million in
bonding authority.
In the Ord case, the power of state authority was used only as a last
resort, when local consensus regarding the reuse plan could not be reached.
Here, the power of the state and federal government was inherent in the
organization of the regional Task Force throughout the reuse planning process.
Involvement by players such as Leon Panetta and Henry Mello reflected the
intergovernmental composition of the Task Force. Thus, like the Land Bank, the
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State's interests and objectives in the redevelopment of Fort Ord influenced the
creation of the reuse strategy. Unlike the Devens case, however, the Task Force
was unable to create a collective regional reuse agreement that met both the
local communities' objectives as well as the need for long term economic
stability. But the Task Force had to make some tough decisions regarding the
future of the entire Monterey Peninsula region and the fate of the two small
communities most impacted by the closure; they had to decide where to draw
the line between the need to support minority interest, lower-income
communities and the need to provide for long term economic stability in the
region. Thus, the Fort Ord case suggests that, in the spirit of locally controlled
reuse planning, the objectives of the most impacted communities were not met.
Attaining Market Competitiveness
The cases of Fort Devens and Fort Ord also exhibited difficulties in
planning for economic development in the face of declining or depressed real
estate markets. In both cases, the reuse entities were presented with the
challenge of providing for economic growth in the presence of greater federal,
state and regional economic decline. In the Monterey Peninsula region, for
instance, economic dependence on the local military institutions was clear.
Agriculture and tourism were the only other industries in the regional economy
and were both showing signs of decline (Cooper interview: August 8, 1994).
Accordingly, the regional Task Force sought to create a new economic base that
was not completely dependent on existing economic sectors. On the other hand,
the Mount Auburn study showed that the Fort Devens regional economy was not
as dependent on military spending. Instead, the region was traditionally
supported by high technologies and durable manufacturing. However, both of
these sectors were in a state of decline at the time of the Devens closure. For
instance, the regions of nearby Lowell and Fitchburg that once thrived on the
durable goods manufacturing industries are now suffering decline as these
industries continue to move to southern states. Likewise, the 128 high
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technology region has been experiencing significant market reductions
throughout the late 1980's and early 1990's. Clearly, these economic realties
limited the potential for new high tech and manufacturing industries at Devens.
Fort Devens: The Land Bank found that the marketability of the Fort Devens
property was limited significantly by the high vacancy rates in the surrounding
region for commercial and industrial property, and by the lack of existing demand
in the regions traditional industries: durable manufacturing in the defense and
computers-related, and heavy equipment industries, as well as non-durable
manufacturing such as plastics, paper products and printing (RKG & Associates,
Non-Residential Market Research: January 1993, pg. 3-7 & pp. 3-18 through 3-
19). Identification of such economic constraints was critical to the development
of a viable Reuse Plan. The Devens case illustrates how the Land Bank used
this information as the basis for an economic development strategy centered on
the attraction of a variety of different uses focusing on: innovation and
technology businesses; rail and trade-related uses; and open space, recreation
and resource protection (Vanasse Hangen Brustlin, Inc., Devens: Reuse Plan:
1994).
The attraction of rail-related industries (such as distribution and just-in-
time manufacturing operations) was not expected to be as competitive as the
attraction of innovative technology businesses. Seemingly, the Devens railroad
junction was unrivaled elsewhere in the North East; competition from similar
railroad facilities was not apparent. On the other hand, regional competition to
attract high-tech, or innovative technologies was expected to be strong. In order
to be competitive in the prevailing economic conditions, the Land Bank focused
on: (1) attractiveness of the spacious sites and campus-like environment; (2) the
creation of a streamlined permitting process; (3) access to existing infrastructure;
(4) the provision of the Innovation and Technology Center; (5) the availability of
environmental research sites; and (6) access to a high skilled labor pool.
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As a commercial/industrial development, the Devens project offers firms
and their employees spacious, green sites with many amenities not found
elsewhere in other regional industrial parks. Minimum density zoning and the
retention of approximately one third of the base property for recreation and open
space assures the maintenance of Devens' campus-like setting.
Through the creation of the DEC Legislation, the Land Bank is also able
to offer a streamlined zoning and permitting process designed to facilitate
commercial/industrial development at Devens. As the case illustrates, the Land
Bank surveyed decision-makers at several local technology firms to get an idea
of the factors considered most important when choosing a location for their firms.
They found that consistency in industrial use regulations and permitting was of
considerable importance to some high tech firms, especially to those producing
or working with hazardous or toxic factors. Typically, these firms are subject to
approvals by various city agencies pursuant to codes and ordinances such as
planning and zoning, permitting, and hazardous waste control. By creating the
DEC's One-Stop Permit Center, consistency is assured through a consolidated
permit and approval process with the authority to regulate all issues on zoning,
building and land use, and local licenses and permits. By combining the typical
development requirements into a single authority the bureaucratic run-around
between city agencies is avoided at Devens.
Although the case suggests that some of the existing infrastructure at
Devens is below standard -- i.e. the existing waste water treatment facility is
aged and over capacity, utilities are currently metered for a single tenant (the
Army), and the roads are too narrow to accommodate safety vehicles in some
locations -- there is value in the fact that entirely new infrastructure does not
need to be created to support new tenants. Typically, this is one of the greatest
costs associated with the development of new commercial/industrial facilities.
But because the Land Bank plans to use part of the $200 million dollars from the
bond authorization to upgrade most of the infrastructure itself, cost saving are
passed onto the new users.
In addition to the physical infrastructure on the base, the Land Bank also
plans to create the Innovation and Technology Center. The purpose of the
Center is to foster small start-up companies through the provision of technical
and financial assistance and incubator spaces. The Center will also be used as
a resource for established firms to foster new ideas and launch new products.
The Land Bank also intends to market the environmentally contaminated
parcels at Devens as research sites for environmental technology firms. As
described in the case study, the Land Bank envisioned that environmental
technology research and development firms would be attracted to the more than
50 remaining Superfund sites on the base as sites for product research and
testing. At the time of this study, this idea was still in the conceptual stages. As
such, the Land Bank had not yet created a marketing plan that would make this
opportunity financially appealing to environmental research firms. But according
to Jeff Simon, Director of the Devens Division of the Land Bank, the idea of
encouraging on-site cleanup research may lead to future innovation in the field
on environmental remediation (Simon interview: March 24, 1994).
In addition, federal grant programs such as the DoD's Environmental
Technology Program, which was awarded to the Land Bank to support
environmental remediation research efforts, and access to ongoing university
research in the greater Boston area, are also envisioned to attract environmental
technology firms (ibid.).
According to RKG's Non-Residential Market Study, the Fort Devens is
located in a unique region that is accessible to multiple labor market areas in
Eastern Massachusetts and New Hampshire; including manufacturing and high
tech labor (RKG & Associates, Non-Residential Market Study: December, 1993,
pp. 3-5 through 3-6). For instance, because the property is located relatively
near the route 128 beltway, access to an existing high tech labor pool provides
another incentive for firms to locate at Devens. During the 1970's and 1980's
firms such as Digital Equipment Corporation, Stratus and Wang attracted a
highly skilled professional work force to the greater Boston region, including the
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suburbs in the Devens region (ibid.). According to RKG's study, these so-called
"knowledge creation industries" have attracted a highly educated labor force to
eastern Massachusetts. In fact, the study reports that the Commonwealth is
ranked second nationally in the number of residents with advanced degrees in
science and engineering (ibid., pp. 3-46 through 3-47).
Although the economic conditions in New England are not as favorable as
they were 10 years ago, the case suggests that the Devens economic
development strategy capitalizes on the competitive advantages of the site.
According to the RKG's Real Estate Market Analysis, it appears as though the
supply of large sites with full municipal service (including rail and highway
access, and existing municipal utilities) is limited in the Fort Devens region.
Specifically, the study concludes that although there are an estimated 5,000
acres of vacant land in the Devens region with the potential for industrial
development, only three individual tracts contain more than 100 contiguous
acres (RKG & Associates, Real Estate Market Analysis: January, 1994, pg. 4-5).
According to the study, large sites are considered important to meet the demand
of growing companies. In addition, the study also reveals that there is a very
limited supply of vacant land with water, sewer and other infrastructure
improvements available for industrial development in the Fort Devens region
(RKG & Associates; Real Estate Market Analysis: January, 1994, pg. 4-3).
Finally, the case also suggests that the Land Bank's economic strategy
focuses heavily on the creation of new businesses, and not just the attraction of
existing businesses from elsewhere in the Commonwealth. This not only
reduces the need to compete with other parks in the region, but also helps to
support the aggregate level of high technology in the entire region. Just as
Digital and Wang paved the way for technologies in the greater Boston region, it
is possible that the new technology businesses fostered at Devens may one day
do the same.
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Fort Ord: At Fort Ord, the existing economic base was concentrated in the
military, agriculture and tourism industries; existing commercial and industrial
businesses unrelated to these industries were scarce. As the case suggests, all
three of these industries were showing signs of decline:
'[The Monterey region] is dealing with a declining economy right
now, especially in the agricultural sector. There are no real
incentives here that keep the growers from moving to the southern
states where labor and land is cheaper -- we have already lost
some of our largest food processing plants to the south. [The
Economic Development Corporation's] primary economic concern
in the region right now is to keep the economic base that we do
have from leaving. To do so, we have to focus on providing new
incentives to the major food processing plants in the region. I don't
think that the region can attract a larger tourism market -- as it is
now, vacancies in the local hotels are very high. Not to mention
the fact that the [inadequate] highway infrastructure limits additional
traffic in and out of the region.. .Right now, I think the only real
source of economic stability comes from the expenditures of the
large wealthy retirement population in the Monterey Peninsula
area.' -- Virginia Cooper, Executive Director of the Economic
Development Corporation of Monterey County, Inc.
In response to these economic conditions, the Fort Ord reuse strategy
describes the creation of a new economic base centered primarily on marine and
environmental technologies. The case illustrates the hope that the creation of a
new California State University campus and the extension of UC Santa Cruz will
be the seeds of this new economy. Ultimately, it is envisioned, that these
academic institutions will become a magnet to attract research in the areas of
marine sciences and environmental remediation technologies that will benefit
from the unique attributes and resources of the Monterey Bay and surrounding
region. Additionally, like Fort Devens, it is envisioned that the environmentally
contaminated land at Fort Ord will be used to attract innovative environmental
clean-up research to the area. In the long-term, it is hoped that this campus-
based economy will foster new industrial growth by encouraging entrepreneurs
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and venture capitalists to invest in technologies and innovations that emerge
from research conducted at the universities. The case suggests that this
strategy will foster the creation of niche markets through the attraction of an
economic base that would be difficult to duplicate elsewhere in the world:
"The effort underway at Fort Ord is more about a 'rewrite' of the
regional economy than about changing names on buildings. The
education and research complex envisioned for Fort Ord will impact
much more than the communities that were affected by the years of
military presence. The new activities are expected to influence
economic activities [from Big Sur] to the Silicon Valley... [The
closure which] began as a crisis in 1991 is now viewed in 1994 as
an unprecedented opportunity for regional economic prosperity." --
Lora Lee Martin, Director of Governmental Research Affairs and
Regional Economic Development at the University of California,
Santa Cruz.
Based on the information provided in the case, it is difficult to tell whether
or not the university-based strategy will be viable in the Monterey region. Given
the number of marine related research institutions already in the region -- the
Monterey Bay Aquarium and Research Institute, CSU's Moss Landing Marine
Laboratory, Stanford's Hopkins Marine Station, NOAA's National Marine
Sanctuary, and the USGS Pacific Marine Geology Lab -- the potential for
commercializing marine related research is certainly there. The potential market
for this, however, may be a few years down the road.
Moreover, although research has increased in the marine related
sciences, the efforts are largely being done for the sake of science, not
necessarily to meet specific market demands (Kildow, lecture notes: April, 1994).
Woods Hole, for example, has not grown significantly as a result of the research
institutions there. In fact, with the exception of a few marine related spin-off
businesses in the Falmouth area, it appears as though Woods Hole is supported
primarily by tourists who use the Wood Hole ferry service to Martha's Vineyard.
Certainly, these education and research related uses will create some new jobs
and attract some local expenditures to Marina and Seaside in the short term,
however, the long term success of this strategy may be 5, 10 or even 20 years
down the road (ibid.).
General findings
The economic development strategies created at each base took into
consideration greater economic and market realities. The Fort Devens strategy,
for instance, builds on the tradition of Massachusetts high technology and
industrial economy, and is supported by existing high technology firms and
access to a extensive transportation network. The solution considers prevailing
economic conditions and exploits the unique attributes of the base. The Fort Ord
strategy, on the other hand, is more risky. This strategy will require a huge initial
capital investment on the part of the federal, state and local governments to get
the university components off the ground. Thus, given the underlying economic
circumstances at Fort Ord, it appears as though the creation of 60,000 new jobs
projected over the next 50 years, is not likely. This premise is supported by the
Duffy Report prepared by the Army to determine the marketability of the FORG
Reuse Plan. The Report suggests the reuse projections for the first 20 year
period are too ambitious due primarily to the sluggish California economy and
the long lead time necessary to allow for growth of the universities' research
sector.
Local Fiscal Realities
At the heart of the inter-jurisdictional conflicts exhibited in both cases were
the local communities' needs to generate new sources of tax revenue from the
base redevelopment. At Fort Ord, the potential for new tax revenue sources was
significantly reduced by the siting of the tax exempt California State University
and UC Santa Cruz extension campuses. Similarly, the new federal prison, Job
Corps training facility and McKinney Act uses reduced the tax potential at Fort
Devens.
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As the cases illustrate, military base redevelopment is an extremely
expensive undertaking. The value of the underlying property is often diminished
by the costs of the infrastructure improvements necessary to bring the property
up to market standards. Thus, depending on the extent of the non-revenue
generating uses, the ability for the surrounding communities to redevelop former
military base property itself may be severely limited, without significant capital
investments from other non-municipal sources.
Certainly, the sooner the base property is improved, the sooner new
industries will be attracted. With the creation of new industries, market demand
for goods, services and real estate in the region will also improve, thus
increasing marginal local revenues. But because a development project of this
scale would probably be unattractive to a real estate developer, private
investment capital is not likely in the short term. The lack of investment returns
in the first 10-20 years of the project, as well as the risks associated with the
federal transfer process and heavy environmental regulatory constraints,
significantly reduce any private sector appeal (Picerno: 1990, pp. 1-3). Thus, the
cases suggest that impacted communities have little choice but to pursue an
agenda based on short term solutions to their current fiscal crisis's -- or to appeal
to the state or federal government for fiscal subsidies.
Fort Ord: Municipal fiscal needs were central to the inter-jurisdictional problems
exhibited in the Fort Ord case. According to Seaside's Planning Manager,
Seaside and Marina had already begun to lose local revenues as a result of the
closure; and as such, were facing fiscal insolvency (Potter interview: February 7,
1995). Although the cities could not furnish documentation of the specific fiscal
impacts experienced by the communities since the closure, Marina and Seaside
city officials contended that the local municipal budgets had been reduced due a
drop in property tax and sales tax revenues. In response to the fiscal downturn,
city of Seaside reduced the city payroll by 10% in 1993 (Potter interview:
February 7, 1995).
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According to the cases, Marina and Seaside needed to generate new tax
revenues, in the short term, to cover the cost of running their cities. But the cities
did not feel as though the university-based Task Force strategy would address
their fiscal needs. Specifically, the siting of the non-revenue producing
institutional users, CSUMB and UC Santa Cruz, reduced Marina and Seaside's
chances for short term fiscal recovery. Moreover, the cities contended that
although the university would create jobs and market demand for local goods
and services, the university population was only expected to reach 1,000-2,000
over the first few years (Hendrickson interview: August 5, 1994). According to
Marina's Mayor, the cities were fearful that the fiscal benefits and jobs resulting
from the university-based economic strategy would not be realized for at least
ten, or even 20 years (From Vision to Nightmare: CSU, Monterey Bay: April
1994, pg. 1). Thus, even with the provision for extended military subvention
subsidies until the year 2000, the cities contended that the subsidies would not
be enough to bridge the anticipated fiscal needs.
The case illustrates how Marina and Seaside spent much of their time and
energies disputing the Task Force's economic development plans. The two
cities even tried to create their own redevelopment authority, FOEDA, for the
purpose of implementing their Vision Plans that were based primarily on the
existing regional tourism industry. But without the money necessary to support
such an entity, the cities were ineffective in their stance against the Task Force:
"At Fort Ord, every one is trying to protect themselves, especially
those [entities] who were receiving subventions to pay for public
services during the military occupation. Suddenly, Seaside and
Marina have lost some of the population base on which they were
receiving the subventions. They will now be required to provide
[additional] public services [to the new residents of the Fort Ord
property] that the Army had been providing for all of these years.
In terms of the other cities [in the region]: they may be affected by
changes in the regional economy, but in terms of loosing direct
municipal revenues, they are not affected. This is why we see the
intensity of conflict in the land use and control issues [at Fort Ord].
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That is why Seaside is going for the hotels." -- Joe Cavanaugh,
Director of FORG.
When Marina and Seaside's attempts to control the planning process
delayed the creation of the Reuse Plan, the Task Force tried to negotiate with
the cities through the creation of the Fort Ord Reuse Group. It was intended that
FORG be created as a cooperative forum in which the Marina and Seaside's
needs and objectives could be better addressed in the context of the regional
Task Force Strategy. This would allow the Task Force to move forward with the
reuse planning process. But Marina and Seaside rejected the FORG proposal
based on the fact that the communities would ultimately lose their jurisdictional
land use rights to a more regionally focused agenda.
Finally, after more than three years of unsuccessful attempts to build a
cooperative relationship with Seaside and Marina, the Task Force exercised its
powers of state affiliation. Senator Henry Mello, then Task Force Chairman,
used the power of the state legislature to break the impasse in the reuse
planning process. He introduced Senate Bill 899 to establish the governance
and operational structure for the future redevelopment efforts at Fort Ord. SB
899 not only re-defined decision-making authorities to include communities not
directly impacted by the closure, such as Pacific Grove, Salinas and Carmel, but
also laid the ground rules for future policy directives and administrative
procedures in the redevelopment process. Ultimately, Mello's solution put an
end to the inter-jurisdictional infighting. But because the legislation essentially
supported the university-based economic development strategy, Marina and
Seaside contend that it still did nothing to address the root of the problem -- the
need to bridge Marina and Seaside's municipal fiscal gaps (Goblirsch interview:
February 7, 1995).
Fort Devens: The Devens case illustrates how the surrounding local towns
initially looked to the redevelopment of Fort Devens as the answer to their fiscal
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problems. Harvard, for instance, envisioned the creation of the towns first
commercial/industrial park as a mechanism for much needed tax revenues, and
the JBoS thought that the development value of the base property would attract
immediate private development opportunities to their towns. However, the towns
quickly discovered that they could not afford to undertake the expensive and
time consuming redevelopment effort.
According to the case, RKG's Fiscal Impact study revealed that in order to
cover the cost of infrastructure improvements and municipal service, it would
collectively cost the towns an additional $20 million dollars in expenditures over
the first five to ten years alone. This dose of fiscal reality gave the Land Bank an
opportunity to approach the towns with a proposal for a joint development
partnership. The case suggests that access to the Land Bank's planning
resources and capital investment funds attracted the towns into a joint-
partnership agreement with the Land Bank. Thus, the towns had the land use
rights but the Land Bank had the money and the expertise to develop the
property.
Clearly, the Devens case suggests that it was the creation of the DEC
Legislation that ultimately put the Land Bank in the drivers seat. After years of
negotiating with the towns and the state, the Land Bank promised to meet the
fiscal needs of all of the impacted communities through the provision of the DEC
Legislation. The $200 million bond funding authorized through the Legislation
provided the capital investment stream needed to bring the property up to a level
of marketability. Ostensibly, access to the bond funds offers the Devens region
the opportunity for short term economic recovery. Although the Land Bank's
proposal did not allow for the towns to directly benefit from the taxes generated
from the new development -- at least for the first 40 years -- the towns could
indirectly benefit from the new residents and businesses emerging at Devens.
Increased local expenditures, new markets for their vacant housing units and, of
course, new jobs for their existing residents would all be possible if the Land
Bank's plans for redevelopment are ultimately successful.
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Thus, in exchange for relinquishing all of their land use development
rights, the towns were given an opportunity to realize new economic prosperity
without having to raise a significant amount of local municipal capital themselves.
An almost unanimous vote of approval for the DEC Reuse Plan and By-laws
indicated that this was a fair solution between all parties involved.
General Findings
The cases suggest that articulation and incorporation of the local fiscal
needs in the reuse strategy are critical to the facilitation of a cooperative,
productive local reuse planning process. The Fort Ord case best demonstrates a
situation in which the opposing short term fiscal needs of the local communities
fueled inter-jurisdictional infighting between Marina and Seaside and the regional
Task Force. The case also illustrates how these conflicting municipal objectives
threatened to impede the potential for short term economic recovery.
Alternatively, the case of Fort Devens illustrates how early financial
negotiations between the Land Bank and the impacted communities greatly
reduced the potential for inter-jurisdictional conflicts to emerge. Clearly, the
results of RKG's Fiscal Impact study gave the towns surrounding Devens a dose
of fiscal reality that overshadowed any petty ideological conflicts that may have
emerged. By following on the heels of the Fiscal Impact Study results with a
proposal for joint-partnership, the Land Bank was in the position to play the white
knight by offering an opportunity to reduce the towns fiscal problems. Moreover,
it appears as though early identification of the fiscal needs of the host
communities may reduce the potential for inter-jurisdictional competition for
limited redevelopment resources. Because the Land Bank was willing to assume
the responsibility for financing the Devens redevelopment, the towns were not
faced with the short term costs associated with the base redevelopment. Thus,
the case suggests that the Land Bank's strategy not only reduced the potential
for breeding conflict between the communities, but also paved the way for the
DEC Legislation that further defined the partnership between the local
communities and the state government.
However, relieving the towns of their fiscal redevelopment requirements is
not an easy thing to do. As the case suggests, a lot of financial and political
maneuvering was required on the part of the Land Bank to be able to reduce the
projected fiscal burdens associated with the redevelopment of Fort Devens. It is
uncertain whether or not the California state government would be willing, or
able to assume similar responsibility for the redevelopment expenditures
required at Fort Ord.
Moreover, as the Fort Ord case suggests, economic and political
circumstances may be such that what is good for the majority of the residents in
a region may not be good for the communities most impacted by the closure. In
this case, there were many communities of interest, including some
communities, such as Pacific Grove and Carmel, that were determined to be
unaffected by the closure (RKG & Associates, Economic Impact Analysis of the
Downsizing of Fort Ord: 1992, pp. i-v) . As opposed to only the four towns
immediately surrounding the base at Fort Devens. In this situation, it may have
been impossible to meet the divergent fiscal needs and objectives of all of the
communities involved. Certainly, in the spirit of democratic politics, the majority
ruled and the minority was left to fend for themselves.
Creating a Development Financing Mechanism
As described above, local fiscal problems were further complicated by the
high cost of infrastructure and property improvements. In addition to lost jobs
and municipal revenues, the levels of public expenditures necessary to bring the
base property up to market standards threatened local municipal budgets. The
cases demonstrate the large investment requirements that are required during
the initial phases of the base redevelopment. According to the operations study
prepared by RKG & Associates, it will take more than 30 years to break even
with full repayment of the anticipated bond debt; and 20 years without complete
repayment of the bond debt (RKG & Associates, Preliminary Financial Analysis
of the Operations and Redevelopment of Fort Devens: December, 1994, pp. 1-1
through 1-2). Thus, in order to obtain the capital investment necessary, a long
term development financing mechanism must be created. In both the Fort Ord
and the Fort Devens case study, the mechanisms proposed were public bond
issues in which future returns are based on the profitability of the base
redevelopment.
Fort Ord: At Fort Ord, SB 899 established the Fort Ord Redevelopment
Authority as an entity empowered by the state to establish special taxing
districts. As such, FORA has the right to use any of the state's special district
financing laws to support the redevelopment of Fort Ord. In California, this is
typically done through a mechanism known as Tax Increment Financing, or
through the creation of a Mello-Roos district. In the first instance, Tax Increment
Financing (TIF) allows communities to fund redevelopment projects by floating
bonds guaranteed, not by the state, but by the value of tax appreciation on the
underlying property as a result of the new development. Any tax income
received from the higher property valuation as a result of the redevelopment
project is used to pay back the bond notes. This mechanism was quite
successful during the 1980's when the value of California property was in a state
of constant appreciation. Developers and municipalities alike benefited from the
public-private development ventures. But, TIF has a limited bonding authority in
a contractionary economy. The present declining economic conditions in
California threaten the viability of the TIF mechanism.
Similarly, the Mello-Roos Bill provides an alternative financing mechanism
to support the Fort Ord redevelopment project. Carried by Senator Henry Mello,
Mello-Roos was enacted in 1982 in response to Proposition 13. It was created
to provide a practical way to finance infrastructure in redevelopment situations
where the Proposition 13 tax caps limited fiscal investments. Proceeds are
generated through a fee structure imposed on a geographically bound taxing
district. Taxes are set up by formula and collected annually on the property tax
bill. The fee is typically close to 1 % of the assessed value of the project. Like
TIF, this mechanism becomes more valuable as development occurs and the
overall value of the developed property increases. Unlike TIF, Mello-Roos does
not depend on annual property appreciation. But without appreciation, this
mechanism alone is not expected to cover the cost of the initial infrastructure
improvements necessary at Fort Ord.
The Fort Ord Infrastructure Study estimated that it will cost $48 million to
pay for the initial infrastructure improvements on the 3,500 acres of developable
property. Thus, the value of the developable property must be worth $4.8 billion
dollars -- or $1.4 million per acre -- in order for the Mello-Roos funding to cover
the costs (Paul Reimer interview: August 4, 1994). With the details of SB 1600
still on the table, a viable solution to this problem had not been proposed.
Fort Devens: At Devens, the case suggests that the Land Bank's ability to get
the state to back $200 million dollars in bonds, was the most important provision
of the DEC Legislation. By securing this financial mechanism before the final
reuse plan was ready for implementation, the Land Bank was able to hit the
development ground running with the funds necessary to begin the infrastructure
improvements. This situation, however, is unique. Typically, state governments
are unwilling to put up so much money for such a localized project. Specifically,
the state expenditures in the Devens case were estimated at approximately
$10,000 per resident beneficiary. Through their political initiatives, the Land
Bank was successful in convincing the state legislature that the appropriation
was in the interest of the state, as well as the local communities. The Land Bank
was able to convince the State Administration that new development at Devens
would help create a new industrial sector in the Devens region that might provide
future state-wide benefits. In addition to economic revitalization of the North
Central region, the Devens development endeavors to revitalize the waning high
technology sector in Massachusetts by creating a competitive edge in the
development of emerging innovative and environmental technology industries.
General Findings
Both cases demonstrate the importance of securing a financial
mechanism that meets both the short term and long term capital needs of the
base redevelopment project. The public investment requirements for the initial
infrastructure improvements in both cases were substantial. Both cases suggest
that the public investment capital was necessary to carry the initial phases of the
project, because sufficient private sector investments are not attracted due to
uncertain economic times and the substantial costs associated with property
improvements, (including environmental restoration and infrastructure upgrades).
At Fort Ord, the reuse authority is under severe pressure to come up with
the money necessary to bring the university sites to operational condition by the
Fall of 1995, when the California State University is scheduled to open. To date,
the federal government has committed only $15 million of the estimated $150
million needed to develop the campus. Moreover, the State of California has yet
to commit short or long term funds, constrained by a state-wide economy
weakened by declining federal defense spending, increasing global competition
and the mounting cost of natural disaster relief throughout the state. However,
without access to investment funds that are not directly tied to short term
property value appreciation, it seems as though state or federal bail-out funding
is inevitable.
Alternatively, the Land Bank met its long term capital needs through the
authorization for issuance of bonds with state credit support. The State
Administration's recognition of the potential economic benefits from the Devens
redevelopment, made the investment politically feasible. However, the success
of this mechanism also depends on the Land Bank's ability to attract users to the
Devens development. Without revenue producing users at Devens, the Land
Bank will be unable to pay back the bond holders. Consequently, the bonds
could be called by the State Administration and re-appropriated elsewhere.
Thus, like the redevelopment mechanisms available for use in the Fort Ord case,
the ultimate viability of the Devens findhcing mechanism is uncertain.
Environmental Process Coordination
The transfer of federal military base property triggers numerous federal
environmental clean-up requirements pursuant to statutes such as the National
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), Superfund laws (CERCLA), and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).41 In addition to
clean-up regulations, there are a variety of other federal and state environmental
laws that can potentially complicate the environmental process including the
Federal Endangered Species Act, state Coastal Zone Management Acts, state
Environmental Protection Agencies, and a variety of local resource protection
laws. As the cases show, a lack of coordination between the myriad of federal,
state and local reuse planning processes can lead to significant delays in the
redevelopment prospects for the base property.
Fort Ord: At Fort Ord, for instance, in addition to the standard round of federal
environmental regulations and requirements, the state of California also requires
compliance with a number of state enacted environmental laws including the
California Environmental Quality Act, California Coastal Act, and regionally
administered water and air management regulations. Under the California
Coastal Act, for instance, plans for the reuse of Fort Ord's coastal region
(spanning four miles of coastline, inland to state Route 1) were required to
conform with the provisions of the California Coastal Act. Pursuant to the Act,
the preservation of the coastal dunes, beaches and rocky cliffs had to be
demonstrated and commercial development of any kind was restricted. In
addition, because the Monterey Bay has been designated as a National Marine
Sanctuary, the coastal region of the base is also protected under the Federal
41 See Appendix A for detailed description of these regulations.
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Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act (Title III). As such, additional
consideration had to be made, for instance, regarding impacts to the marine life
resulting from the new base development and watershed contamination
(California Coastal Commission; "Staff Report and Recommendation on
Consistency Determination": March, 1994).
The biggest problem exhibited at Fort Ord as a result of a non-cooperative
environmental process stemmed from the Army's refusal to work with the local
communities to incorporate their Reuse Plan into the Army's Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS). Under the National Environmental Protection Act of
1969 (NEPA), the disposal agency (in this case, the Army) must prepare an EIS
in order to establish the future impacts associated with the reuse of the base.42
For instance, based on the anticipation of the future land uses at the site, the EIS
estimates how the new uses will impact the surrounding natural resources, traffic
patterns, noise, water and air quality, and even socio-economic structure. The
EIS is a decision guidance document used by the federal disposal agency as the
basis for its Property Disposal Plan (PDP). The PDP identifies impeding factors -
- such as the presence of environmental contaminants -- and defines the process
by which the federal lands will be cleaned and transferred to future private users
or to the local communities.
The Army Corps of Engineers, however, did not consider local plans for
the reuse of Fort Ord. Because of the inter-jurisdictional infighting, FORG could
not negotiate its Reuse Plan in time to meet the Army's deadline for EIS
consideration in May of 1992. So the Army Corps took it upon themselves to
create a reuse plan based on what they thought the local reuse plan might look
42 NEPA required two EIS fillings. The first EIS was required under the BRAC Legislation and
was to be used as a baseline study of the environmental conditions of the base prior to reuse and
disposal planning. The second EIS presented the projected impacts based on the implementation
of the local reuse plan. The EIS also presented alternative reuse scenarios and recommended
future actions to be taken by the DoD. This final EIS serves as the basis for the Record of
Decision. The ROD was the document that specified future actions to be undertaken by the
disposal agency, until such time as all of the federal property is disposed. This includes provision
regarding how and for what purpose the federal land will be transferred in the future.
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like. In general, the Army's EIS limited the maximum build-out population to
approximately 60,000 jobs. This was a substantial reduction from FORG's initial
draft Reuse Plan in which the development density was expected to
accommodate 180,000 new jobs.
This situation posed a serious problem for FORG. Without the recognition
of the local Reuse Plan in the Army's final EIS, the communities feared they
would have to re-negotiate with the Army Corps for each use that did not
conform with Army's Property Disposal Plan; this could also include the
preparation of a new EIS for each use not anticipated in the original EIS. FORG
pleaded with the Army to incorporate the local draft reuse plan, but the Army
refused to delay the EIS proceedings in order to accommodate FORG (Letter
from the US Army Corps of Engineers: March 8, 1993). According to the Army's
project consultant, "the Army Corps had a deadline to meet, and they did not
want to get involved with the local community infighting"; apparently, the ACOE
was afraid that their process would be further delayed if they got involved with
the inter-jurisdictional infighting between the communities (Demos interview: April
5,1994).
After unsuccessful attempts to convince the Army Corps to revise the EIS
to meet the provisions of the FORG plan, FORG decided to revise their own
reuse plan to meet the provisions of the Army's anticipated reuse plan. This,
FORG reasoned, was the only way to reduce the possibility for future delays in
the federal transfer process (Cavanaugh interview: August 3, 1994). But the
Army denied FORG's request for access to the data and information used by the
Army to support its finding in the EIS:
"Without the baseline data from the Army's EIS, FORG will be
making assumptions [in the revision of its Reuse Plan] which may
be contrary to the Army's assumptions. This is dangerous, maybe
suicidal; it is NOT the cooperative planning the Army promised us.
It is ridiculous to have a Fort Ord Army rep. sitting at the FORG
table unable to articulate information that is readily available and
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key to the process. At the Corps of Engineers' urging, [FORG] has
included the Army in the local reuse planning process. Shouldn't
they cooperate by working with us? Who benefits from withholding
engineering information, biological studies and other baseline data
from the groups empowered to use it to do a Base Reuse Plan?
We need a cooperative approach to facilitate the planning
process." -- Memorandum from Joe Cavanaugh (Director of FORG)
to the staff of Leon Panetta's office.
Despite the setback, FORG continued to revise its own reuse plan to be
more in line with the Army's alternative plan. In order to do so, FORG had to
significantly scale down the density and scope of their projected redevelopment
build-out. Ultimately, FORG was successful in reducing the scope of its reuse
plan, only a few items regarding traffic circulation and habitat preservation
remained to separate the two plans (ibid.). FORG tried again to appeal to the
Army to incorporate FORG's new Reuse Plan. But the Army, for reasons not
disclosed, refused to amend the existing EIS.
In the end, FORG is left with a reuse plan that is not officially recognized
by the Army in their EIS or their property transfer and disposal plans. As a
result, every proposed use for the property at Fort Ord will be subject to a new
EIS review process that will determine its impact on the environment. This may
severely restrict the reuse authorities' ability to negotiate timely deals with
potential users.
Fort Devens: Alternatively, the Land Bank set out to find a way to reduce the
potential for problems associated with the multi-governmental environmental
processes. They negotiated an unprecedented agreement with the Department
of Defense, granting both the Land Bank and the JBoS Cooperating Agency
status. Cooperating Agency status allowed the reuse entity to be directly
involved in the environmental decision-making processes at all levels of the
environmental process. This assured the Land Bank the opportunity to
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anticipate potential environmental process conflicts, and to negotiate potential
solutions before the problems could affect the reuse planning process.
The Devens Cooperating Agreement is unique in that it is the only case in
the nation in which the local entities cooperated in planning the federal clean-up
process. The Land Bank made this process possible through a Memorandum of
Agreement with the Army, stating that the newly formed Cooperating Agency
would be directly involved with the documentation processes for the on-going
federal EIS process. This assured representation of the Devens' Reuse Plan in
the federal and state environmental processes and avoided the problems such
as those experienced by the Fort Ord Reuse Group.
General findings
The Fort Ord case clearly demonstrates the problems that can result from
uncooperative environmental processes. In this case, the solutions proposed for
this problem came too late. Ultimately, the inability to coordinate with the federal
EIS process resulted in a significant delays in the reuse planning process at Fort
Ord. Alternatively, the Devens case offers a unique solution to the issues
regarding environmental process coordination, and also illustrates a more
preventative approach to dealing with the potential problems that may be
duplicated at future closure sites.
Federal Screening Process
Uses authorized pursuant to the federal screening process can negatively
impact the value of the local reuse plan. Often federal entities choose locations
in which the federal use is not the highest and best use for the site. Examples of
how the federal screening process impacted the local reuse plans are illustrated
in both the Fort Ord and Fort Devens cases.
Fort Devens: At Devens, there are two examples of how the proposals for
property acquisition under the federal screening process affected the feasibility
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of the local economic development strategy. The first involved the Army's
retention of land for its Army Reserve Enclave, and the second involved the
proposed location for the federal prison. In both examples, the Land Bank
undertook extensive actions to negotiate the proposed federal uses:
The Army Reserve Enclave: In the first instance, attempts by the Land Bank and
Governor Weld to renegotiate the location of portions of the Army Reserve
Enclave were successful. In this case, the Army proposed to retain part of the
Main Post for use as the new headquarters for the New England Regions Army
Reserve Enclave in an area known as the "600 block" of the Main Post.
Seemingly, the Land Bank was concerned about environmental clean-up of the
retained Army sites and that the land proposed for continued Army use would
not be cleaned to meet federal requirements for environmental quality standards.
Moreover, the Land Bank was concerned about the impact that the sites would
have on future development at the base; apparently, the Army had requested
property that the Land Bank considered to be some of the most commercially
valuable property on the base.
In reaction to the Army's request, the Land Bank began to look at the
proposed reserve enclave and its impact on the future economic development of
the base. They tried to rally support from the State Administration and local
communities. The local communities, however, did not play a significant part in
the Land Banks efforts to fight the Army's request; perhaps they felt the Army's
continued presence on the Main Post would reduce the land available for the
airport project. So the Land Bank turned to the State government for the
necessary support in Washington. They commissioned land planners and real
estate consultants to review the proposal and document the issues to be brought
before the Department of the Army. Although the Land Bank did not have legal
authority to accept or reject the Army's site request, the Land Bank was able to
put some political pressure on the Army (Fort Devens Redevelopment Board,
Report to the Govemor December, 1992, pp. 12-14).
In late 1992, Governor Weld sent a letter to the Army accepting the
majority of the Army's proposed Enclave but with several provisions, including
the relocation of some uses, the development of a waster water treatment plant,
voluntary compliance with state environmental statutes and the maintenance of
an 'open' post environment. In 1992, the compromise proposal was submitted to
the DoD. The final proposal reflected most of the revisions requested by the joint
reuse group, including the open-post status and the compliance with prevailing
state environmental laws. Although an amicable agreement was eventually
reached, it did not come without a significant expenditure of time and resources
on the part of the Land Bank and the JBoS (ibid.).
Even before the negotiations regarding the siting for the Reserve Enclave
were complete, the remainder of the Devens property was declared surplus for
military purposes and made available for general federal screening. During this
next phase of the federal screening process, a number of potential users made
their proposals to the DoD for consideration and approval. The largest federal
user to come forward was the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
The Federal Prison: The siting of the federal prison greatly affected the value
and marketability of the Devens development plans. According to the case, the
prison siting was initially solicited by the local towns as a strategy to block the
potential airport siting. Ostensibly, the surrounding towns reasoned that the best
way to stop the airport development was to site an alternative use right in the
middle of the proposed runway location. The federal screening process gave
them the opportunity to find an alternative user for the site before the state,
specifically MassPort, could gain control of the land. In February of 1993,
however, the Massachusetts Aeronautical Commission announced that demand
in the eastern New England region was not great enough to support the
development of a second major airport. Thus, it appears that the JBoS's
strategy had nothing to do with the state's decision not to pursue the airport at
Devens -- but the towns felt better knowing that they had done something to
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possibly prevent future speculation regarding the siting of the new airport at
Devens. Moreover, the case illustrates that the JBoS continued to pursue the
federal prison even after the threat of the airport project appeared to have
passed. Seemingly, the prison was the communities assurance the airport would
never be located at Devens.
However, the towns did not consider how the prison siting would reduce
the viability of the Land Bank's economic development plans. The prison site
was located on what was considered to be some of the most valuable real estate
on the base. Not only was this location considered to be the most suitable for
commercial and industrial uses -- with direct highway access to state Route 2 --
but the proposed prison site also encompassed the base's only 18 hole golf
course. As a potential source of revenue, the Land Bank did not want to see it
destroyed (Bassett lecture: January 14, 1995).
The Land Bank first responded to this turn of events by appealing to the
Federal Bureau of Prison's (FBoP). They tried to negotiate a new site for the
prison that would not impact the underlying economic value the Reuse Plan. But
the FBoP did not respond favorably to this request, stating that the access to the
Cutler Army hospital facility made the first site more attractive. So the state
responded again. In November of 1992, Governor Weld sent a letter to the
FBoP requesting that it consider the North Post portion of Fort Devens as an
alternate site for the prison complex. The letter expressed the Land Bank's
concerns that the siting of the prison on the Main Post would be detrimental to
the future growth and redevelopment of the base. The Governor even proposed
to construct a new medical facility on the North Post, to meet the needs of the
FBoP with funding for the new facility provided through the issuance of bonds by
the Health and Education Facilities (Fort Devens Redevelopment Board, Report
to the Govemor December, 1992, pp. 12-14).
But the Land Bank and the Governors attempts were unsuccessful. The
FBoP refused to consider the North Post site for reasons not disclosed. The
attempt to divert the federal prison project provoked the JBoS into accusing the
Weld Administration of tying to derail the prison siting at Fort Devens (Bassett
lecture: January 14, 1995).
In the Spring of 1994, the FBoP requested to expand the prison complex
on the Main Post site to build a minimal security work camp. The FBoP
envisioned that the new work camp would not be enclosed by security fences;
reasoning that the camp would be used only by white collar detainees (ibid.) . As
such, the Land Bank feared that the expansion would not only further reduce the
viability of the Devens Reuse Plan, but would also jeopardize public safety in the
region. Accordingly, they tried to rally support from the local communities to fight
the prison expansion (Seidman interview: February, 6, 1995).
In order to convince the towns that the prison expansion would be
detrimental to the region, the Land Bank tried to appeal to the local communities
sense of public safety. A public hearing was held to discuss the possible
negative safety impacts resulting from the prison siting. To emphasize their
position, the Land Bank depicted the minimum security prison as a "prison
without walls", and used testimony from concerned local citizens in an attempt to
evoke fear in the residents of the neighboring towns (Bassett lecture: January
14, 1995). Ultimately, the strategy worked. The Land Bank and the towns
created a unified front that was successful in stopping the FBoP's proposed
prison expansion (Seidman interview: February, 6, 1995).
Fort Ord: At Ord, the City of Seaside had counted on the acquisition of some of
the most valuable pieces of property on the base: a large single family housing
development and two championship golf courses, overlooking the Pacific Ocean.
But during the federal screening process, the Presidio of Monterey (a
neighboring DoD installation) requested the acquisition of these properties to
house their military personnel. At Fort Ord, the Army had previously opened the
golf courses to the public as a way to provide revenues for many of the soldiers
social service programs such as day care, libraries and youth activities.
According to Colonel ElIzey, the Garrison Commander in charge on closing Fort
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Ord, the Presidio saw the screening process as a chance to also support their
soldier service programs (Elizey interview: August 4, 1994). But this situation
raised questions about the military's objectives in the installation closure
process, both in the minds of the Task Force and the city of Seaside. It appears
as though the federal government's objectives in closing the bases was to
reduce the federal military budget by selling commercially valuable land to the
local communities for the purpose of private redevelopment. This, it was
envisioned, would reap the highest return to the military and would give the local
communities the greatest chance for economic recovery. But the retention of
potentially high income producing properties for continued military use, such as
those at Fort Ord, contradicted these objectives. By saving the most valuable
properties, this reduced the potential return to the Army and to the communities.
Given the demand for course time in the Monterey County region,
potential profits to the City of Seaside from the privatization of the courses were
obvious. So, Seaside officials, along with their legal council, traveled to
Washington to fight the federal acquisition ("Black Mayor Says Base Closing Will
Ruin California City", JET: 1993). As a compromise to Seaside's request, the
Army stated that it would divest itself from the golf courses provided the
proceeds from the sale would go to a non-appropriated fund to support the
soldier services. This compromise, the details of which were still being debated
at the time of this study, would allow Seaside to generate revenues from the golf
courses and would also receive some development rights for the property
immediately surrounding the courses for the development of a residential or
resort-type community (Potter interview: August 3, 1994).
General findings
The situations above demonstrate how anticipation of federal uses can
give the reuse entity an opportunity to control the use of the most valuable base
properties. This suggests that the ability to negotiate with potential federal
users, before the property transfer is complete, is critical to the creation of a
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viable economic development strategy. But the cases also illustrate the difficulty
in coordinating with all of the federal agencies who may be interested in the
property. Evidence from both cases suggest that involvement and cooperation
from the on-site BRAC offices and Base Transition Coordinator were practically
non-existent. Although the BRAC office and BTC's were tasked by the DoD to
work with the communities to help them through the federal base reuse process,
there is no evidence to suggest that these entities were effective in that role. But
even with the cooperation of the on-site disposal agents, it would be difficult to
anticipate the property needs of other branches of the federal government in an
effort to negotiate land acquisitions that will not negatively impact the local
economic development plan.
Finally, the cases also demonstrated how the uncertainty of the McKinney
Act users impacted the local economic development plans. Because, in both
cases, McKinney Act proposals were considered after the initial federal
screening process, it was feared that the reuse plans would be subject to future
McKinney Act uses that may negatively impact the economic redevelopment
strategy.43 However, recent Legislation was passed that provides a new
approach to assisting the needs of the local homeless providers.
On October 25, 1994, the President signed the Base Closure Community
Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-421).
The act exempts base closure property from the McKinney Act and creates a
new community-based process wherein homeless assistance providers will work
directly with local redevelopment authorities regarding property acquisitions
(Department of Defense, A New Community-Based Approach to Assisting the
Homeless at Military Base Closure Sites: November, 1994, pg. 1).44 As such,
those who wish to acquire federal property for use to assist the homeless must
first coordinate potential site locations with the local reuse authority. It is
43 See Appendix A for more information regarding the McKinney Act provisions.
44 See Appendix A for more information regarding the new legislation to provide housing for the
homeless.
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envisioned that this new process will reduce the level of conflicts associated with
the provisions of the former McKinney Act, because the new Legislation allows
the local reuse authority to anticipate uses to assist the homeless.
Conclusion
Summary of Findings
In summary, a number of inferences can be made from the issues presented
above:
" It is evident from the cases that state involvement helped to shape the
outcome of the reuse planning process in both the cases of Fort Ord and Fort
Devens. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions regarding the importance
of state government involvement based on the information provided in these
cases. The cases suggest that there were many context-specific factors
involved that shaped the reuse planning and development processes at each
case study site. However, the Fort Devens case does suggest that the needs
and objectives of the lower-income communities may be best met through a
process led by either a state, or even regional entity willing to assume
financial and political responsibility for the redevelopment of a former military
base.
" The cases of Fort Ord and Fort Devens demonstrate how conflicting interests
and objectives between different governmental entities can delay the reuse
planning process. In order to assure that valuable planning time is not lost to
inter-jurisdictional infighting, the cases suggest that the establishment of a
single governing or mediating entity is desirable. But the cases also suggest
that in order to be effective in this role, the governing entity should have
access to both financial and political capital. Without these ingredients, the
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governing entity may not be effective in gaining the control necessary to
successfully orchestrate the reuse planning process.
* The cases also demonstrate the difficulties in planning for economic
development in the face of declining or depressed real estate markets.
Although the respective reuse entities certainly cannot control conditions in
the prevailing economies, the cases suggest that viability of the economic
strategies may be dependent on the reuse entity's ability to exploit unique
site attributes given prevailing market opportunities.
* The cases clearly demonstrate the conflicts that can arise when the fiscal
needs of the communities differ. Seemingly, the economic development
strategy that best meets the fiscal needs of the majority resident population
stands the best chance of gaining the political support necessary to access
public funds and other regional or state resources. But if the fiscal needs of
the communities most affected by the closure do not match the interests and
objectives of the regional majority, does this mean that these communities
should just be forced to face fiscal losses? The case of Fort Devens
suggests that the needs of the minority communities were better addressed
through the Land Bank's willingness to assume responsibility for the initial
capital expenditures required to redevelop the base.
* The need to provide significant long term investment capital through the
creation of a public financing mechanism is also demonstrated in the cases.
Traditional financing mechanisms, such as tax increment financing, are
structured to capitalize on significant property value appreciation. However,
stagnant local economies, coupled with the long term nature of the military
base redevelopment process, render traditional methods ineffective. Thus,
the cases suggest a need to institute additional vehicles for public-private
investment to support military base redevelopment.
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* The cases indicate that the lack of coordination between the inter-
governmental planning procedures and clean-up regulations can delay the
reuse planning process. The Fort Devens case suggests that local
involvement with the federal and state environmental planning processes can
reduce the potential for future conflicts between the environmental agencies
and the local reuse group. Seemingly, by allowing the local reuse group an
opportunity to anticipate and appeal problematic issues before they become
a reality, inter-agency conflicts may be avoided.
* Finally, the cases suggest that legislative changes to the federal screening
process requirements may already be helping to reduce the potential for
conflicts with the local reuse plans. But perhaps additional amendments to
the BRAC Legislation should be sought that further restrict the DoD from
conveying certain valuable properties, such as golf courses, to other federal
uses. This restriction would allow both the DoD and the local communities to
financially benefit from the military base closure.
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Chapter Five:
Conclusion
In the preceding chapters, I have illustrated the various problems
exhibited in the multi-jurisdictional economic planning processes at Fort Ord and
Fort Devens. The reason for this study was not only to explore the different
aspects of the base closure process that affect the economic development
planning process, but to also estimate the prospects for fiscal recovery in the
lower income communities surrounding closing military bases. My findings
suggest that, in the Fort Ord case, the perceived needs of the economically
impacted host communities were not well served by the local economic planning
and development processes. As a result, it appears as though these
communities are potentially facing fiscal distress.
Specifically, I found that the minority interest communities surrounding the
bases -- Marina and Seaside -- had grown to support the needs of their military
neighbors. From housing, to entertainment, to durable defense related goods,
these communities developed service-oriented economies that catered primarily
to the needs of the military, the military personnel and their families. Not
surprisingly, the skill base and incomes of the workforce in these communities
were lower than the rest of the region. In both cases, these communities
maintained rights to portions of military base property that fell within their
jurisdictional borders. Seemingly, the communities saw their respective land use
rights to the former base property as a form of restitution for their local economic
losses in the face of the closure. But when the military moved out, the host
communities are left with large parcels of developable property and no mean
with which to redevelop it.
Moreover, the Fort Ord case suggests that the prospects for local
economic development were defined mainly by a constituency of wealthy,
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professionally oriented communities in the Monterey Peninsula region.
According to city official from Marina and Seaside, their communities were forced
to relinquish their jurisdictional rights to those who had access to the political and
financial capital necessary to mobilize redevelopment of the base property. For
instance, the cases demonstrate how the host communities needed primarily to
replace the revenues lost by the military. This meant replacing the military
industry with new industries or users that could best utilize the local skill base
and the service infrastructure that presently exist in these communities. In the
Fort Ord case, the tourism-based strategy chosen by the minority interest
communities seemingly provided the most jobs and local revenue with the least
amount of job re-training and short term capital expenditures.
According to Seaside and Marina officials, the regional university-based
strategy reflected the needs, interests and objectives of the regional majority, but
did not promise to provide municipal revenues and jobs to their lower-income
communities, at least in the near term. Specifically, the case illustrates that the
university is expected to support a population of only 1,000-2,000 students in the
first 3-5 years. This small student population will not replace the level of market
demand for local goods and services, and housing in the surrounding
communities that the military once supported. Moreover, the case suggests that
it may take as long as 10-20 years for university-related research efforts to reach
a level of marketability. Thus, it appears as though the spin-off potential, touted
by the Task Force as the key long term economic generator in the university-
based strategy, will not be realized in the near term. Given this, Marina and
Seaside are concerned that they will not be able to meet their fiscal budgets in
the near term, without the additional revenues afforded by the tourism industry.
The Fort Ord case suggests that inter-jurisdictional planning conflicts were
attributable primarily to a mis-match of local versus regional economic interests
and objectives. If the communities' needs can not be reconciled with the
interests and objectives of the regional majority, the Fort Ord case demonstrates
that minority interest communities were denied this critical access to regional,
state or federal resources. As such it appears as though the lower-income
communities of Marina and Seaside will continue to face fiscal losses. Thus, in
the spirit of democratic governance, it appears that the perceived needs of the
low-income communities may not have been met in the regional reuse process.
However, it is difficult to infer from this case what would happen if a
closing base was located in a region of entirely lower-income communities? It is
uncertain how this situation would have affected the outcomes at either base --
would the jurisdictional interests and objectives between the lower-income
communities still have been conflicting? Moreover, it is also unclear in the case
of Fort Ord whether or not the same level of political representation, from Task
Force members such as Leon Panetta and State Senator Henry Mello, would be
evident if the entire Monterey Region was of a lower socioeconomic structure. It
is easy to imagine how the constituents of lower-income communities may not
attract the kind of political influence like that exhibited at Fort Ord. It is difficult to
project what may have happened in the Fort Ord case, without the state and
even federal representation on the Task Force.
In the Fort Devens case, on the other hand, it appears as though the
needs of the only lower-income community, Ayer, were successfully balanced
with the interests and objectives of the other, more affluent communities
surrounding the base. The Devens case suggests that the Land Bank was able
to balance the needs, interests and objectives of all of the surrounding
communities primarily by assuming responsibility for the initial redevelopment
costs. This significantly reduced the potential for conflict between the local
communities over allocation of redevelopment resources. Thus it appears as
though the Land Bank was able to use their political and financial influences to
balance the needs and interests of all of the surrounding communities,
regardless of their socioeconomic circumstances.
But again, there is no evidence in the Devens case to suggest that the
relative socioeconomic structure of the immediate Devens region significantly
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influenced the Land Bank's decision to oversee the redevelopment of the base;
there is no evidence to suggest that the Land Bank would not have played the
same role if the surrounding communities were all of a lower socioeconomic
structure. Moreover, although the case does suggest that Governor Weld may
stand to bolster political support in the North Central region if the Devens
redevelopment is successful, the case does not suggest that this was the
primary motivation behind the states involvement.
In conclusion, from the cases presented in this study, it is difficult to draw
conclusions about the prospects for economic development in low-income
communities as a result of a base closure. Context-specific factors in each case,
make it difficult to infer more general conclusions from the outcomes of each
case.
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Appendix A
The Federal Military Base Reuse and Disposal Process
Introduction
Since the early 1960's hundreds of military bases have been closed or realigned
in response to Congressional pressures to reduce US military spending. In
1988, more than a decade after the last closure round, the Pentagon announced
the closure of 86 bases and the realignment of 59 others. In 1991, the Pentagon
announced the closure of 36 and the realignment of 43 more bases. A third
round in 1993 close and realign 35 and 27 bases, respectively (Wilcox:
November, 1992). In 1995, the Pentagon is expected to announce the closure of
over 300 additional military installation in the US.
The recent closures are a result of both the end of the Cold War and political
pressures to reduce the federal deficit. Since 1987, national defense spending
has fallen 20 percent. The Pentagon anticipated that the closures would not only
reduce military maintenance and operations spending but also provide a return
on the military's investment in real property and improvements. However, what
the federal government did not anticipate was the high cost of base closure and
transfer. Between the cost of environmental restoration, federal planning
assistance to the local reuse entities, and the lower than expected market values
of the properties, these potential cost savings were significantly reduced (Hill and
Raffel, 1993).
The BRAC Process
Planning for the reuse of disposed military property is an extremely complex
process that requires the coordination of a variety of federal government
agencies, local institutions and the private sector. Prior to the 1988 closure
round, over 100 military bases were closed or realigned in the United States
under a disposal process that was deemed inefficient and mired with what many
considered to be unnecessary bureaucracy and red tape. In response,
Congress passed the Base Closure and Realignment Act (or BRAC). The BRAC
Act was created to provide a systematic process by which the federal
government, specifically the General Services Agency (GSA) and the
Department of Defense (DoD), could transfer ownership of the existing military
property in an equitable, and preferably profitable fashion to the private and local
public sectors.
The reuse process essentially begins when a military base is placed on the list
as prepared by an independent commission established under the Base Closure
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and Realignment Act of 1988. The independent BRAC Commission was created
as a non-partisan entity to set closure criteria and recommend bases for closure.
Selection criteria is based on military property value, potential federal investment
returns and economic and environmental impacts (Hertz, 1991). Once prepared,
this BRAC list is reviewed by Congress and the President, and is accepted or
rejected in its entirety.
The Federal Process
Once the BRAC list is made public, communities surrounding closing bases
either begin to develop strategies for redevelopment or fight vehemently to
remove bases from the list -- the latter of the two alternatives is seldom ever
successful. Those communities who choose not to challenge the closure
recommendation typically begin the reuse process immediately. Generally,
anywhere from 2-4 years may pass before on-site military units completely
evacuate the bases; and it can take another 2-10 years before the community
begins to benefit from the physical and economic redevelopment of the base.
Thus, the federal government becomes a long term player in the local base
redevelopment process. As such it is important that all local reuse entities
become familiar with the federal processes and procedures.
The passage of the Defense Authorization Act of 1994 promulgated a number of
amendments to the federal base disposal and reuse process. The purpose of
these amendments, often referred to as the Pryor Amendments, were to help
local communities achieve rapid economic recovery more quickly and more
effectively by providing the Department of Defense new authority to give priority
to early reuse of the base's property (Department of Defense, "Revitalizing Base
Closure Communities and Community Assistance: 1994, pp. 1-6). The
provisions of the Pryor Amendments apply for all bases closed after the 1994
Defense Authorization Act was passed, however, the provision may be applied
retroactively to those bases closed in the 1988, 1991 and 1993 closure rounds
(ibid.). Accordingly, it is important to describe the federal closure procedures
before and after the Pryor Amendment changes to provide background to the
federal base closure processes applicable in the case studies presented in this
thesis.
1 The criteria for selection of bases recommended for closure is the subject of much debate. For
instance, although original BRAC legislation requires that the BRAC Commission consider the
economic impacts resulting from an individual closure, it is not common practice (Courter, 1994).
In fact, recent allegations suggest that the BRAC Commission has used its power for to exercise
political favoritism. They are accused of selecting, or not selecting military installations in certain
Congressional districts throughout the Country (60 Minutes, 1994). Accordingly, the federal
government continues to fine-tune the BRAC legislation through a series of comprehensive, well-
lobbied Congressional Amendments.
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The following is a brief summary of the base closure and disposition process as
stated in the Base Closure and Realignment Act (as amended). The relevant
provisions of the Pryor Amendments are introduced as necessary to support the
federal process pursued at both the Fort Ord and Fort Devens case study sites.
Additional information regarding the Pryor Amendments to the 1994 Defense
Authorization Act are provided below.
Federal base closure and disposal process and procedures are as follows:
* Once the base is announced for closure, other military agencies are given
first chance to claim the base property. The requests are reviewed by
Secretary of Defense for suitability and need determinations. Typically, only
those requests that result in overall DoD cost savings are considered.
" The balance of the property is advertised in the Federal Register and is
screened for use by other federal agencies. Typically, the property is
conveyed from the DoD to the new federal user at fair market value, however,
this provision may be waived. The initial screening period requires a 30-60
day clearance period, but typically many federal agencies can request DoD
surplus land at any time during the disposal process.
" Prior to the passing of the Defense Authorization Act of 1994, the provisions
of the Stewart B. McKinney Act required the DoD to consider requests for
property by organizations assisting the homeless. This process occurred
simultaneous to the federal processes above. Under this process,
organizations assisting the homeless were given the opportunity to acquire
former military property to provide housing and services to the homeless.
Before the property was made available to the homeless providers, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reviewed the base
property to determine which sites were appropriate for use to assist the
homeless and which were not. The suitable sites were then advertised in the
Federal Register. The providers were then required to submit an application
to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for suitability
determination. HHS would award property to those applicant that could prove
need for the services, a plan for housing and service provision, and some
form of program funding. Once approved, the property would be leased to
the provider through a lease with HHS.
" Any land left unclaimed by federal or McKinney Act users is determined
'surplus federal property' and is available for conveyance to the state/local
governments and/or the private sector for redevelopment. Property transfers
are offered through either Public Benefit Conveyance, Economic
Development Conveyance or Negotiated Sales. If a local public entity
requested land for a truly public purpose, such as a park or a government
building, the land would be transferred to that entity at no charge (provided
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the entity did not sell the property later for profit). Negotiated sale transfers
involved negotiations between the federal and local governments and were
used for properties transferred for non-public purposes. Under the provisions
of the Pryor Amendments land may also be conveyed for the purpose of
stimulating local economic development. (See description of the Pryor
Amendments below for further description of the Economic Development
Conveyance.)
* The local and state governments are required to create an official reuse
planning group to oversee the redevelopment of the base. Typically, this
group is recognized by the Office of Economic Adjustment as the entity to
receive federal planning grants. The Reuse Group is tasked with negotiating
all local public interests and producing a base reuse planning document (the
Reuse Plan). The Reuse Plan is the basis for the DoD's environmental
impact analysis procedures.
* The disposal agency (Army, Navy, etc.) is required to prepare an EIS
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). The EIS
provides a description of the affected environment, as well as a brief
assessments of the impacts of the military disposal actions and the
anticipated reuse plans. It considers how the disposal and reuse will affect
air quality, water quality, traffic, noise, demographics, the economy and the
environment. It addresses issues regarding the quality and potential reuses
of the existing land and the factors likely to impede DoD's disposal process.
Typically, the disposal agency prepares a series of 'baseline' studies prior to
the preparation of the EIS. These studies provide detailed accounts of
existing environmental condition in and around the base property prior to
base closure. Typically baseline studies include land use, air quality, soils,
flora and fauna and other physical attributes baseline studies.
. Once the Reuse plan and the EIS have been prepared, and disposal agency
issues the Record of Decision (ROD). The ROD is significant because it
allows the federal government to begin transferring land to the state, local
and/or private sectors for redevelopment. It defines the federal governments
plan for property disposition. This document has important legal implications
for the DoD's environmental restoration compliance. For instance, before the
DoD can transfer any property, the environmental impact resulting from its
proposed reuse must be determined -- this is done through the EIS. The
property is restored to a level compatible with this anticipated reuse. If the
local reuse authority requests property for a use not previously anticipated in
the disposal agency's EIS, a new EIS must be prepared before the property
can be legally transferred. This is why it is so important that the EIS consider
the local reuse plans.
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* Finally, the disposal agency then identifies the possible environmental
contaminants of the site(s) and prepares a mitigation strategy; this process
can be referred to as the cleanup and remediation procedure.
Superfund Site Requirements
In the case of military bases that have been designated as Superfund sites
placed on the National Priority Lists (NPL sites), the disposal process is further
complicated by laws created under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Superfund
Amendments and Re-authorization Act (SARA) of 1986 that regulate the cleanup
of hazardous waste. If the base was not declared a Superfund Site -- the level of
contamination was not considered to be a national priority -- than the level of
contamination and remediation necessary to reduce contamination levels to
acceptable standards would determine the properties availability for transfer.
In accordance with these Acts, the federal and state agencies involved with the
environmental process are required to negotiate and Interagency Agreement
(IAG) that specifically addresses the evaluation and treatment or the hazardous
waste sites. In addition, the EPA is required to continued monitoring sites that
have been identified as containing hazardous waste in the EIS. The specified
Hazardous waste sites are broken up into parcels referred to as "operable units"
that will be handled individually by the EPA and cleaned up in phases. The
'phases' are determined by the nature of the cleanup and the value of the land;
land with the highest value to the community or to the federal government will
receive priority cleanup status. Transfer of ownership can take place once the
actual mechanism for cleanup are in place (i.e., the ground water pumps are
installed) and the EPA has issued it own Record of Decision (ROD/EPA).
Parcels that have not been identified as "operable units" may be transferred from
the federal government per the original ROD described above.2
The Players
The Federal Players: The federal base reuse process involves numerous
agencies and organizations from the federal level to the state and local levels.
At the federal level, the DoD (and the individual military service branches),
Government Services Agency (GSA), Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA), the
Department of Health and Human Services, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are considered the
primary players. In addition, however, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department
of Education, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Interior, and the
2 Per the conversation with John Chestnut - Project Manager/Superfund site at Fort Ord, Region 9 EPA
office; February 29, 1994.
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Department of Justice also play significant roles in both the disposal and
redevelopment of closed military property.
Local Players: The federal process uses the term local to define any non-federal
agency involved in the reuse or property transfer actions. At the State and local
levels, a variety of state and local government entities, as well as community
organizations, special interest groups and the private sector are often involved in
the process.
President Clinton's "five point plan"
In an attempt to speed economic recovery in communities impacted by the
closure of military facilities, the Clinton Administration announced its $5 billion,
"five-point plan" for revising the federal base disposal and closure processes.
"Rapid redevelopment and creation of new jobs in base closure communities are
the goals of the new initiative" (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1993). By
cutting the red tape of the existing federal property transfer process and
improving communications between the federal and local entities, the President's
Plan was aimed at facilitating community reinvestment. Generally, the Plan was
outlined in five parts:
1. Jobs-centered property disposal
2. Fast-track cleanup processes
3. The provision of Base Transition Coordinators
4. Easy access to federal transition and redevelopment assistance
5. Larger economic development planning grants to closure communities.
The Pryor Amendment
Proposed by Senator David Pryor, the Pryor Amendments reflected many of the
new policy directives outlined in President Clinton's five-part program. In April of
1994, a set of interim rules were released for public review and comment. A
summary of the major elements of the interim rule follow:
* Real Property Screening: Revises the federal screening process prescribed
in the General Services Administration (GSA) regulations to allow for a faster
screening process.
. Local Redevelopment Plans: Requires early formation of a local
redevelopment authority and development of the local Reuse Plans.
" Jobs-Centered Property Disposal: Requires the DoD to identify properties
believed to have a ready market and begin the appraisal process as soon as
possible.
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" Economic Development Conveyances and Profit Sharing: The proposed
Pryor Amendments call for the provision of Economic Development
Conveyance of market-driven parcels in an effort to accelerate job creation in
closure regions. Under this provision, redevelopment authorities can apply
for control of the market-driven parcels at no initial cost with a "recoupment"
provision that will permit the DoD to share in any future net profits should the
base be later leased or sold, for a period not to exceed 15 years.
" Leasing of Real Property: Permits leasing of base property as less than fair
market value or for no cost at all to provide new incentives for redevelopment
authorities and businesses to spur job creation and speed economic
redevelopment.
" Personal Property: Allows for the transfer of personal property (equipment,
furniture, etc.) with real property.
* Minimum Level of Maintenance and Repair to Support Non-military Purposes:
Provides procedures to protect the condition of the base facilities while the
military mission is drawing down and the redevelopment plan is being
assembled.
The McKinney Act
Background: The Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 was
legislated during the Reagan Administration to help meet the needs of the
nation's homeless. A number of programs were authorized through the
McKinney Act including the emergency shelter programs, HUD-owned property
disposition programs, housing for persons with AIDS and the Title V
amendments for Surplus Federal Property for Use to Assist the Homeless.
Under the Title V amendments, excess federal properties, including military
installations, were made available to states, local governments and non-profit
organizations for use to assist the homeless. The general process was as
follows: Once the federal property was declared surplused by its governing
agency, the Department of Housing and Urban Development determined
suitability of the site for use to assist the homeless. Property determinations and
availability were then listed in the federal register. Once listed, homeless
providers were given the opportunity to submit a proposal for use to Department
of Health and Human Services -- the federal agency given the authority to
approve or disapprove the proposed McKinney Act uses. Once approved, the
homeless providers were awarded use of the property, typically through a
license, permit or lease agreement with HHS. HHS remained in control of the
property until an alternative transfer agreement, such as a sale, could be made.
On October 25, 1994, the President signed the Base Closure Community
Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-421).
The act exempts base closure property from the McKinney Act and creates a
new community-based process wherein homeless assistance providers will work
directly with local redevelopment authorities regarding property acquisitions
(Department of Defense, A New Community-Based Approach to Assisting the
Homeless at Military Base Closure Sites: November, 1994, pg. 1). The new law
removes the priority status of the requests for property to assist the homeless.
Instead, property acquisitions to assist the homeless are considered after the
federal screening process is complete; unlike the provisions of the McKinney Act,
providers now must wait until the federal base property is surplused by the DoD.
Thus, homeless providers are now required to negotiate potential land use
sitings with the local reuse authority.
Once this process is complete the local reuse authority must submit a plan to the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that may include a
homeless use. HUD will evaluate the proposal based on the size and nature of
the proposed use to assist the homeless, and its economic impact to the
surrounding communities and the local reuse (ibid, pp. 5-6). Once the
application is approved by HUD, the DoD may transfer property for use to assist
homeless needs in accordance with HUD's approved plan.
According to the Act, the new process shall apply to all base closure property
approved for closure subsequent to the October, 1994 enactment date. For
those installations already approved for closure, the local reuse authority may
submit a request to the Department of Defense for consideration under the new
process (ibid, pg. 2).
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